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NO GUTS, NO GLORY?
This study investigates to what extent extreme forms of confidence, from either a
management or an analyst’s perspective, may impact financial or operating performance. 
We construct a multidimensional degree of company confidence measure from a wide
range of corporate decisions. We empirically test this measure for large US companies
from 1980-2008 and find significantly different company and performance characteristics
between confidence extremes. Diffident firms tend to be smaller, more distressed, less
conservatively financed and, except for the new millennium, yield a lower return on
invested capital with higher variability. When adjusting stock returns for risk, the
performance differences prior to moving to extreme confidence become even more
pronounced. 
Analysts’ earnings forecasts may also be distorted by extreme confidence or overly
relying on an anchor and insufficient adjustments. Innate bias, anchoring to prior year
earnings, risk attitude and responses to recent news are conditional on the level of
analysis. Innate optimism prevails on the industry and analyst level. We find no support
for anchoring by analysts with a long track record or across industries, which suggests a
bottom-up approach. Long-term risk is considered as upside, but short-term risk is seen as
downside. There is also a tendency to underreact to news, whether good or bad. If we
could better predict individual analyst’s forecasts, we may better anticipate market
reactions to earnings news. Our animal spirits will prevent this from happening and
should be kept alive, as lack thereof seems the main culprit to performance. No guts, no
glory.
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Scope 
Following the financial meltdown in 2008, the “homo economicus” has suffered 
another blow, from which we have yet to fully recover. Every opportunity seemed a free 
call option with only upside potential, thus translating into risk seeking behavior and moral 
hazard. All kinds of economic actors, e.g. consumers, investors, managers, financial 
intermediaries and government bodies, fell prey to these human traits. Countervailing 
power was heavily eroded, but instead economic reality caught up with the fads. This has 
happened before in economic history, which raises the question on the persistence of the 
impact of human behavior on economic decisions.  
There is ample anecdotal evidence on behavioral distortions, but we will narrow our 
focus to three types of economic actors e.g. managers, investors and financial 
intermediaries. When assuming that the latter two fully rely on their own judgment rather 
others, the moves of company management and its competitors should be their prime 
concern. Their competitive advantage lies in understanding and anticipating such events 
and whether or not one should read something in these between the lines.  
For instance, a change in segment reporting seems a frivolous event with no major 
market impact. However, the financial community may consider such changes, which 
rendered the prior years’ sales and profit breakdowns useless, rather suspicious than a way 
of improving transparency1. It could even trigger price reactions, albeit not necessarily 
irrational if the new structure fuels second thoughts on the company’s cash flow 
generation. In addition, diversifying acquisitions could raise the eyebrows, as investors are 
better able to accomplish diversification themselves. Such moves could stem from 
management’s overconfidence or from catering to investors’ needs who themselves are 
irrational. It raises the question if and to what extent interaction between management and 
investor sentiment may affect decisions and stock price behavior. 
In addition to the primary goal of providing an opinion on the company’s financial 
health and its stock valuation based on (past) company events, analysts and investors2 may 
also be interested in so-called soft attributes, such as management characteristics. This can 
translate into hefty stock price reactions when board changes are announced. One could 
earmark management as confident, aggressive or overconfident respectively as 
conservative3 or diffident by recalling a list of management’s wise or stupid actions from 
                                                 
1 Especially if management feels that their shares undervalued, they can defend such changes in segment 
reporting by pointing at the similarity of this new structure versus (higher valued) peers 
2 This excludes the so-called “quants” who tend to be focused on realized rather than expected numbers as to wipe 
out any bias. 
3 These wordings are also used by Malmendier and Tate (2008) in their press-based approach of overconfidence 
 2 
 
the past. From this list, one could implicitly infer a probability of similar actions or 
positive momentum or the risk of mean-reversion. In particular, extreme events tend to 
come up easily to one’s mind, so one has to be careful to properly weigh these. 
Perfect expectations aside, investors and analysts face the challenge of how to 
respond to news which does not comply with their current view, especially when the news 
is negative. The easiest response is to give management the benefit of the doubt and hope 
for the best. This wishful thinking implies underreaction to news. However, when results 
keep disappointing, patience is put up to the test. Frustration accrues, which can result in 
an overreaction to the next disappointment, which could just happen to mark the tipping 
point. One has to choose between biting the dust and revising an opinion early and the risk 
of losing credibility or money by hanging on too long on old ideas.  
The careful reader will have detected various biases and heuristics enclosed in these 
stories. If systematic rather than random, such distortions can spill over to real and 
financial markets and drift us away from an optimal resource allocation. In this 
dissertation, we explore how these non-rational factors, which Keynes (1936) qualified as 
“animal spirits”, can not only be detected, but also how these may impact performance. 
We consider performance from a broad perspective, which can refer to both financial and 
operating performance. We capture the former by return measures for (specific) capital 
providers, while operating performance refers to how well someone is doing his job. The 
latter is used for equity analysts and measured by forecast accuracy. In particular, the wide 
coverage on overconfidence and the neglect of both diffidence and the use of heuristics in 
economic decision making caught our eyes.  
More specifically, we seek to develop a measure for managerial confidence that, 
unlike current literature, captures both the upper and the lower confidence extremes. As 
diffidence hardly attracts any research attention, one could get the impression that this 
phenomenon has no major economic impact, which is tested in this dissertation. 
Conversely, overconfidence has been widely investigated, including its impact on 
corporate decisions. However, its impact on financial performance is hardly covered, 
which we seek to address in this dissertation. Our findings indicate that particularly 
extremely low rather than high levels of confidence hurt financial performance, including 
risk adjusted stock returns, In addition, we also put more color on our confidence measure 
by exploring whether or not there are specific company, industry or time characteristics.  
By nature, the measurement of a human bias is subjective, but we seek to mitigate 
this by not only earmarking one particular corporate decision as a sign of confidence, but 
taking various corporate decisions into account instead. Another advantage of this 
multidimensional approach is that mitigating or spill-over effects also become pronounced 
in the overall score. As more information is required, this comprehensive approach comes 
at the cost of sample observations. The overall low scores in our sample of large US firms 
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suggest that mitigating factors are at work. In the last chapter, we will also discuss 
countervailing power mechanisms.  
In addition to contributing to the string of research on managerial (over)confidence 
bias, we also dig into an area which seems hardly touched in economic literature, such as 
the use of heuristics by equity analysts. Analyst (over)optimism, strategic bias and over- or 
underreaction to news has been widely documented, but these effects could be (partly) 
captured by an underlying driver, such as anchoring and adjustment. The jury is not out 
whether or not this specific rule-of-thumb can cause extreme confidence as well4, but this 
is not relevant for our empirical analysis of analyst forecast errors. A distinctive feature f 
our approach is that we disentangle anchoring from (insufficient) adjustment. Next to our 
contribution to the hardly covered use of heuristics in analyst forecasts, our large sample 
enables us to perform analyses on lower or non-aggregate levels, such as the analyst, firm 
or industry. Furthermore, we also allow for strategic bias or higher estimates for firms with 
lower transparency i.e. strategic bias and asymmetric attitudes to short and long-term risk.     
Overall, we find that what we qualify as innate optimism or optimism that is not 
reflected in the chosen anchor5 itself is persistent, except on the firm level. Furthermore, 
our results point to anchoring, except when analyst forecast errors are considered from an 
industry perspective or when the anchor is a negative number. Also, we find an overall 
tendency for less pessimism for small firms, which corroborates with strategic bias. With 
regard to the adjustment process, we mostly find underreaction to recent news with 
asymmetric responses to good and bad news. We also find this asymmetry in long and 
short-term risk measures. While long-term risk is considered upside potential, short-term 
risk is seen as downside. These results imply that analyst forecasts are affected by both 
human biases and the use of heuristics, which could result from the fact that they need to 
satisfy the needs of various internal and external clients.  
1.2 Research Structure 
This dissertation is comprised of several parts, as summarized in figure 1.2.1. First, 
we provide a theoretical background on the decision making process and rationality or the 
lack thereof. Subsequently, we discuss extreme forms of management confidence and how 
this may impact financial performance. Lastly, we investigate the use of heuristics in 
analyst forecasts. We explore to what extent anchoring and adjustment may impact analyst 
forecast errors or accuracy. Some argue that the inefficient adjustment to information or 
too high emphasis on one’s anchor is a sign of overconfidence. Alternatively, it is intuitive 
to think that the refuge to such rules shows a lack of confidence in one’s own judgment. As 
earlier discussed above, there is no consensus on how to interpret the use of this specific 
                                                 
4 We refer to Block and Harper (1991) for a detailed discussion on anchoring and overconfidence in estimates. 
5 For instance, one could chose peak earnings as an anchor for an earnings forecast 
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heuristic. In summary, we explore to what extent extreme forms of confidence, from either 
a management or an analyst’s perspective, may impact financial or operating performance.  
In chapter two, we discuss theoretical concepts and empirical findings on 
psychological biases and the use of heuristics in decision making. Although there is 
extensive research in this field, we keep our focus on the most commonly cited human 
errors in behavioral finance.  
In chapter three, we proceed with an overview of theory and empirical research on 
irrationality in finance. We discuss optimal behavior for managers, investors and financial 
intermediaries e.g. maximization of net present value respectively the risk-return tradeoff 
and how biases and the use of heuristics can cause deviations from this optimum. In 
addition to the common distinction between irrational investors and irrational managers, 
we also distinguish financial intermediaries as a separate category. In the next chapters, we 
will further dig into behavioral distortions, or specifically extreme confidence and 
anchoring and adjustment.  
In chapter four, we narrow our scope to the overconfidence bias and we construct a 
degree of confidence variable. Although widely documented, research on overconfidence 
is mainly aimed at unfolding its impact on corporate decisions or investment and 
acquisitions in particular. We take a reverse approach in which the Rotterdam adage of 
“actions speak louder than words” is imperative. We take those decisions as a starting 
point and infer a degree of confidence from a wide array of investment, financing and 
operational actions. Conversely, when narrowing the scope to only one course of action for 
earmarking companies as overconfident, mitigating and leveraging effects to other 
decisions are ignored. In addition to including various dimensions, we define confidence as 
a (five-point) scaled rather than a binary variable. Instead of only looking at extreme high 
levels of confidence or overconfidence, it also enables us to measure the impact of extreme 
low confidence.  
Chapters five to seven comprise our empirical analysis. In chapter five, we 
empirically explore the characteristics of extreme confidence companies, including time 
and industry characteristics. In addition, we extend our analysis of company confidence to 
financial performance, which is defined as the return to the capital providers. Regardless of 
the direction of the confidence bias, moving to extreme situations of confidence suggest 
suboptimal decisions and hence lower performance.  
In chapter six, we proceed with performance characteristics and explore if moving 
to extreme confidence levels translates into abnormal stock returns for varying time 
horizons. We explore if the market already anticipates such moves or only reacts to such 
moves. We also include a measure of investor confidence to allow for spill-over effects of 
managerial and investor confidence.  
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In chapter seven, we move from biases to the use of heuristics. Specifically, we 
look at the use of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic and its impact on analyst 
performance or forecast errors. We explore if analysts use prior year earnings as an anchor 
for current year’s forecasts, controlling for innate bias, risk appetite and insufficient 
adjustment to past news events. In addition to analyzing analyst forecast accuracy on an 
aggregate basis by performing pooled panel regressions, we redo the analysis on lower 
levels e.g. the analyst, firm and on the industry level. 
Lastly, we conclude with a brief summary and discussion how to interpret our 
findings in today’s and tomorrow’s environment. 
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2 Decision making under uncertainty 
Abstract 
In this chapter, we discuss various stages in the decision making process and what 
violations of rationality may occur. We narrow our scope to widely documented biases and 
heuristics in financial decisions and leave the underlying motivational factors behind these 
distortions to psychologists. Given the high amount of decisions that we face these days, 
we may easily forget that this is a continuing and complex process. It consists of several 
stages, which offer also room for retrospection before moving forward. Even when a 
decision is made, the process continues as the generated feedback ploughs back into our 
beliefs and preferences i.e. we learn from our experiences. As an alternative to expected 
utility theory, we discuss Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory (1979), which gives 
room to non-rational factors in our decisions. This theory can be regarded as one of the 
main drivers behind the paradigm shift away from efficient markets.  
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2.1 Introduction 
“Like Prometheus, they defied the gods and probed the darkness in search of the light that 
converted the future from an enemy into an opportunity. The transformation….has 
channeled the human passion from games and wagering into economic growth, improved 
quality of life, and technological progress.” 
 
From the introduction of “Against the Gods” by Peter Bernstein (1996) 
 
As Bernstein (1996) notes, emerging ideas on risk, its measurement and its 
consequences fuelled a paradigm shift away from posing our future at the mercy of divine 
powers. The genie is left out of the bottle, but it also increases complexity by adding a 
wealth of decisions covering the future instead of only the (near) present. This decision 
power does not only increase our responsibility, but also creates new risks, such as getting 
disconnected with the present or becoming irrational. A big shock can enforce a reality 
check, but history suggests that, sooner or later, such learning effects fade out as irrational 
behavior is very persistent. 
The big challenge in investigating irrational behavior is not only how to define and 
measure it, but also how to unfold its impact on decision making and performance, 
including interaction effects. Before we move to the measurement and impact of non-
rational factors, we provide an overview of the decision making process and possible 
distortions due to human errors.  
2.2 Stages in decision making 
Figure 2.3.1 at the end of this chapter summarizes the stages in decision making and 
how human errors may distort these. In this section, we will briefly describe rational 
decision making, as shown in the left-hand side of the figure. In the next section, we will 
discuss possible noise in this process, as indicated by the right-hand side of figure 2.3.1.  
Preceding any decision, we start with a set of ex ante preferences and beliefs. In the 
widely used definition of economics by Robbins (1932)6, the scarcity of means force us to 
set priorities before making decisions. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) make the 
concept of rational preferences more explicit by defining several requirements: 
completeness, transitivity, independence and continuity. In addition, time, risk and social 
preferences can be incorporated in their theoretical framework. With regard to beliefs, 
rationality requires that we consider all possible options of satisfying our needs given 
                                                 
6 Robbins (1932) defines economics as “the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between 
ends and scarce means that have alternative uses” 
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budgetary, legal, time and legal constraints. In addition, all relevant information, both 
public and private, is collected and properly processed to ensure consistency. 
The next step is to translate a set of ex ante beliefs and preferences into specific 
goals. The widely used expected utility theory advocates that we should aim at maximum 
final wealth. Deviations from this situation, which we denote as a challenge, provoke 
action in order to close this gap. For instance, one could seek to address certain constraints, 
or, which is easier, just redefine priorities.  
One could have different views on discrepancies between the target and current 
situation. In this respect, Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) distinguish between a broad and a 
narrow view respectively between an inside and outside view. If both a broad and outside 
perspective is adopted, the risk of cognitive errors is lowest. The former implies that 
challenges are not considered on a standalone basis, but seen as part of a bigger set of 
opportunities. The latter indicates that mere statistical probabilities rather than subjective 
probability estimates are used in the decision making process.  
Before making a final decision, additional data can be gathered to update beliefs 
and preferences, conditional on time and budgetary constraints. Absent any bias, views are 
updated according to Bayes’ rule, which is indeed a widely adopted assumption in 
economics.  
Finally, a decision is made, but the whole process does not end here. In addition, 
rational decision makers should properly process feedback for evaluating decisions, 
updating beliefs, preferences and taking corrective action if needed.  
Although our discussion suggests a very orderly and predictive process of distinct 
stages of decision making, those stages may comingle or even be skipped in reality, due to 
time or cognitive constraints in reality. As Keynes (1936) already remarked, sometimes, 
our “animal spirits” or “a spontaneous urge to action” just take over. Afterwards, we may 
seek to rationally justify such actions to comfort people that we were in control rather than 
acted because we just felt for it. 
2.3 Violation of rationality in decision making 
The stages in the decision making process as discussed in the prior section all 
involve human judgment and hence bear the risk of irrationality. When a decision maker 
acts in line with a certain decision or normative model, but uses biased input, he is 
qualified as biased. Alternatively, if a he properly forms preferences and beliefs, but uses a 
wrong decision model, he can be qualified as irrational. Even if both the input and decision 
follow the rules of rationality, irrationality may occur with regard to the processing of 
feedback. Field and experimental studies have indeed unfolded several inconsistencies 
resulting from cognitive errors and resource constraints. We will briefly discuss some 
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well-known biases and types of heuristics and subsequently relate these to the different 
stages in decision making as shown in the right-hand of figure 2.3.1.  
First of all, we note that our set of ex ante beliefs and preferences is not fixed, but a 
moving object instead. When we come of age and are able to make informed rather than 
instinctive or impulsive decisions, our beliefs and preferences7 change accordingly. For a 
child, less abstract needs prevail, such as quenching thirst or security, while more abstract 
needs like self-fulfillment gain in importance when we grow older. Regardless of how we 
learn i.e. by inductive or deductive reasoning, both ways entail a risk of human error. 
Our preferences may be distorted by inconsistencies related to timing, risk attitude 
or social pressure. DellaVigna (2009) highlights that self-control problems can cause a 
preference for a combination of a short-term gain and long-term pain to the alternative of a 
short-term pain and long-term gain. Conversely, there is also evidence of hyperbolic 
discounting or the use of higher discount rates for near future payoffs than for far future 
payoffs. With regard to risk, various experiments have shown that people do not have a 
linear risk attitude, but underweight merely probable outcomes vs. certain ones. Allais 
(1953) described this phenomenon as the certainty effect. Also, risk aversion does not 
prevail when people are faced with certain losses. Instead risk-seeking behavior or an all or 
nothing approach tends to be followed in such situations. Lastly, social pressure can cause 
people to drift away from their own preferences.  
With regard to the formation of our beliefs, cognitive constraints, such as bias or the 
use of heuristics, could have a distorting impact. Current literature8 provides a long list of 
biases, which can also interact. For instance, optimism, the illusion of control and the 
better-than-average-effect all fuel overconfidence. If things go right, self-attribution and 
confirmation bias can make us feel better than average and give us the illusion of control. 
Conversely, in adverse situations others are blamed or the event is ignored, the latter of 
which is referred to as cognitive dissonance. 
In order to deal with budget and time constraints, one could resort to the use of 
heuristics. In their pioneering work on decision making under uncertainty, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) distinguish three types of heuristics for estimating probabilities and 
outcomes. These comprise representativeness, availability and anchoring and adjustment, 
all of which can be related to cognitive biases9.  
                                                 
7 We define ex ante beliefs and preferences as the set of beliefs and preferences when a challenge arises and has 
to be tackled 
8 We refer to Larwood and Whittaker (1977) on self-serving bias in organizations and overly optimistic planning, 
Weinstein (1980) on overoptimism about future life events and the illusion of control, Svenson (1981) on our 
driving skill perceptions (better than average effect), Alicke (1985) on positive traits and the illusion of control, 
while negative traits are externalized. Shefrin (2007) provides an extensive overview 
9 None of these biases are attributable to penalties or to motivational effects like wishful thinking 
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The representativeness heuristic implies that probabilities are evaluated by the 
degree to which a certain event is representative of or resembles another event. This can 
translate into base rate neglect i.e. the gambler’s fallacy, sample size neglect i.e. the false 
belief that the full population characteristics are reflected in a small sample as well, a 
lingering belief in the law of small numbers i.e. failure to see a sequence of events as 
random, the inclusion of irrelevant information and misconceptions of regression and 
causality. The availability heuristic implies that the probabilities of events are estimated by 
the ease with which such observations come to one’s mind. Biases, such as familiarity, 
salience and imaginability10 , can inflate perceived probabilities of these events. Finally, 
the anchoring and adjustment heuristic refers to distortions caused by starting from an 
initial value and subsequently making adjustments to find the answer. As adjustments are 
insufficient, different starting points yield different estimates, which are biased towards the 
initial value. It results into miscalibration or too narrow confidence intervals. Furthermore, 
probabilities of simultaneous events are overestimated, while those of separate events are 
underestimated. All in all, these distortions in beliefs and preferences could induce persons 
to pursue other goals than maximization of final wealth.  
Examples of alternative goals comprise the maximization of the change in wealth, 
minimization of regret or the completion of an acceptable percentage of a certain objective. 
Simon (1956) came up with the term satisficing, a blend of satisfying and sufficient, to 
describe the latter phenomenon. When we narrow the scope to a manager, alternative goals 
could entail maximizing status and compensation, a preference for small short-term gains 
to large long-term gains, minimizing the risk of being replaced or catering to investor 
needs (social pressure).  
After defining goals, discrepancies between the current and target situation can be 
detected. As earlier discussed, Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) distinguish various 
perspectives from which such challenges can be viewed. The risk of bias is highest if a 
narrow and inside view is taken. The former implies that challenges are considered on a 
standalone basis with no interaction or covariance with other (future) opportunities. 
Closely related to this, challenges can be framed in a certain way, which implies that only 
selective elements instead of the whole environment are included. An inside view also 
reinvigorates the risk of bias, as challenges are seen only from the decision maker’s point 
of view. This can induce anchoring to current values or extrapolation of recent trends 
instead of the use of mere statistical or objective probability rates.  
Biases and the use of heuristics can also dampen learning effects or rational 
processing of feedback. Negative feedback can be ignored for false reasons, a phenomenon 
known as cognitive dissonance, or used to blame others. Alternatively, self-attribution 
                                                 
10 Kahneman and Tversky (1974) also mention effectiveness of a search set and illusory correlation 
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could result into taking credits for positive outcomes or hindsight bias can fuel the false 
belief that one already knew the outcome. It also implies that only feedback that confirms 
current beliefs is taken into account.  
As a response to widely documented violations of expected utility theory, 
alternative theories on decision making emerged. The pioneering work of Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), denoted prospect theory, addresses violations with regard to risk. It 
marked a turning point in economics by explicitly allowing for human errors when 
decisions are made under uncertainty. Unlike expected utility theory, prospect theory is not 
a normative theory, but only descriptive of how decisions are made under uncertainty. 
Based on various experiments, they argue that people use a relative rather than absolute 
definition of utility. This is also embedded in their theory, which defines utility as gains 
and losses versus a reference point rather than a final state of wealth. Closely related to 
this, Thaler (1980) detects the endowment effect, which implies that the value of a good 
given up is perceived higher than the value of acquiring that good. This also implies that 
one’s starting position or reference point matters when determining value. In line with 
experimental outcomes on risk attitude, prospect theory uses decision weights instead of 
mere statistical probabilities when calculating value. These weights are mostly lower, 
except in loss-making situations or very unlikely events, such as winning a lottery or 
losing your home in a fire. In the latter situations, overweighing tends to occur.  
As prospect theory aims to mirror the outcomes of revealed rather than rational 
preferences and beliefs, its value function has a different shape than that of expected utility 
curve. The main difference is that the former captures asymmetry in responses to positive 
and negative changes of wealth by its concavity in the gains area, convexity when losses 
occur and a steeper slope for losses than for gains. In this way, Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) show that utility is higher when gains are segregated and losses combined. If there 
is a combination of gains and losses, value is highest when small losses are combined with 
larger gains and when small gains are segregated from larger losses. 
In the next chapter, we will narrow our scope to three types of economic agents, i.e. 
investors, managers and financial intermediaries. We will discuss literature on optimal 
behavior and violations thereof. Furthermore, we will specify our view on efficient 
behavior for these agents, on which we will build our empirical analysis in chapters five to 
seven.  
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Figure 2.3.1 : Stages in Decision Making 
 
RATIONAL IRRATIONAL
VNM (1944)* Inconsistencies
- Completeness - Time
- Transitivity - Risk **
- Continuity - Social pressure, herding
- Independence
Constraints: Cognitive Constraints:
- Budget Heuristics Biases
- Time - Representativeness - Selection bias
- Legal - Availability - Base rate neglect
- Anchoring and Adjustment - Sample size neglect
- Law of small numbers
- Misconceptions of causality
- Familiarity
- Overconfidence
- Conjunction fallacy e.g.
Expected Utility: Other theories:
Max. final wealth Max. change in wealth**
Min. regret
Satisfice needs***
Perspective: Perspective:
- Outside - Inside 
- Broad - Narrow (framing)
Updating: Updating:
- Bayesian - Biased
Learning
Biases
- Self-attribution
- Illusion of control
Corrective - Confirmation bias
Action - Hindsight bias
- Cognitive dissonance
- Sunk cost fallacy
Evaluation or 
feedback
Prior Preferences
+
Prior Beliefs
Extra data
Decision
Updated beliefs and 
preferences
Goals
Challenge
Positive
Negative
 
Note: derived from Shefrin (2007); DellaVigna (2009) * VNM stands for Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), 
** See prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), *** Simon (1956) introduced this term, a blend of 
satisfy and suffice. Max. (Min.) stands for maximizing (minimizing). 
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3 Irrationality in finance 
Abstract 
In this chapter, we follow up on the most common distinction in behavioral finance 
which is made between irrational managers and irrational investors. In addition to 
managers and investors, we also include irrational intermediaries as a separate category. 
For each of these actors, we discuss theories on optimal behavior and how biases and the 
use of heuristics can distort the picture. We define net present value maximization as an 
optimal strategy for managers, requiring returns consistent with Carhart’s (1997) four 
factor model as efficient for investors and finally mean forecast error minimization as the 
main priority for intermediaries. Although most studies only assume one type of actor to 
be irrational if any, spill-over effects between different actors may occur as well. We 
therefore conclude this chapter with some thoughts on contagion and herding behavior.  
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3.1 Introduction 
“The market can stay irrational longer than you stay solvent.”  
 
Attributed quote to Keynes by Harrod (1951)  
 
In the attributed quote to Keynes, the possibility of rational agents not living up to 
their reputation is addressed. As a result of limits to arbitrage or other constraints11, such as 
regulation, the lack of perfect substitutes or noise trader risk, mispricing may persist. For 
instance, insider trading rules hamper the so-called strong form of market efficiency, 
which implies that even inside information is reflected in prevailing asset prices. These 
rules prohibit “buying or selling stock in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of 
trust and confidence while in possession of material, non-public information.” Also, the 
weak and semi-strong forms of market efficiency are subject to debate. DeLong et al. 
(1990) show that the long breath and persistence of noise traders can make it too risky for 
arbitrageurs to bet against the market for restoring the equilibrium.  
Alongside limits to arbitrage, the existence of market anomalies suggests that the 
EMH does not hold. These phenomena fuel a string of research on irrational market 
participants. Barberis et al. (1998) note that cross-sectional tests may be able to reject the 
efficient market hypothesis. However, results can be conflicting and ambiguous. We will 
discuss this in more detail in section 3.4 when we address irrational investors. On an 
aggregate or portfolio basis, inefficiencies are clearly harder to detect or not long-lived. 
Still, Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) find persistence of the so-called “Halloween indicator”, 
which implies that returns from May up to and including October are structurally lower 
than in the other six months of the year. Baker and Wurgler (2002) find support that 
rational managers exploit such inefficiencies by timing the market. Fama and French 
(1992, 1996) dismiss these results and argue that these patterns reflect differences in 
riskiness instead of market inefficiency.  
In addition to limits to arbitrage and the existence of market anomalies, the 
recognition that distortions in human behavior may be very persistent rather than faded out 
on an aggregate basis, fuelled a paradigm shift away from the prevailing “homo 
economicus”. Long before the development of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) by 
Fama (1970), economists acknowledged the role of subjective elements in decision 
making. Keynes (1936) introduces the concept of “animal spirits”, while March and Simon 
(1958) highlight human limitations and develop the bounded rationality concept. Still, the 
role of irrational human behavior in economics stayed marginal until Kahneman and 
                                                 
11 In this case, budgetary constraints are the restraining factor, but time constraints from regular performance 
evaluation can also render a bet against inefficient markets unattractive. 
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Tversky (1979) developed prospect theory. This descriptive theory challenges the widely 
accepted expected utility theory, which used to be imperative when analyzing decision 
making under uncertainty.  
Notwithstanding empirical backing, behavioral finance continues to be at a 
competitive disadvantage compared to modern finance, for which data availability, data 
cost and the hard to measure subjective elements are to blame. In addition, Bernstein 
(1996) adds that “it has been criticized for representing the Theory Police rather than a 
separate school of thought.” Also, within behavioral finance, the research coverage 
between irrational investors and irrational managers is highly imbalanced. Irrational 
managers get clearly less attention, while Heaton (2002) remarks that the impact of 
individual biases on corporate decisions is easier to detect than those on stock valuation. 
He points at the infrequent nature and noisy feedback of major corporate decisions, which 
makes the learning curve flatter. As a result, inefficiencies are not easily arbitraged12 away. 
In the next sections, we will discuss various types of economic agents who are prone to 
behavioral distortions i.e. managers, investors and their intermediaries or analysts. 
3.2 Irrational managers 
3.2.1 Introduction 
“It is the optimistic denial of uncontrollable uncertainty that accounts for managers’ views 
as themselves as prudent risk takers and for their rejection of gambling as a model of what 
they do.”       
 
Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) 
 
Risk attitude is a key ingredient when defining confidence levels, as it could 
translate into too low hurdle rates when evaluating the net present value of investments. 
Based on interviews with managers, March and Shapira (1987) find that managers 
consider risks as controllable or modifiable13, which makes their skills relevant. 
Furthermore, they tend to view risk from a downside perspective rather than upside 
potential. However, according to the standard rational model of economics, managers are 
just gamblers when making business decisions. Their role and added value is restricted to 
updating probability beliefs of the gambles in a consistent or Bayesian way and to 
maximizing expected utility. Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) summarize the ambivalence of 
managers, who are prone to the conflicting biases of “unjustified optimism and 
                                                 
12 Takeovers are a costly mechanism for addressing inefficiencies 
13 In the words of March and Shapira (1987), managers seek to change the odds 
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unreasonable risk aversion”. Management’s too optimistic beliefs or “bold forecasts” do 
not translate into their “timid” decisions, due to their risk preferences.  
Similar to stock markets, we can argue that on an aggregate level, such as the 
industry, all the parties’ information involved should be reflected. In addition to public 
information, this entails insider, including competitor sensitive, information. This can 
become a competitive edge that pays off in better financial performance when properly 
used. Cash-strapped companies can fall into a downward spiral of getting lower quality 
information, thus increasing the probability of bad decisions and underperformance 
compared to sector peers. Goel and Thakor (2008) argue that overconfident CEOs 
underinvest in acquiring project relevant information, thus increasing project selection 
errors and the quality of information used to judge the CEO. 
If some managers do not act rationally, we could assume that their actions are 
random, thus not impacting overall resource allocation when assuming efficient markets. 
Otherwise, arbitrage in the form of management replacement or corporate takeovers should 
occur. However, high transaction cost could render such actions very costly. Some 
researchers doubt the impact of management on the firm. March and Simon (1958) 
propose that organizations create functions which effectively limit discretion and diminish 
the importance of any one individual’s characteristics. Population ecologists like Hannan 
and Freeman (1977) argue that environmental and organizational constraints contain 
managerial impact. Conversely, the findings of Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) imply 
that top management teams and CEO dominance positively contribute to performance in 
certain industries. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) also find support for management impact on 
a wide range of investment, financial and organizational decisions.  
We adopt the view that managers indeed matter and so does the risk of irrationality 
on their behalf. This leaves capital providers as a cost-effective source for pushing 
managers to take rational decisions. In order to infer the optimal behavior for the firm, we 
need a normative theory on the optimal allocation of real assets14. This brings us to the 
theory of the firm as developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and its offspring.  
3.2.2 Optimal behavior for the firm 
The firm’s very existence is justified in its mission statement, which is usually 
concise. It transforms into a strategic blueprint when measurable objectives are defined of 
which progress can be monitored. In Anglo-Saxon countries, shareholder value 
maximization tends to be the adage. Alternatively, firm value maximization or other 
objective functions with a more explicit risk target could be imperative. The latter could 
prove very useful for entities performing a critical social function, such as financial 
                                                 
14 Strictly speaking, managers do not only allocate real assets, but also intangible assets such as human capital. In 
addition, they can also engage in financial asset allocation by taking financial stakes in other companies 
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institutions. Jensen and Meckling (1976) briefly describe some theories on firm behavior 
before discussing their own well-known approach, which we extend by including 
alternative theories. 
Coase (1937) is among the first to define a theory around the firm and argues that 
its optimal size is based on the transaction cost of organizing production compared to the 
market. Alternatively, one could adopt a portfolio approach, by defining the firm as a 
portfolio of real assets. We could argue that the current value of a standalone real asset is 
given by the investment outlay, but estimating its future or expected net present value is 
more complicated than that of tradable financial assets. In addition to a higher 
heterogeneity of real assets, pricing information is less readily available if at all or can be 
heavily distorted by illiquid markets15. This also makes it hard to calculate correlations 
between different assets. Furthermore, the benefits of diversification as highlighted by 
Markowitz (1952) are traded off against the potential loss of control, scale and expertise 
(including market share or competitive edge), all of which are hard to quantify. 
Furthermore, these portfolio optimization models implicitly assume that firms can lend or 
borrow resources indefinitely at a fixed rate, thus making capital structure irrelevant, 
which brings us to Modigliani and Miller (1958). When we construct our company 
confidence measure in chapter four, we will relax this assumption and explicitly take into 
account a firm’s financial slack when judging management’s action. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) focus on the hurdle rate or the cost of capital to 
determine the optimal investment level. They argue that if the objective is to maximize 
market value of the firm, the hurdle rate for each investment is equal in all cases and not 
dependent on its funding. This assumption of capital structure irrelevance is closely related 
to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) assumption that investors have an indefinite 
ability to tap funds at a fixed rate, which equals the risk-free interest in a CAPM-
framework. However, due to market imperfections, such as the tax benefits of debt, 
bankruptcy and transaction costs, capital structure indeed seems relevant for the firm’s 
investment decisions and valuation. 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) explicitly include monitoring cost in the firm’s 
decisions on investment, which result from the fact that production is a joint effort. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) criticize this view, as outsiders like suppliers and customers are not 
explicitly taken into account. In response, they develop a theory of the ownership structure 
for deriving an optimal scale or investment level for the firm. The authors emphasize that a 
firm is not an individual but “a legal fiction” where contractual relations align conflicting 
objectives of its stakeholders. In this framework, an insider’s risk attitude towards 
underdiversification16 and the net agency cost of outside equity17 and debt funding can be 
                                                 
15 There are few so-called pure asset players listed 
16 Underdiversification occurs when the manager puts his money in this firm rather than spread it over other ones 
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explicitly taken into account. These agency costs do not only comprise monitoring costs, 
but also include bonding costs and the residual loss or lower firm value from making 
suboptimal decisions.  
Myers (1977) follows up on Jensen and Meckling (1976) by making the cost of 
suboptimal investment explicit. He infers that the optimal debt level is inversely related to 
the share of growth opportunities, which can be qualified as a discretionary item. 
Conversely, current assets in place are non-discretionary and should be financed with debt. 
In the latter case, debt positively relates to profitability and operating leverage. When 
assuming shareholder instead of firm value maximization, risky debt reduces the current 
market value of a firm holding real options. These real options increase collateral value 
and imply a transfer of wealth from equity to bond holders, as the latter do not 
downwardly adjust their required rate of return. In order to prevent this, underinvestment 
to the optimal level may occur. As real options are riskier than their underlying value, 
Myers (1977) argues that instead of using a constant cost of capital, different discount rates 
should be used for cash flows from current assets and from future investment. For firms 
with valuable growth options, a CAPM based discount rate would overestimate the correct 
hurdle rate. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) take this a step further and investigate the financing 
options for firms with growth opportunities when capital structure is indeed relevant. Their 
model is based on information asymmetry between management and shareholders, which 
can result in firms refusing to issue stock and hence giving up value enhancing 
investments. In order to prevent such situations, managers may prefer to create financial 
slack or show a preference for internal funds. If external funds have to be attracted, debt is 
preferred to equity, also in line with pecking order theory. 
The above mentioned views on the firm’s optimal investment level or size18  
primarily focus on the required rate of return of the capital providers. However, the needs 
of other stakeholders have to be “satisficed” or sufficiently met as well. As we have seen 
in the US automotive industry, you cannot keep squeezing the margins of your suppliers at 
your own company’s benefit. It would prevent the latter from getting their activities funded 
and hence lead them into bankruptcy. Also, we see that public outcry or product boycotts 
can be harmful to firms that do not respect labor rights and hence cause their staff to be 
“nickel and dimed”19 . 
                                                                                                                           
17 Apart from their funding role, outside equity providers perform no other functions in the organization unlike 
inside equity holders 
18 Size is similar to cumulative investments, so these objectives are similar 
19 We borrowed this term from Barbara Ehrenreich (2001) 
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3.2.3 Biases and heuristics in management behavior 
Shefrin (2007) provides an extensive overview on biases and the use of heuristics in 
finance, which includes a string of examples how to detect and correct distortions in 
human behavior. In academic research on irrational managers, we see a high interest for 
the optimism and overconfidence biases. Despite measurement and validation problems 
common to any psychological trait, these biases may attract such a high attention as they 
trigger action rather than inaction.  
Roll (1986) was among the first to embed hubris in company decision making or 
specifically, in corporate takeover activity. As Hayward and Hambrick (1997) commented, 
Roll does neither specify the definition of hubris nor the ways to test it. Roll simply state 
that hubris causes bidders to overpay for their targets, as synergy benefits are too 
optimistic. Such valuation errors could stem from overestimated return expectations, 
underestimated risk respectively overestimated ability to control risk. As a result, the 
market value changes of the target (increase) respectively the acquirer (decrease) or the 
new combination (slight decrease).  
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) follow the dictionary when defining hubris as 
exaggerated pride or self-confidence. Still, this definition requires further specification in 
order to measure it. They test Roll’s hubris hypothesis by using several indicators for 
hubris. These comprise the acquirer’s recent performance, recent media praise, a CEO’s 
self-importance as measured by the relative cash and non-cash salary compared to the 
second highest executive and a composite factor constructed from these three indicators. 
All indicators seem positively related to acquisition premiums paid, especially when 
corporate governance is weak, thus supporting the hubris hypothesis. In addition, hubris 
seems negatively related with subsequent stock performance. 
Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) explore if there is a relation between 
overconfidence and investment, including acquisitions. They consider overconfidence 
from a returns rather than a risk perspective20. They define overconfidence as 
overestimating returns and use two overconfidence measures. One proxy is based on 
option exercise behavior or actually the lack of exercising deep in the money options and 
the other one is based on business press characterization. In their 2005 paper, they find that 
investment by overconfident CEOs is more sensitive to cash flow, especially in equity- 
dependent firms. In a later study, they find that acquisitions are 65% more likely to happen 
if a CEO is qualified as overconfident, especially if there are no financial constraints i.e. no 
external financing is required. Overconfident CEOs are more likely to use cash rather than 
stock as takeover currency when the firm has a low valuation vs. peers. Also, the market 
reaction seems more negative than an acquisition by a non-overconfident CEO, which 
                                                 
20 The authors assume constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) in their model 
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seems further aggravated by a diversifying move. These empirical findings support Myers 
and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory and Roll’s (1986) hubris hypothesis. 
Ben-David et al. (2007) consider overconfidence from a risk perspective and use 
the degree of miscalibration of the CFO’s views on the expected performance of the 
market index and company stock as a proxy. They separate optimism from overconfidence 
with the former implying that the mean is overestimated, while the latter implies that 
volatility is underestimated. The results from their survey indeed confirm miscalibration, 
as realized market returns fall within the CFO’s 80% confidence interval only 38% of the 
time i.e. confidence intervals are indeed too narrow21. As overconfident CFO’s use lower 
discount rates in their net present value calculations, they also invest more. In addition, 
they use higher financial leverage with a longer duration, have lower dividend payouts and 
are more likely to buy back shares. Finally, they find empirical support for the argument 
put forward by Hayward and Hambrick (1997) that stock momentum impacts CEO hubris. 
CFOs tend to be more confident after periods of high stock market (S&P 500) returns, 
while past returns of their own stock also seem to have an impact.  
Goel and Thakor (2008) also adopt a risk perspective and argue that overconfident 
managers can both underestimate risk and deliberately opt for more risk in order to 
increase the probability of getting promoted. The reasoning behind this is that manager’s 
perceived ability is inferred from the average pay-off of their decision(s), while the risk 
associated with these decisions cannot be disentangled. Their model shows that an 
overconfident manager is more likely to be promoted than a rational one, thus suggesting 
that overconfidence is persistent in companies. These biases can make managers believe 
that their firms are undervalued, encourage overinvestment and risk taking and fuel a 
preference for internal to external finance, consistent with pecking order theory. 
Concluding, current literature offers various proxies for overconfidence, such as 
merger and acquisition behavior e.g. the number, size and acquisition premium paid, 
option exercise behavior by CEOs, characterization by the business press, miscalibration 
of management’s expectations on returns, relative CEO compensation, CEO prominence 
and past stock performance. Overconfidence or specific forms thereof can be considered 
from a first-order returns perspective (too high) or second-order risk perspective (too low) 
or both. We are not aware of research that defines management overconfidence from a 
third or fourth moment perspective. The former or skewness would imply a higher focus 
on the occurrence of more extreme values. Overconfidence would imply negative 
skewness or a lower expected frequency of negative events than under a normal 
distribution, thus inflating the mean. The latter or kurtosis can be reconciled with 
underestimated variance.  
                                                 
21 In other studies on miscalibration on different topics such as those of Svenson (1981) on driving skills, similar 
percentages are found 
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In addition to adopting a single or narrow perspective, current literature makes no 
distinction between different degrees of confidence. Furthermore, the relation between 
overconfidence and corporate decisions gets most attention, in particular investment - 
acquisitions included - and financing. However, in order to qualify a corporate decision as 
irrational (ex post), we need to incorporate performance measures as well. In chapter four, 
we will further elaborate on our view on company confidence and develop an alternative 
measure.  
3.3 Irrational investors 
3.3.1 Introduction 
“How do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values? ... We 
should not underestimate or become complacent about the complexity of the interactions of 
asset markets and the economy.” 
 
Alan Greenspan in a speech to the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research on December 5th 1996 
 
While managers are in charge of allocating real assets, investors allocate the money. 
When analyzing irrationality, it is easier to assume that only one of these actors is assumed 
to be irrational, but in his 1996 speech, Greenspan already warns for spill-over effects. As 
we have yet to fully recover from the financial market meltdown in 2008, the risk of 
contagion has become evident. We would also rather fine-tune Greenspan’s question to 
“How do we know ex ante when irrationality is about to take over?” Is it possible to define 
red flags when we move on the verge of irrationality, so collective corrective action can be 
taken? The big difficulty is that today’s prices are an aggregate of our beliefs and 
preferences, so it is hard to detect where irrationality is hidden, unless it has infected us in 
total. We refer to Hirshleifer (2001) for an extensive overview about irrational asset 
pricing, while we limit ourselves to some main findings on irrational investor behavior in 
the next section.  
3.3.2 Optimal investment behavior 
Markowitz (1952) was the first to develop a theory on the optimal investment 
portfolio by building on the benefits of diversification. In his framework, Markowitz 
explicitly rejects the rule that investors maximize discounted expected returns, as this 
ignores variance, which is “an undesirable thing”. He showed that when combining 
different assets, overall portfolio risk or variance could be lowered without compromising 
disproportionately on returns. By combining assets or portfolios, one could plot a line or 
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efficient frontier, which provides the highest (mean) return given a certain amount of risk 
or variance. By definition, the market portfolio is efficient and lies on this line. Markowitz’ 
portfolio theory is a key ingredient of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed 
by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965).  
The CAPM infers the optimal risk-return ratio by combining a risk-free asset with 
the market portfolio and argues that only systematic or non-diversifiable risk is rewarded. 
Unlike investments in real assets, the CAPM assumes that investors are indeed able to lend 
and borrow unlimited amounts at the risk free rate. This indefinite borrowing capacity at a 
fixed (risk free) rate implies that investors do not need to create financial slack now for 
future investment22.  
Alternative asset pricing models can incorporate additional risk factors, such as the 
two additional factors distinguished by Fama and French (1992, 1996) e.g. size and book 
to market value, to which Carhart (1997) added a fourth factor of recent stock price 
momentum. Another well-known asset pricing model is developed by Ross (1976) and 
known as Arbitrage Pricing Theory or APT. While the CAPM (-based) model(s) captures 
sensitivity to the market portfolio, APT enables the inclusion of various economic factors. 
When asset prices diverge from the model-implied return, arbitrage will restore the gap. A 
more simple and non-regression based model is the Dividend Discount and Gordon 
Growth Model developed by Gordon (1959, 1962) 23, In addition to model modifications, 
alternative objective functions like minimizing downside risk, maximizing tracking error 
e.g. result in different optimal asset allocations.  
3.3.3 Biases and heuristics in investor behavior 
There is a string of academic research on irrational investor behavior, but we limit 
ourselves to some well-known studies, the results of which can be conflicting. De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985) empirically found stock return patterns which cannot be reconciled with 
efficient markets. The winner-loser effect or the reversal of stock returns over a three to 
five year period suggests that investor overreact at first, which is corrected in later years. 
On a shorter horizon, however, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) found an opposite effect of 
underreaction to news. This causes stock momentum on a short horizon of three to twelve 
months. Under- and overreaction could stem from various biases or the use of heuristics, 
such as summarized in figure 2.3.1 in the previous chapter. 
Daniel et al. (1998) propose a theory of securities that incorporates both market 
under- and overreaction, based on two well-known psychological biases: investor 
overconfidence and self-attribution. They define overconfidence as overestimating the 
precision of one’s forecast or private signal, which results into overreaction to private 
                                                 
22 Open end funds can resort to alternative, but more expensive means of finance by issuing new shares 
23 We refer to the Appendix for more details on the Gordon Growth model (1962) 
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signals and underreaction to public signals. Alongside a constant confidence level, they 
introduce a dynamic element in their analysis by including self-attribution. The latter 
causes asymmetric shifts in investors’ confidence as a function of their investment 
outcomes. Events that confirm an individual’s beliefs and actions tend to boost confidence 
too much, thus intensifying overreaction. On the contrary, disconfirming events weaken 
confidence too little. Their model incorporates these effects and predicts short-run 
momentum and long-term reversals in stock prices.  
Barberis et al. (1998) explain overreaction and underreaction by the use of 
representativeness heuristics respectively the conservatism bias. They define a dynamic or 
learning model in which actual earnings follow a random walk, but individuals believe that 
earnings either follow a steady growth trend e.g. extrapolation or are mean-reverting e.g. 
the gambler’s fallacy. The investor is Bayesian when updating his beliefs, but uses an 
inaccurate model of the earnings process.  
Another well-known market anomaly is the phenomenon that Mehra and Prescrott 
(1985) described as the equity premium puzzle. They state that the level of risk aversion 
necessary to explain the large differences in returns between stocks and (risk-free) T-Bills 
would have to be implausible high and is hard to reconcile with rationality24. Benartzi and 
Thaler (1995), solve this so-called equity premium puzzle by explicitly incorporating 
mental accounting. The frequency with which investors make up the balance or count their 
profits and losses impacts their risk appetite. Investors suffer from myopic behavior as they 
use a narrow time frame for measuring portfolio performance. The authors find that people 
will have to evaluate their portfolios every 13 months to make them indifferent between 
the US historical distributions of returns on stocks and bonds.  
Odean (1998A) tests the disposition effect25 or investors’ tendency to hold losing 
stocks too long and sell winners too early. In analyzing trading records for 10,000 accounts 
at a discount broker from 1987-1993, Odean finds empirical support that investors indeed 
have a strong preference for realizing winners rather than losers. This behavior does not 
seem to stem from rebalancing portfolios, avoidance of relatively higher trading costs of 
lower priced stock or by a rational belief of reversal in subsequent periods. However, the 
results can be complied with prospect theory, which implies high decreases in value from 
losses and higher increases in value from small gains relative to large gains. Alternative 
explanations are that investors fall prey to the gambler’s fallacy or an irrational belief in 
mean reversion. This could translate into cognitive dissonance and/or overoptimism that 
the tide will turn for the better for the losers.  
                                                 
24 In the model by Mehra and Prescott (1985), this risk aversion parameter can take up a value of up to 10, 
whereas previous estimates and theory imply that this coefficient should be close to one. Still, their model fails to 
explaining the puzzle when allowing for such a high risk aversion 
25 Shefrin and Statman (1985) introduced this term 
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In another paper, Odean (1998B) investigates how overconfidence can impact 
financial markets. Odean (1998B) distinguishes between price takers, insiders or market 
makers and infers how trading volumes, market depth, expected utility, expected returns, 
price quality and volatility could be affected. He finds that impact on the market can be 
very different if at all and is conditional on who wrongly processes the information or 
overly relies on its own information when overconfident. In a later study, Barberis and 
Odean (2001) empirically investigate overconfidence for which they use excessive trading 
as a proxy. They find that overconfidence is a gender trait or more prevalent at men, who 
thus heavily erode stock returns by not recouping their high transaction costs.  
Closely related to availability heuristics, Shefrin (2007) identifies affect or 
familiarity heuristics. This could explain wide empirical evidence of home bias or 
overrepresentation of domestic stocks in international investment portfolios. Also, one 
could argue that the availability heuristic fuels bubbles by taking recent performance of a 
stocks in a certain sector as indicative for peers as well. During the Internet bubble, adding 
dotcom to your company name could pay off in significant abnormal price appreciation as 
indicated by Cooper et al. (2001). In later work (2005), they found that the opposite of 
removing any connection with the dotcom era also paid off in higher abnormal returns. 
Fama and French (1992, 1996) dismiss behavioral explanations and argue that these 
patterns reflect a compensation for risk instead. In other words, the model for predicting 
asset prices is misspecified instead of markets being inefficient. The main challenge is how 
to deal with this joint hypothesis problem of choosing the right asset price model and 
properly forecasting its parameters. Furthermore, it is not always easy to disentangle ex 
ante from ex post information i.e. there is a risk of hindsight bias. Both stated and revealed 
preferences are based on utility, but differ in timing and measurement. Stated preferences 
are inferred from surveys or intended instead of actual decisions. Albeit more forward 
looking or ex ante, well-known shortcomings of survey-based research, such as strategic 
behavior or biased responses could have a distorting impact. People do not always put their 
money where their mouth is. Conversely, revealed preferences are an ex post measure and 
based on real acts which speak louder than words.  
3.3.4 Interaction between investors and managers 
Not only rational investors, but also rational managers can exploit stock price 
distortions. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) find support for stock market driven acquisitions, 
as a predator’s high stock valuation makes preys look cheap. Furthermore, negative 
abnormal returns following seasoned equity offerings or initial public offerings are widely 
documented, which also suggests that management indeed exploits the opportunities of 
overvalued stock. Baker and Wurgler (2002) find that rational or smart managers have a 
persistent impact on capital structure by timing the (irrational) market. This is also 
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supported by Huang and Ritter (2009) who find more equity issues when the (implied) cost 
of equity is low.  
On the negative hand, inefficient markets could cause managers to use wrong 
hurdle rates for investments. This can be interpreted as an irrational response to an 
irrational phenomenon. Stein (1996) proposes a market-based approach when managers 
maximize short-term stock prices or when it faces financial constraints. Otherwise, the 
fundamental asset risk approach is to be preferred. 
3.4 Irrational intermediaries 
3.4.1 Introduction 
As expectations of individual investors cannot be directly observed in the market, 
analyst forecasts can be used instead. Stickel (1992) and Chen et al. (2005) suggest a 
higher market impact of more accurate analysts, thus implying that if an analyst has 
persistent bias in his estimates and hence incurs larger forecast errors, investors will take 
him less seriously. Abarbanell (1991) also raises the question if analyst earnings estimates 
are a good proxy for market expectations, as some research suggests a reverse relation in 
which the sign and magnitude of analyst forecast revisions are positively related with (sign 
and magnitude) of past price changes rather than the other way around. Trueman (1994) 
and Campbell and Sharpe (2009) suggest that market participants may adjust for cognitive 
errors and reporting strategy of analysts. Especially when looking at analyst 
recommendations, the number of positive outweighs the number of negative26 
recommendations by far. This could even trigger contrarian reactions to news, such as 
upward adjustments in forecasts, but downward price movements.  
3.4.2 Optimal behavior for financial analysts 
Francis and Philbrick (1993) state that sell-side analysts operate in a multi-task 
environment and have to perform a balancing act of optimally weighing - often conflicting 
- interests of many internal and external clients. Paradoxically, these different input factors 
of the analyst’s utility function can cause earnings forecasts to be biased without being 
irrational from the analyst’s point of view. We refer to this as strategic bias. Regardless, 
analysts can still beat time-series models in forecasting earnings27 and market efficiency 
may be preserved as well.  
Incentive mechanisms, management relations and reputation concerns are 
considered the main drivers behind strategic bias in analyst behavior. Francis and Philbrick 
                                                 
26 We note that in the investor community, “NEUTRAL” or “HOLD” recommendations are usually considered a 
so-called “institutional SELL”.  
27We refer to Brown et al. (1987), Fried and Givoly (1982), Aflleck-Graves et al. (1990)  
 28 
 
(1993) find that following less favorable stock recommendations, analysts issue optimistic 
earnings forecasts to improve management relations. Das et al. (1998) also see 
management relations or access to non-public information as critical and find this 
translated into higher optimism for lower predictability firms. Hence, forecast bias is 
instrumental to improving forecast accuracy28. Lin and McNichols (1998) and Dugar and 
Nathan (1995) argue that underwriter and/or banking relationships fuel optimism, which 
could pay off in future corporate deals.  
Driven by similar motives as strategic bias, McNichols and O’Brien (1997) put 
forward self-selection bias. This implies that analysts report their true unbiased beliefs, but 
cherry-pick stocks with a favorable29 outlook and exclude stocks with bleak prospects. In 
statistical terms, this practice truncates the left tail of the earnings distribution and hence 
inflates the mean.  
Gu and Wu (2003) also focus on the shape of the earnings distribution and argue 
that skewness could may render analyst forecast bias, including pessimism, rational. If the 
analyst’s objective is to minimize mean absolute forecast error, negative (positive) 
earnings skewness results in analyst optimism (pessimism). In such situations, the usually 
higher (lower) median rather than mean forecast is most optimal and accurate. 
3.4.3 Biases and heuristics in analyst behavior 
Analyst bias or its upward version or analyst optimism in particular, is a widely 
documented phenomenon30. It could be a deliberate strategy to win management’s favor, a 
rational response to skewed earnings distributions or reflect cognitive errors. Only the 
latter can be categorized as irrational. Paradoxically, Richardson et al. (2004) find both 
optimism and pessimism in analyst forecasts, conditional on the forecast horizon. Both 
effects can be explained by strategic bias or focus on good relations with management. For 
longer-term forecasts, analysts tend to be too optimistic, while they “walk-down” their 
estimates to a level that management can beat when the announcement date approaches.  
In addition to the possibility that inflating forecasts could be an analyst objective 
itself, analysts could be prone to irrationality or make cognitive errors. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) describe how various heuristics and associated biases may distort 
expectations about probabilities and cause over- or underreaction to news. This implies 
that irrational behavior of analysts spills over to investors as well. Earlier, we discussed 
                                                 
28 We refer to Lim (2001) 
29 Other arguments beyond a firm's outlook impact the decision to follow (drop) coverage on the firm, such as 
potential corporate deal flow and the analyst's visibility or potential market impact, which is likely to be bigger 
for thinly rather than widely covered stocks 
30 We refer to Fried and Givoly (1982), Butler and Lang (1991), Francis and Philbrick (1993), Abarbanell (1991), 
Stickel (1990), Lys and Sohn (1990)., La Porta (1996) 
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that there is also research that investors are smarter and adjust for bias, albeit they may not 
sufficiently do so.  
In their pioneering work on the behavioral impact on market expectations, Froot 
and Frankel (1989) empirically show overreaction or excessive speculation to exchange 
rate expectations. Underreaction and overreaction are also widely investigated in equity 
markets and empirical results can be conflicting. Although these models measure the stock 
market rather than analyst reaction, these can be easily modified by taking (scaled) forecast 
related variables as dependent variables. 
With regard to earnings news, De Bondt and Thaler (1990) empirically find analyst 
overreaction, but Mendenhall (1991) finds opposite results of underreaction. Trueman 
(1994) reconciles this ambiguity in a model which predicts underreaction to extreme and 
overreaction to small earnings surprises. He also allows for asymmetric price reactions to 
good and bad earnings news, as investors can anticipate such distortions in analysts’ 
forecasting behavior. Similarly, Easterwood and Nutt (1999) allow for asymmetric 
responses to (unexpected)31 earnings information, which is lacking in previous models32. 
They argue that overreaction, underreaction and optimism should be disentangled before 
concluding whether analysts either irrationally process earnings-relevant information or 
suffer from strategic bias. Their evidence of overreaction to good and underreaction to bad 
news complies with systematic optimism. Conversely, both strategic and selection bias 
suggest that optimism is opportunistic and a predefined goal. When looking at reactions to 
analyst forecast errors, Ali et al. (1992) and Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) find support 
for analyst underreaction. In this chapter, we use quarterly earnings surprises as a proxy for 
recent analyst forecast errors. 
Similarly, Lys and Sohn (1990), Klein (1990) and Abarbanell (1991) provide 
empirical evidence of underreaction to past stock price news. However, Fried and Givoly 
(1982) find a reverse causal relation that earnings forecasts and revisions impact share 
prices. Also, Chen et al. (2005) find that analysts have a bigger market impact the longer 
their track record and the better their forecast accuracy. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) 
include both earnings and stock momentum news in the equation and find both under- and 
overreaction, conditional on whether the news positive or negative33. Also, they find a 
relation between the shape of the forecast error distribution34 and unexpected accruals, thus 
suggesting that management plays a role as well.  
                                                 
31 They define unexpected prior earnings change as the change in excess of the average earnings change over the 
preceding three years 
32 They refer to Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999), who base their model on 
the representativeness and anchoring heuristics respectively overconfidence and self-attribution respectively the 
dominance of momentum traders vs. news watchers 
33 Easterwood and Nutt (1999) also make a distinction between good and bad news 
34 They explicitly investigate middle and tail asymmetry of the forecast error distribution 
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Research on the underlying drivers or the heuristics used for forming expectations 
is, however, scarce. Affleck-Graves et al. (1990) specifically test the impact of judgmental 
heuristics on analyst forecasting skills compared to time-series earnings models and non-
experts. The latter use the same information as the time-series model i.e. historical 
earnings, but can also apply heuristic rules when forming earnings expectations. Analysts 
are superior to both and heuristics indeed seem to have an impact, as optimism bias is also 
present in non-expert forecasts. This also complies with Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
who show that decisions of both naive and expert people show systematic biases from the 
use of judgmental heuristics. Amir and Ganzach (1998) argue that heuristics, or 
specifically optimism35, representativeness and anchoring, jointly influence earnings 
forecasts and forecasting errors. They attribute overreaction to forecast changes to 
representativeness and underreaction to forecast revisions36 to anchoring. They find 
asymmetry of overreaction to positive and underreaction to negative forecast 
modifications, with longer forecast horizons amplifying the effects.  
Consistent with anchoring and adjustment, Campbell and Sharpe (2009) find that 
expert consensus forecasts on macro-economic variables are systematically biased toward 
the value of previous months’ releases. However, the market seems to properly account for 
this by only reacting to surprises beyond those caused by anchoring and adjustment. Cen et 
al. (2010) explore the impact of anchoring on earnings forecast errors and asset prices and 
find higher (lower) forecast errors for firms with EPS estimates below (above) the anchor. 
They reason that when analysts anchor to the industry median forecast, they are reluctant 
to issue a forecast well away from this number, even if their information implies that they 
should deviate. Unlike Campbell and Sharpe (2009), Cen et al. (2010) find that the stock 
market does not correct for this bias, as risk adjusted returns are lower (higher) for below 
(above) median EPS firms.   
3.5 Irrationality multiplied 
So far, we have only considered irrationality for an isolated group of economic 
actors, or specifically managers, investors or intermediaries. On the one hand, we could 
argue that other parties serve as a countervailing power and hence indeed keep irrationality 
within certain limits. For instance, Baker and Wurgler (2002) find that managers exploit 
overvalued stock by issuing new equity i.e. by timing the market. On the other hand, 
interaction within and between various agents can feed a positive feedback mechanism. 
Such herding behavior is not irrational by definition and can be a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
                                                 
35 Amir and Ganzach (1998) use the term leniency to indicate optimism 
36 They relate forecasts to realized prior period earnings (denoted forecast changes) and to prior period forecasts 
(denoted forecast revisions) and refer to both when using the term forecast modifications  
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If we all behave like the “homo economicus”, this results in Pareto efficiency. The other 
side of the coin is that irrational behavior could solicit irrational responses, thus resulting 
in a real impact on the allocation of resources away from the optimal level.  
Stein (1996) highlights the threat of using improper discount rates in capital 
budgeting decisions by using market-based hurdle rates instead of a long-term fundamental 
rate. Closely related to this, management could feel pressured to cater to investor’s needs, 
even if these are not rational. Baker et al. (2004) wonder if this argument could account for 
the conglomerate waves in the 1960s. When irrationality becomes widespread rather than 
isolated, we can significantly drift away to extreme situations. The illusion of control, 
confirmation bias and self-attribution bias, can cause successes to be wrongly claimed and 
reinvigorate irrational moves. Sooner or later, reality will catch up with the facts rather 
than the fads.  
Such extremes have proved to be not that rare in history. Following the Tulip and 
South sea bubble centuries ago, another financial meltdown occurred from which we have 
yet to recover. After just entering this millennium with unprecedented high stock 
valuations, markets collapsed shortly hereafter. After a cool down period of the dotcom 
bubble, a real estate and financial market boom and bust followed. The dark side of 
bubbles also became pronounced in fraudulent practices, such as the huge Ponzi-scheme of 
Madoff. Before moving back to normal37, such shocks can trigger disproportionate 
responses in the process of resetting our prior false beliefs and preferences. It brings us 
back to those basic questions whether the real value is hidden in the promise of the future 
or in what we have on hand today.   
3.6 Our view on optimal behavior 
So far, we have discussed various concepts on optimal behavior for firms, investors 
and financial intermediaries. In this thesis, we make the following assumptions in order to 
qualify behavior as irrational. If the use of human biases or heuristics still contributes or 
does not necessarily jeopardize the realization of an optimal situation, we do not consider 
it irrational,  
With regard to management, we assume maximization of the net present value 
(NPV) of the firm as its primary goal. This requires a proper assessment of current cash 
flow generation, of future growth opportunities and the cost of capital. In addition to 
disagreement in literature between using a constant rate vs. a time-varying or business-
varying risk rate, one could disagree between using the current implied risk premium or 
the long-term risk premium. In our NPV-based approach, we assume a constant cost of 
capital, thus implying a constant relative risk aversion which is proportionate to time 
                                                 
37 In statistical terms, we can refer to this as mean reversion 
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unlike hyperbolic discounting. If the market would show a disproportionate negative value 
impact of a bad investment, this would encourage managers to maintain the current status 
quo rather than to take risks. Similarly, for companies trading close at their critical 
reference point, such as the peer group multiple, it could make sense to minimize downside 
risk by following a cautious strategy. 
With regard to rational investors, we adopt the view that it should not be possible to 
earn cumulative abnormal returns by using all publicly known information i.e. we assume 
semi-strong market efficiency. In addition to the four factors in Carhart’s (1997) model, 
we consider the company’s confidence level or change thereof as publicly known 
information. 
Our approach to optimal analyst behavior is mostly driven by practical reasons i.e. 
data availability and considers minimization of squared forecast errors as the primary goal. 
Although it may be intuitive to think that negative forecast errors in particular or too high 
earnings estimates are taken negatively by the investment community, we do not assume 
such asymmetry. As seasonality can make quarterly earnings forecasts more volatile, one 
could refrain from using squared errors and instead take the year to date net forecast error. 
Paradoxically, the earlier discussed strategic bias or deliberate forecast error could result in 
lower forecast errors overall, as it enables better management access and company 
information. Due to quarterly earnings releases, it is easy to track the accuracy of equity 
analysts. Conversely, there is no such reality-check for credit analysts, unless a company 
does indeed move into financial distress. An example of indirect evidence that other 
objectives may have prevailed is the ban of Internet analyst Henry Blodget from the 
investment industry and what has become known as “the global settlement case of state 
attorney Eliot Spitzer. The ten largest investment banks were charged a USD 1.4bn fine to 
settle issues of conflict of interest within their businesses during the Internet boom. More 
severe regulation followed in order to contain such behavior and to force analysts to 
provide an accurate view on the companies under coverage. 
3.7 Summary 
In this chapter, we have discussed both theoretical and empirical work on 
irrationality of different economic actors, or specifically managers, investors and financial 
intermediaries. Among these actors, irrational managers are thinly covered. It continues to 
be a thorny issue to judge whether an agent is indeed acting irrational, as his objective 
function is very hard to unveil if at all. Furthermore, we have to rely on revealed beliefs 
and preferences rather than stated ones when empirically investigating these behavioral 
distortions. It is easier to judge the rationality of decisions ex post than ex ante, due to the 
benefit of hindsight. We adopt the following view with regard to rationality. We consider 
net present value maximization of the firm as optimal for managers, a risk-return tradeoff 
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consistent with Carhart’s (1997) four factor model as efficient for investors and finally the 
minimization of forecast errors as an optimal strategy for intermediaries.  
With regard to human biases, overconfidence and optimism bias are most widely 
covered. However, different definitions and proxies are used, which makes it more 
difficult to compare these measures with each other. Research on the use of heuristics is 
skewed to irrational investor behavior, while it is hardly investigated for financial 
intermediaries, such as security analysts. This may seem surprising, as analysts can be 
considered a major supplier of information to investors and their expectations may even be 
put on par with those of investors.  
In chapter four, we will narrow our scope to company confidence. We infer a 
composite degree of confidence measure from various corporate actions by leveraging on 
the insights of current theory and empirical research. Our approach differs from prior 
research as we do not only consider confidence from the upper extreme, but also consider 
lower confidence levels. Furthermore, we take a reverse approach by inferring confidence 
from corporate decisions and by explicitly exploring performance characteristics.  
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4 An alternative company confidence measure 
Abstract 
In this chapter, we infer a comprehensive degree of confidence measure from 
corporate decisions on operations, investment and funding for large US companies. Our 
approach differs from current research as it measures different degrees of confidence 
instead of only the upper extreme, while we also take a multidimensional approach for 
inferring our confidence measure. We do not only link overconfidence to one specific 
corporate action, but take a more comprehensive approach. We argue that only if executive 
management exhibits extreme high or low confidence across different types of corporate 
decisions, they can be assigned with an extreme confidence degree. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters revealed that it is a big challenge to define and measure 
human biases, their interaction and their impact on financial decisions. In current research 
on biased management behavior, we see a high interest for overconfidence and – closely 
related with this – hubris. Despite various definitions and proxies, overconfidence or 
specific forms thereof is commonly viewed from a single or a narrow perspective. Most 
studies make no distinction between different degrees of confidence, but only focus on 
overconfidence or the upper extreme. Either explicitly or implicitly, overconfidence 
comprises other biases, such as the ability to earn higher returns i.e. the better-than-average 
effect or the illusion to better control risk.  
In current literature, overconfidence is inferred from a wide array of predominantly 
ex post information. This comprises merger and acquisition behavior e.g. the number, the 
size and acquisition premium, CEO option exercise behavior, characterization by the 
business press, surveys on the miscalibration of risk and return expectations, the CEO’s 
importance as reflected in relative compensation and prominence in the annual report or 
from the firm’s past stock performance. After earmarking firms or people as overconfident 
from these actions, the impact on corporate decisions is investigated and capital budgeting 
decisions in particular catch a lot of attention. Although ex ante information can predict 
rather than explain corporate behavior, it is hard to get sufficient unbiased data.  
In this chapter, we add to current research by developing a more comprehensive and 
multidimensional measure of confidence. Instead of a sole focus on the upper extreme, we 
examine differences between the upper and lower ends. Although the term confidence is 
subjective by definition, we seek to mitigate this by using various instead of only a single 
corporate action for assigning confidence levels. This is in line with Ben David et al. 
(2007), who investigate the relation between overconfidence and a range of corporate 
policies on capital spending, M&A behavior, funding and shareholder payout. In addition, 
the inclusion of several dimensions can absorb interaction effects between different 
decision variables. On the one hand, this approach implies an extra hurdle for arriving at 
extreme confidence levels when there are mitigating factors. On the other hand, positive 
feedback mechanisms could prove otherwise.  
The chapter is organized as follows. First, we discuss our definition of confidence 
and how this compares to prior research. Inspired by a body of research on both 
overconfidence and corporate decision making, we define seven confidence indicators for 
inferring a total confidence score. We conclude the chapter with an overview on our 
methodology of assigning a degree of confidence by each indicator. In chapters five and 
six, we will empirically test our multidimensional confidence measure.   
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4.2 Our definition of confidence 
We seek to incorporate both return and risk characteristics in our definition of 
confidence. Strictly speaking, overestimating returns refers to overoptimism, while 
underestimating risk or return variability captures overconfidence. However, these two 
biases cannot be easily disentangled and current literature on overconfidence considers 
these aspects more or less interchangeable as well. We require that our definition can be 
compared to alternative definitions of overconfidence, but also easily modified to a 
definition of low confidence or diffidence as well. In addition, we are looking for a 
comprehensive meaning that captures the many forms how confidence may materialize.  
We define high confidence as overestimating the potential to create value i.e. to 
realize positive net present value by perceiving oneself better than average and more in 
control. As a result, management overestimates returns, underestimates risk or both, all of 
which can inflate net present value (NPV) calculations. Next, we expect these beliefs to 
materialize in behavior, such as a search for growth by bold38 investments, acquisitions and 
diversification. Cash availability and the degree of operating leverage are restraining 
factors in this respect. As external funds are undervalued in the view of highly confident 
manager, confident managers follow a pecking order with a preference for internal funds 
or low dividend payouts to attracting debt, while equity issuance is seen as the last resort 
for funding new projects. If, however, management sees no further positive NPV projects 
going forward i.e. the optimum level of investment has been achieved, they could resort to 
investing in their own company or undertake share buybacks. We would also expect higher 
confidence to translate into more aggressive earnings forecasts and a bigger risk of missing 
these, which makes accruals accounting more attractive. 
In the prior chapter, we referred to Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) who 
paradoxically stated that managers are “subject to the conflicting biases of unjustified 
optimism and unreasonable risk aversion”. Our definition of high confidence can be 
complied with their view as it does not ignore risk aversion, but only implies that due to 
high confidence (on controllability of events, return expectations e.g.), perceived risk is 
lower than the true, underlying risk. If high confidence was only to reflect risk, we would 
have similar mean returns but significantly higher variance for high confidence companies. 
Conversely, if high confidence was only to translate into mean returns, we would have 
similar variance but significantly higher returns for high confidence companies.  
4.3 Our multidimensional approach  
In our definition of confidence we take both a return and risk perspective by 
associating a higher degree of confidence with higher perceived net present values. Our 
                                                 
38 We borrow this term from Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) 
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focus is on extreme levels of confidence, for which we use the terms overconfidence and 
diffidence respectively high and low confidence.  
We use the methodology of Hayward and Hambrick (1997) for the construction of 
our degree of confidence measure. We take a broad set of confidence indicators, which 
reflect corporate decisions on operations, investment or funding. In our view, acts speak 
louder than words, so personal characteristics, such as compensation package, option 
exercise holdings, background, e.g. are only (indirectly) relevant if translated into 
company decisions.  
Any attempt to measure a human trait like confidence involves human judgment 
and hence bears the risk that chosen variables and breakpoints are arbitrary. By choosing a 
broad set instead of a single indicator, we seek to mitigate this risk. We use a four-point 
scale for assigning a degree of confidence to each confidence indicator variable, thus 
enforcing a direction instead of allowing for neutral confidence levels. If possible, we use 
quartiles instead of absolute breakpoints between the four different confidence levels, as it 
is easier to speak of high or low levels in relative terms rather than in absolute terms. Still, 
we are well aware that our choice for quartiles is subjective as well and that alternative 
breakpoints could yield different results. The use of more stringent criteria for assigning 
extreme confidence levels39 comes at a loss of observations in the extreme confidence 
area40 for each indicator. As a result, the aggregated confidence scores converge. 
Subsequently, we aggregate the scores on each indicator. Alternatively, we also aggregate 
the standardized confidence indicator values or Z-scores on the separate confidence 
indicators to arrive at a total confidence score.  
4.4 Acts of Confidence: the indicators 
4.4.1 Introduction 
We have identified various confidence indicators to construct our degree of 
confidence measure. These indicators reflect operating, investment and funding decisions, 
or specifically the degree of diversification, acquisition behavior, operating leverage, 
accruals accounting, investment and shareholder payout policy (both dividends and share 
buybacks). To our knowledge, only Ben David et al. (2007) consider overconfidence in a 
comprehensive framework that involves  a range of corporate actions. They construct a 
model for empirically testing the effects of overconfidence on investment (including 
acquisitions), financial leverage and shareholder payout policy.  
                                                 
39 One could think of alternative breakpoints, such as 15%, 50% and 85% percentiles between the four different 
confidence levels 
40 We note that in our empirical analysis in the next chapter, we already lose a lot of observations, as we require a 
lot of data for each firm, thus leaving us with fewer firms in the extreme confidence area as well. 
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Some of the indicators that we have defined capture macro-economic developments 
which affect all managers simultaneously, thus pushing confidence into one specific 
direction. One could argue that we cannot speak of behavioral bias in such periods. We 
could resolve this by determining extreme confidence levels on a year by year basis instead 
of calculating breakpoints for the period as whole. In absolute terms, this would lead 
different definitions of extreme confidence instead. Also, when using a relative confidence 
measure, an investment level of 70% of depreciation, while the market anticipates that you 
will preserve your book value41 can be earmarked as a sign of confidence if the average 
ratio is at 50%. However, this is not a sustainable strategy for preserving company value. 
Furthermore, some of these macro-effects are dampened by the scaling of our indicators to 
earnings or market valuation. Also, compensating effects are at work when current 
investments are postponed while earnings retention ratios stay high. However, when we 
measure returns for extreme confidence firms, we correct for such macro-economic effects 
in order to isolate the confidence effect.   
Based on existing theoretical concepts and empirical findings, we define a relation 
between these indicators and the degree of confidence. Each indicator is ranked on a four-
point scale, which varies from low, medium low, medium high and high confidence. We 
have not defined a neutral score, thus enforce a direction. The total confidence score is 
constructed as the aggregate of the separate scores which could end up to zero or a neutral 
level.  
4.4.2 Degree of diversification 
Looking from an agency theory perspective, Stulz (1990) argues that diversification 
could free up more internal resources which might induce overinvestment, a behavioral 
characteristic linked to (over)confidence. In addition, diversification by acquisitions can be 
associated with hubris or overconfidence (Roll 1986, Malmendier and Tate 2008). Shleifer 
and Vishny (1989) argue that diversified firms are more complex to manage and a way for 
management to entrench themselves i.e. to protect their position and increase their 
influence. Rajan et al. (2000) find empirical support of their model that predicts a positive 
relation between the misallocation of resources and the degree of diversification. This 
misallocation results from high divisional autonomy on reinvestment opportunities and 
insufficient countervailing power by top management to redirect investments to more 
efficient uses. This could result into both overinvestment and underinvestment on a 
divisional level, a phenomenon we will discuss later.   
Alternatively, we could argue that diversification is a way to reduce risk and cash 
flow volatility. However, high risk aversion should not be put on par with low confidence. 
                                                 
41Otherwise sai,d they value the market-to book ratio equals one 
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The key factor is management’s (mis)judgment on how he can control or mitigate risk by 
his decisions. If he misperceives the correlations between different activities, the 
variability of the new portfolio could be underestimates as well.  
Following above mentioned theoretical and empirical research and our argument 
that even risk reduction arguments behind acquisitions leave room for high managerial 
confidence, we make the following assumption. Overall, we consider firms moving away 
from their core business as confident, either by overestimating their ability to run the 
newly acquired business better or by overestimating the diversification effect i.e. 
underestimating the true variability associated with the new company profile. This is 
captured in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: The higher the degree of diversification, the higher the degree of confidence 
4.4.3 Acquisition policy 
Acquisitions can also be associated with confidence, as these decisions involve a 
large amount of money and high execution risk. Theoretically, overconfidence could 
translate into both higher and lower acquisition spending.  
One the one hand, one could argue that overconfident managers overestimate their 
abilities to run another business better. There is wide empirical support for the winner’s 
curse of overpayment and negative abnormal market returns in takeover battles, thus 
suggesting that hubris is indeed at work. We refer to Roll (1986), Hayward and Hambrick 
(1997), Morck et al. (1990), Malmendier and Tate (2008) and Ben-David et al. (2007). 
Especially diversifying moves, which also yield a high confidence score on diversification, 
seem value destroying. 
On the other hand, stock market inefficiency or more specifically, management’s 
belief that its shares are undervalued, a characteristic associated with overconfidence, 
could deter them from making acquisitions if they rely on common stock as a currency. 
However, it is not easy if possible at all to determine which acquisition moves are foregone 
for this reason. Although such a sample would be reduced to companies who are fully 
equity-dependent, management is unlikely to admit that it has serious interest. 
Alternatively, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) formulate a theory in which managers are 
rational and exploit inefficient capital markets. In their framework, transactions are driven 
by inefficient stock market valuations of the acquiring companies rather than CEO hubris. 
This market timing strategy is widely investigated by Baker et al. (2004) and Baker and 
Wurgler (2002). It assumes that management puts the interests of existing shareholders 
above those of new shareholders instead of treating them equally. If these new 
shareholders do not earn a satisfactory return given the (new) risk profile of the company, 
the company could face difficulties or a higher risk premium for subsequent equity issues. 
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In other words, exploiting overvalued stock may not seem a value enhancing strategy on 
the long-term. This in line with Stein (1996) who argues that the use of market implied 
instead of fundament rates of return is a sign of myopic behavior. In addition, management 
seems reluctant in admitting that their shares are overvalued, even at the peak of the stock 
markets in 2000.   
We recognize that investors could be irrational, on both the individual and 
aggregate level. Even the efficient market hypothesis provides room for such distortions, 
conditional on their temporary nature. Both rational and irrational managers could take 
advantage of overvalued stock markets to go on an acquisition spree at the risk of the 
company’s reputation of creating long-term value. As earlier discussed, we consider net 
present value maximization of the company’s cash flows as imperative for rational 
behavior.  
In summary, there is wide theoretical and empirical support that overconfidence 
translates into acquisitive behavior, while there are practical limitations regarding foregone 
acquisitions, the latter of which would qualify equity-dependent firms as overconfident 
when they refrain from making an acquisition. Therefore, we assume that highly confident 
management prefers to act and acquire rather than being constrained by a higher cost of 
equity. The degree of confidence depends on the acquisition outlay rather than the number 
of acquisitions, as summarized in the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 2: The larger the acquisition spend, the higher the degree of confidence 
 
We note that we do not include the impact of the method of payment. However, if 
the transaction is funded by a share issue, this will result in a low confidence score on the 
share buyback indicator. Overconfident managers would be very reluctant to issue shares, 
as they consider their shares undervalued.  
4.4.4 Operating leverage 
Capital intensity or operating leverage can be linked to both industry characteristics 
and managerial effects. We adopt the view of Hannan and Freeman (1977), who indicate 
that high operating leverage gives management less discretionary power with regard to 
investments. In this case, assets are not easily adaptable to other functions, so a long-term 
view is required. As a result, the investment cycle tends to follow a lumpy rather than a 
smooth pattern over the years. A large part of the cost base is fixed, which translates into 
higher earnings swings absent any managerial overconfidence effects. On the contrary, 
capacity reductions are easier to realize in the short-term by mothballing plants and 
equipment. Such low investment levels could be interpreted as low confidence. We define 
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the following proposition when assigning a degree of confidence level to operating 
leverage:  
 
Proposition 3: The lower the operating leverage, the higher the degree of confidence 
4.4.5 Accruals accounting 
Accounting practices and specifically earnings management could also hint at high 
confidence, which is likely to translate into an ambitious earnings outlook. Using the 
words of Schrand and Zechman (2010), “overconfident executives are more likely to 
borrow from the future to manage earnings because they expect future earnings will be 
sufficient to cover reversals.” When empirically testing earnings management, Dechow et 
al. (1995) test several accrual-based models to distinguish between discretionary and non-
discretionary accruals. Sloan (1996) empirically finds that the market overreacts to 
accruals or fails to see the underlying earnings quality, thus rendering the use of an 
accruals-based reporting strategy attractive on a short-term basis. However, the market will 
correct this mispricing, thus leading to a negative subsequent stock returns. Hribar and 
Yang (2010) argue that overconfidence can result into an optimistic bias in earnings 
forecasts, the issuance of a narrow forecast range and a higher probability of missing 
estimates. The authors find that overconfident CEOs42 who voluntarily provide earnings 
guidance, engage in more aggressive accounting as measured by abnormal accruals. In this 
way, they could meet or even beat their ambitious earnings targets. If so, self-attribution 
bias could even reinvigorate their overconfidence. Schrand and Zechman (2010)43 even 
find support that overconfidence may even result into fraudulent actions to cook the books 
to meet unrealistic high expectations. Most of these accrual items are discretionary in 
terms of size and timing.  
Although Dechow et al. (1995) argue that it is hard to detect earnings management 
for “economically plausible magnitudes of one to five percent of total assets”, we are most 
interested in the extremes and only those are awarded with the highest or lowest level of 
confidence. In order to determine whether or not accruals are extreme, we look at which 
share of the earnings component consists of accruals instead of more persistent cash flow 
items. Our confidence assignment is summarized in proposition four: 
 
Proposition 4: The higher the accruals to earnings ratio, the higher the degree of 
confidence.  
                                                 
42 They follow Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) and define overconfidence by option exercise behavior and 
press-portrayal 
43 Schrand and Zechman (2010) use three proxies for overconfidence i.e. one based on option exercise behavior 
(Malmendier and Tate 2005), one multidimensional construct as developed by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) 
and one that uses personal traits such as educational background. 
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4.4.6 Investment  
Current research emphasizes the relation between overconfidence and its impact on 
investment and capital structure. This is not easy to detect, as in our definition, confidence 
could relate to both estimated returns and riskiness. The former translates into higher 
estimated cash flows, while the latter implies a lower hurdle rate of the project. 
Furthermore, there are also interaction effects between investment and capital structure, as 
the latter could be a constraining factor. 
Heaton (2002) argues that overconfidence can materialize in both overinvestment 
and underinvestment, depending on a company’s financial position44. This relationship is 
empirically supported by Malmendier and Tate (2005). If a company has abundant free 
cash flow, overconfidence can lead to overinvestment, consistent with agency theory as 
developed by Jensen (1986). With ample funds available for investing, the hurdle rate 
could be misperceived as very low i.e. the marginal instead of the risk adjusted cost of 
capital is used in the net present value analysis. Ben-David et al. (2007) empirically find 
that overconfident managers invest more, use a too low discount rate for evaluating 
projects and opt for higher financial leverage instead of scrutinizing investment. Stein 
(1996) already highlights the risk of using wrong discount rates in capital budgeting 
decisions, but he refers to irrational markets rather than managers. When managers pursue 
to maximize short-term stock valuation or need to attract funds on a short-term basis, they 
should use the market implied discount rates. If they afford to adopt a long-term view and 
face no financing constraints, the fundamental discount rate should be used.  
If there is a financing deficit and – in the view of management - expensive external 
funds have to be attracted, overconfidence could translate into underinvestment according 
to Heaton (2000). This suggests that management only acts in the interest of existing 
shareholders, as it prevents new investors to participate in the upside of the - in the view of 
management -undervalued assets-in-place. However, existing shareholders would also 
benefit from any upside following a good investment and re-evaluation of existing assets, 
even if they have to share it with new shareholders.This argument of underinvestment is 
further weakened when only debt is attracted, which - unlike equity - entails a fixed rather 
than a residual claim on the value of the firm45. Therefore, we dismiss the argument that 
overconfidence translates into underinvestment. 
In our framework, we assume the argument of attractive investment opportunities to 
dominate the (under)valuation of a company's risky securities, thus ruling out 
                                                 
44 One could argue that if the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) holds, overinvestment would be contained in 
case of a financing deficit, as the market would discount this risk in higher cost of external funds. EMH also 
implies that the cost of external funds will not become too high to deter management from investing. It is not 
relevant whether or not the market is right in pricing risky assets, as it is all about management’s perception 
45 However, bond holders benefit from the higher value of collateral i.e. lower default risk, which Myers (1977) 
describes as the asset substitution problem between stock-and bond holders 
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underinvestment by overconfident managers. We also adopted this argument when 
discussing acquisitions as an act of confidence. We argue that overinvestment can only 
occur if investment is indeed high, which we measure by the depreciation level and the Q-
ratio46. Depreciation conveys information about the required level of investment or 
maintenance level, while the Q-ratio conveys the market’s view on the company’s growth 
and associated investments. Furthermore, we expect management to use a lower hurdle 
rate if there is no financing deficit47, thus overstating the value that they belief to create. 
This is translated into the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 5: the higher the investment level, the higher the degree of confidence, 
especially if there is no financing deficit i.e. a lower hurdle rate is used   
4.4.7 Dividend policy 
Contrary to interest payments, (common) dividend is not a contractual obligation, 
but an item at management’s discretion. Hence, managerial bias could have an impact. 
Alongside overconfidence, other irrational elements can impact dividend policy. Lintner 
(1956) cites inertia, conservatism and anchoring to the existing dividend rate as key 
dividend drivers. Alternatively, Bhattacharaya (1979) uses the bird in the hand fallacy as 
an explanation for a preference of dividends to share price appreciation. Closely related to 
this, Thaler (1999) emphasizes the role of mental accounting or the way how we organize 
information. Alternatively, Baker and Wurgler (2004) argue that catering to investor needs 
could determine a firm’s payout strategy. 
Brav et al. (2005) find empirical evidence that dividend and investment decisions 
are taken simultaneously, while decisions on share buybacks are made hereafter. 
Consistent with the latter, we isolate dividends from share buybacks. However, we do not 
assume a perfect correlation between dividend and current investment either and therefore 
introduce dividend as a separate confidence indicator48. This corroborates with findings by 
Fama and French (2002) that short-term changes in investment and earnings are absorbed 
by higher debt rather than lower dividends. When we perform an empirical analysis of our 
confidence indicator in the next chapter, we find a low positive correlation between 
dividend payout and high investment. This could suggest a positive view on the 
profitability of both current and future assets. Alternatively, in order to mitigate agency 
concerns from overinvestment, management could ease this by increasing the dividend 
                                                 
46 This ratio could be used as a proxy for the company’s growth potential as expected by the market 
47 We refer to Stein (1996) who explores “how to set hurdle rates for capital budgeting decisions in an irrational 
world” 
48 We believe the horizon of executive management could also have an impact. A CEO close to retirement might 
not be concerned with future investment opportunities, but rather op for making big moves now 
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payout without compromising on investment. However, we find no significant correlation 
between dividend changes and investment.   
Similar to acquisitions and investment, both a negative and positive relation 
between overconfidence and dividend payout could occur. If overconfidence on 
profitability prevails, we would expect higher dividends, consistent with signaling, pecking 
order and tradeoff theory49. Empirical results are ambiguous though. Grullon et al (2002) 
and Benartzi et al. (1997) do not find that dividend payouts predict future profitability. 
Brav et al. (2005) only find a weak relation, which primarily works in one direction i.e. in 
good times. In bad times, dividends tend to be sticky rather than being cut, which is also 
empirically supported by Fama and French (2002). Alternatively, we could state that 
overconfidence on investment opportunities dominates overconfidence on profitability. 
This implies that dividends are lower in order to create financial slack. 
We use the following approach to assign a degree of confidence level. We 
distinguish between first order (dividend level) and second order (dividend change) effects. 
Regardless of the payout level and based on research that dividends tend to be sticky in 
bad times50, we consider a dividend cut as a sign of low confidence. In all other cases of 
stable or rising dividend, we consider both the payout level and the financing deficit before 
assigning a confidence score. We adopt the view that dividend or earnings retention ratios 
reveal information about future investment plans rather than profitability, thus following 
the results of Grullon et al. (2002), Brav et al. (2005) and Ben-David et al. (2007). 
Therefore, it is closely (inversely) related to the investment indicator discussed earlier. We 
do neither assume perfect (negative) correlation between current and future investment nor 
relate dividend to a company’s growth profile. All in all, we define the following 
propositions:  
 
Proposition 6a: firms with a dividend cut, regardless of the payout ratio, have a low 
degree of confidence   
 
Proposition 6b: the lower the dividend payout ratio, the higher the degree of confidence, 
especially if there is no financing deficit i.e. a lower hurdle rate is used  
4.4.8 Share buybacks 
If Modigliani and Miller’s dividend irrelevance theorem (1958, 1961) would hold, 
dividend and share buybacks are perfect substitutes. Grullon and Michaely (2002) find 
                                                 
49 As agency costs are already incorporated in tradeoff theory, we do not consider it separately 
50 One could argue that if firms cut their dividends, this is driven by the current situation rather than long-term 
issues. As anecdotal evidence, we mention how shocked the market reacted when “widow stock”General Electric 
announced a dividend cut in 2009.  
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empirical support for the substitution hypothesis, but Fama and French (2001) do not, 
albeit different calculations could be to blame for this discrepancy. Brav et al. (2005) find 
that share buyback decisions follow investment and dividend, which corroborates with 
rejecting the substitution hypothesis. If the substitution hypothesis would hold, our 
propositions on overconfidence and dividend policy could be extrapolated to share 
buybacks as well. In their model, Ben-David et al. (2007) also assume that overconfident 
managers consider dividends and share buybacks separately. Their empirical results show 
that overconfident managers are more active in share buybacks.  
Despite the lack of conclusive evidence on the substitution hypothesis, we argue 
that dividends cannot be put on par with share buybacks due to differences in calculations, 
regulation51 and market timing. Brav et al. (2005) find that CFOs prefer share repurchases 
to dividends, as these are more flexible for timing the market and enhancing earnings per 
share. Market timing is hard to reconcile with overconfidence, as it implies that stock is 
issued when it is overvalued, a conclusion unlikely to be drawn by overconfident 
management. Malmendier et al. (2010) indeed find hat overconfident managers are less 
likely to use equity for covering financing needs, while Ben-David et al. (2007) do not find 
a significant relation between market timing and share buybacks. Ikenberry and Vermaelen 
(1996) also implicitly mention market timing arguments. They state that share buybacks 
expand the company’s investment opportunity set by offering management the option to 
use the firm’s resources when they see a mispricing vs. their “insider” valuation of the 
firm.  
Although there is a timing difference between share buyback decisions on the one 
hand and investment and dividends on the other hand, we follow a similar reasoning as 
Ben-David et al. (2007). Higher buybacks imply a higher degree of confidence, especially 
if there are abundant internal funds. This is summarized in proposition seven: 
 
Proposition 7: The higher the amount of share buybacks, the higher the degree of 
confidence, especially if there is no financing deficit.  
4.4.9 Financial leverage 
In chapter three, we discussed how to determine a firm’s optimal size or investment 
level and we implicitly assumed capital structure a means rather than an end. In other 
words, we do not consider capital structure as an explicit company goal. However, when 
we empirically test our degree of confidence measure, we will introduce a control variable 
that captures a firm’s excess financial leverage compared to the average of the industry.  
                                                 
51 One could think of the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Also, prior to 1983, there were more constraints on share 
buybacks, as these could be interpreted as insider trading 
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In the world of Modigliani and Miller, capital structure is irrelevant for a 
company’s value. Although there is ample literature on capital structure on a standalone 
basis, studies on overconfidence and its impact on financial leverage decisions are still in a 
developing stage. Theoretical frameworks include tradeoff theory, agency theory, pecking 
order theory and target adjustment theory. In order to derive an optimal capital structure, 
one could distinguish between optimism about the current assets in place and optimism 
about future assets or growth.  
Following tradeoff theory, a bullish view on the profitability or bankruptcy risk of 
the current assets in place should translate into higher financial leverage and vice versa. 
Higher or less volatile earnings or lower bankruptcy risk imply a higher tax base and 
higher agency costs52, thus calling for higher debt. Conversely, pecking order theory states 
that if management sees many investment opportunities going forward i.e. has high 
confidence in future growth, they may keep financial leverage low to create financial 
flexibility. This can be reconciled with agency theory as well, as low financial leverage 
implies less monitoring and therefore more room for overconfidence to have an impact. 
Hackbarth (2008, 2009) captures these ideas in a theoretical model and analyzes the effects 
of optimism and overconfidence on the interaction between financing and investment 
decisions. His model can explain what Graham (2000) described as the debt conservatism53 
puzzle, but managerial traits can mitigate bondholder-shareholder. In other words, debt or 
the overhang of debt can lead to suboptimal delay of investment, but mildly biased 
managers can overcome this as they tend to invest earlier than rational managers54.  
In their empirical study on the optimal capital structure, Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) find more support for the pecking order than for the target-adjustment or trade off 
model. Frank and Goyal (2003) extend the study of the former, but only detect some weak 
support for pecking order behavior at large firms55. Fama and French (2002) also find more 
support for the pecking order than the tradeoff theory. If expected earnings variations are 
short-term, management is more likely to accept temporarily higher leverage rather than to 
opt for structurally lower leverage ratios. Graham (2000) empirically finds persistence in 
debt conservatism for large, profitable companies with growth options.  
Malmendier et al. (2010) find empirical support that internal financing is preferred 
to external funding, thus implying low financial leverage. However, if management is 
faced with many attractive investment opportunities and a financing deficit, it may prefer 
higher financial leverage to postponing these projects into the (far) future. As management 
                                                 
52 This assumes that higher profitability translates into higher free cash flows which is not necessarily the case if 
accruals or the tax burden increase as well 
53 Debt conservatism implies underutilization of debt relative to the tax benefits and a strong preference for 
internal to external financing. Graham uses the so-called kink variable to measure debt conservatism 
54 Hackbarth refers to this as the leverage and timing effects 
55 When they control for conventional leverage factors, the effect evaporates. 
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is evaluated on a regular basis, or at least once a year, the tradeoff between long-term and 
short-term results also makes the option of deferring projects less attractive. In such a 
situation, overconfident companies will use about one third more debt than their (rational) 
peers and issue less frequent equity. Ben-David et al. (2007) also empirically find that 
overconfidence translates into higher debt levels with longer maturity. As long as 
management still prefers internal funds to debt and uses new equity as a last resort, it 
complies with pecking order theory.  
4.5 Summary and discussion 
In this chapter, we have outlined the principles that underlie our comprehensive 
degree of confidence measure by using a similar methodology as Hayward and Hambrick 
(1997). As we do not only consider the higher end of the extreme, we use the terms lower 
and higher confidence respectively diffidence and overconfidence. We infer our 
confidence measure from a broad set of confidence indicators reflecting corporate 
decisions on operations, investment or funding. These indicators are inferred from current 
theoretical and empirical research on managerial (over)confidence. In our view, acts and 
even deliberate inaction, speak louder than words, so personal characteristics, such as 
compensation package, option exercise holdings, education background, e.g. are only 
(indirectly) relevant if translated into company decisions. 
Based on both theoretical and empirical insights, we translate the values of the 
confidence indicators into a confidence degree on a four-point scale. If possible, use 
quartiles instead of more arbitrary absolute breakpoints for assigning a degree of 
confidence. Although we consider financial leverage means to an end instead of a separate 
firm objective, we do include financial slack as one of the underlying drivers behind 
investment, dividend and share buyback. Table 4.5.1 summarizes the confidence indicator 
variables and the assignment of confidence levels to each of these, but we refer to 
appendix I for a more detailed variable description.  
In the next chapter, we perform an empirical analysis and investigate the 
characteristics of extreme confidence companies. We do not only explore these company 
attributes on a pooled basis, but also examine these across time and across industries. We 
also extend the analysis to company performance, for which we use various measures. 
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5 Empirical analysis of company confidence  
Abstract 
In this chapter, we empirically investigate if extreme degrees of company 
confidence translate into significantly different company characteristics, including 
performance. Contrary to prior research, we do not only focus on the upper extreme or 
overconfidence, but also include diffidence. In addition, we consider industry respectively 
time characteristics and company confidence, which can be considered a rough validity test 
of our degree of confidence measure. We find significant differences in the characteristics 
of low and high confidence firms in terms of size, book-to-market equity ratio, financial 
leverage compared to the industry average and performance. Low confidence firms tend to 
be smaller, more distressed, less conservatively financed and, except for the new 
millennium, yield a lower return on invested capital with higher variability. Differences in 
industry representation are not very pronounced between the confidence extremes. Low 
confidence firms seem mostly overrepresented in dynamic or rapidly changing industries 
like technology and telecom. High confidence firms are also well represented in these 
sectors, but have even more exposure to consumer non-durables and manufacturing. 
Narrowing the scope to performance, we find that differences in returns on invested capital 
are most pronounced in the eighties, but remain high in subsequent decades. 
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5.1 Introduction 
As discussed earlier, most research on management overconfidence focuses on its 
impact on a certain company decision, in particular investment. Conversely, the evolution 
of overconfidence across time and across industries is hardly covered. We believe that 
such a reality check56, although with hindsight, adds to our knowledge as well and could 
make us aware of possible red flags. In addition, the impact of overconfidence on company 
performance or valuation is hardly covered, while this would provide a link to investor 
behavior as well. We have to interpret our results with caution as hindsight bias may lead 
to judging certain behavior as irrational ex post, while this was not necessarily so ex ante.  
In the previous chapter, we developed a framework for assigning degrees of 
confidence and briefly touched upon the benefits of our measure compared to alternative 
ones. We argued that it would be less subjective, as more dimensions are included before 
concluding whether or not extreme confidence is exhibited. Furthermore, we do not share 
the implicit assumption that diffidence is not very interesting. Although it implies inaction 
rather than action, this does not imply that there is no impact on corporate performance 
either. Similar to other confidence proxies, we use ex post information, thus rendering it 
less suitable for predictions and validity tests.  
It is important to note that irrational managers should not be put on par with agency 
problems, as suboptimal or even detrimental decisions of the former may not be a 
deliberate action. Irrational managers may unjustly believe that they are acting in the 
company’s best interest, so some remedies to address agency problems, such as stock 
options, may not work57. However, tight corporate governance, legislation like the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act and a well-functioning market for corporate control may be effective 
countervailing power mechanisms to contain managerial biases. If so, we would find that 
compensating rather than reinforcing factors are at work within the different company 
decisions, thus topping off extreme confidence scores. Our results indeed point at 
mitigating factors rather than a positive feedback mechanism.  
In order to make our measure more intuitive, we explore if it translates into specific 
company, time-series and industry characteristics, while also extending the scope to 
corporate performance. We can empirically test if returns to capital providers are 
systematically different for biased firms. In this chapter, we only explore gross stock 
returns and return on invested capital. In the next chapter, we specifically explore if stock 
holders can earn abnormal stock returns by investing in extreme confidence firms. 
Hackbarth (2009) shows that a mild bias might be seen as positive, as it offsets 
underinvestment stemming from risk aversion. If overconfidence was only to reflect risk or 
                                                 
56 One could consider this a quick-and-dirty validity test 
57 This is also suggested by Malmendier and Tate (2005) 
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miscalibration, we would have similar mean returns but significantly higher variance for 
overconfident firms and vice versa for diffident firms. Conversely, if overconfidence was 
only to reflect returns, we would have similar variance but significantly higher mean 
returns for overconfident firms and vice versa for diffident firms. Alternatively, we could 
argue that extreme situations of confidence lead to suboptimal decisions and hence lower 
returns on invested capital, regardless of the direction of the bias58. 
We find an asymmetric relation of lower returns on invested capital for diffident 
compared to overconfident firms, thus rejecting the latter hypothesis. The difference in 
mean returns is even significant in the 2000 years, which was a very turbulent decade. We 
entered the new millennium with peak stock valuations, while by the end of this decade, a 
major financial and housing market collapse occurred. Based on our findings, we conclude 
that incorporating both risk and return into the definition of confidence indeed seems 
justified. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, we discuss our sample, followed by 
the methodology that we follow. For details on the company confidence measure, we refer 
to chapter four. Next, we present and discuss the common sample and extreme sample 
characteristics, including industry, time-series and performance related variables. Finally, 
we conclude and provide suggestions for further research.  
5.2 Sample Description 
In our empirical analysis, we focus on well-covered companies, or specifically S&P 
500 firms from 1980-2008. Although changes in the S&P 500 index occur throughout the 
year, we take the calendar year-end as a cut-off point for determining the sample for the 
coming year. We have excluded regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) and financials 
(SIC codes 6000-6999), due to specific income statement and balance sheet characteristics. 
Earlier empirical studies on (over)confidence use a similar sample of large cap firms in the 
same industries over a similar period. Malmendier et al. (2010) arrive at a share of 13% 
overconfident firms in a sample of Fortune 500 firms from 1980 to 1994, while Hribrar 
and Yang (2010) have a share of 11% overconfident observations in a sample comprised of 
572 Fortune 500 firms from the year 2000 up to and including 2004. On the one hand, we 
could argue that if our confidence variables compensate each other, the share of extremely 
high confidence firms could be less than the share found in earlier research or 20% when 
assuming symmetry between extremely high and low confidence scores. On the other 
hand, we could argue that the share of extreme confidence scores is higher than in previous 
research if our confidence variables have a reinvigorating effect. Beforehand, we do not 
                                                 
58 Hackbarth (2009) shows that a mild bias might be seen as positive as it offsets underinvestment from risk-
aversion 
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know what the case is, and therefore choose the 10% and 90% percentile as breakpoints for 
determining the two confidence extremes. 
As we require a wide range of input variables, we incur a high risk of missing data 
otherwise. In addition to calculating the variables underlying the seven confidence 
indicators, we have added additional control variables e.g. size or market capitalization, 
excess financial leverage compared to the industry level, the book-to-market equity or 
BEME-ratio and finally stocks returns. We retrieve our data from the Compustat database, 
except for stock prices, when the CRSP database is used. Our sample matches those used 
in other empirical studies on overconfidence in terms of firms (large caps) and period 
covered. Hambrick (1995) remarks that these industries are highly regulated, which 
restrains managerial discretion.  
We start our analysis with an unbalanced panel of 11,391 observations from 900 
firms, of which only 100 have observations for the full period. We require each 
observation to have values on all seven confidence indicators, which results in a final 
sample size of 5,416 (47.55%) observations in total. In order to avoid such a loss of 
observations, we could apply less stringent criteria and instead calculate the average of the 
indicator scores that are available. In our view, this makes the companies not comparable, 
as their confidence level is derived from a different set of actions. It also results in a higher 
weight of widely available variables from just over 14% to up to 100%. Alternatively, we 
could opt to estimate missing data, but this seems less useful for hard to predict or more 
discretionary events like acquisitions and accruals accounting59.   
5.3 Methodology 
The first part of our analysis comprises the calculation of our degree of confidence 
measure. We calculate the confidence indicators as defined in chapter four and then assign 
a degree of confidence score for each indicator following the propositions in chapter four. 
We refer to appendix I for more details on variable descriptions and calculations. We use a 
four-point scale, from minus two for the lowest and plus two for the highest confidence 
level, thus enforcing a direction. If possible, we use quartiles for determining breakpoints 
between the four different confidence levels60. We pool all observations over the full 
period to increase the number of observations and lower impact of outliers, which could be 
year-related. This approach assumes that the definition of low and high confidence stays 
constant rather than varying over the years. This could result in years with hardly any 
confident firms or vice versa. However, for the 1980-2008 period as a whole, we thus 
                                                 
59 Especially on these variables, we lack data 
60 The use of alternative breakpoints such as 15, 50 and 85% percentiles significantly reduces the number of 
extreme confidence scores on the separate indicators and hence reduces the variation in the aggregated confidence 
scores.  
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assume that 20% of our sample will consist of extreme confidence. In other words, we 
allow for years in which firms could be perfectly rational, but do not assume such 
situations to be steady i.e. assume that such ideal situations will be disrupted.  
Next, we aggregate the separate confidence indicator scores to arrive at a total 
score, which lies between -14 and +14. It could also add up to zero unlike the separate 
indicator scores, as we enforced a direction for the latter. Observations with missing values 
for one or more confidence indicators are excluded from our sample.  
The second part comprises the analysis of the high or top 10% scores and low or 
bottom 10% confidence scores. We first discuss the descriptive statistics for the full period 
and then explore how confidence evolves over time and industries. We break up the period 
into three parts, comprising the eighties, the nineties and the 2000 years. In addition to the 
possibility that confidence levels can be time-dependent, industry characteristics can be an 
important driver. In order to avoid a high dispersion over many sub industries, we use the 
SIC codes for assigning firms to one of the 12 Fama-French industry groups, as defined on 
Kenneth French’s website. As we have excluded utilities and financials from our dataset, 
this leaves us with ten industry groups.  
In the last part of our empirical analysis, we investigate the relation between our 
confidence measure and company performance. We use a hybrid measure, defined as the 
return on invested capital at market value (ROIC MV), which captures both backward 
looking (accounting) and forward looking (market) information. We run a pooled panel 
regression (Ordinary Least Squares), specified by the following regression equation: 
 
titiLOWtiHIGHtiti DDBXMVROIC ,,,3,,21,0, '_ HEED uu  
 
Equation 5.3.1 
 
The constant term α could be interpreted as a benchmark return, such as the risk-
free rate. The matrix X’ comprises control variables i.e. size, BEME-ratio, excess leverage 
and the twelve Fama French industry groups. We use a period fixed model i.e. adjust 
ROIC MV for the average return for year t over all cross-sections. In this way, we seek to 
capture the opportunity set in a certain year, which can be considered an important input 
factor for managers. In addition, we could include firm fixed effects to allow for a firm’s 
“natural” rate of return. We argue that this could be a feasible approach for firms in mature 
industries, but consider this less feasible for firms in more volatile or new industries. 
Finally, D is a dummy variable, the subscript of which indicates whether or not a company 
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has an extremely high or low confidence level. Furthermore, we use White adjusted 
standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity61.  
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Individual Sample Characteristics  
Table 5.4.1 shows the descriptive statistics of each of the confidence indicators 
separately. With the exception of acquisitions, we have used quartiles for defining 
breakpoints between low, medium low, medium high and high values of a certain 
confidence indicator variable. However, due to a discrete distribution and/or additional 
constraints regarding the financing gap or the sign of a dividend change, the confidence 
scores are not necessarily evenly distributed over the four levels for each variable. Only for 
the accruals and operating leverage indicators, all of which have no discrete distribution, 
extreme scores capture a share of 25%. For the other confidence indicators, the proportion 
of high scores is lower.  
We find that conservative accounting seems to dominate, as negative accruals 
comprise over half of the observations. The low occurrence and modest size of share 
buybacks suggests that this item is considered more discretionary rather than embedded in 
a company’s objectives. Especially for ad hoc events, such as large acquisitions or share 
buybacks, high scores are scarce. As earlier documented by Fama and French (2002) and 
Brav et al. (2005), we find support that dividends are sticky on the downside, as the 
median change is zero. In addition, diversification yields little high scores, as most S&P 
500 firms are highly focused or active one or two segments only. This translates in a high 
amount of low scores. Furthermore, the low frequency of extreme scores on the investment 
indicator is striking, for which the financing gap is to blame. The restrictive impact of 
financial slack is less dramatic for dividend payout and share buybacks, although extreme 
scores still capture less than half or 35-40% of observations. Also, the median investment 
level is somewhat low when compared to maintenance levels and market expectations62.  
In the next section, we will narrow our scope to the common sample, thus only 
including observations which yield data on all confidence indicators. 
 
                                                 
61 If observations of the same firm in different periods are highly correlated with each other, the use of clustered 
standard errors is preferred 
62 We related investment to depreciation level and Tobin’s Q ratio 
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5.4.2 Common Sample Characteristics 
As we require a score on all seven confidence indicators, we lose more than half of 
our observations and arrive at a final sample of 5,416 observations of 754 cross-sections 
over 29 years. Figure 5.4.1 summarizes the distribution characteristics of this sample.  
The Jarque-Bera statistic and the shape of the distribution curve indicate that the 
total confidence scores are not normally distributed63. We arrive at a negative mean score, 
but also have longer tails on the left i.e. a higher share of observations lies to the right of 
the low mean. We use 10% and 90% percentiles for determining the breakpoints for the 
low and high confidence sample. As the total score is discretely distributed with -14 and 
+14 as extremes, the share of high respectively low confidence firms is higher and 
amounts to 11.04% (598 observations) respectively 10.38% (562 observations). High 
scores on (a) certain indicator(s) are restrained by the additional conditions we have set or 
cancelled out by low scores on the other confidence indicators. Although the picture is 
more balanced for scores of each confidence indicator separately, lower scores still 
dominate the picture.  
  
Figure 5.4.1: Total Confidence Score distribution 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
-14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Series: TOTAL_CONFSCORE
Sample 1980 2008
Observations 5416
Mean      -0.915805
Median  -1.000000
Maximum  11.00000
Minimum -14.00000
Std. Dev.   3.684401
Skewness  -0.261242
Kurtosis   3.159069
Jarque-Bera  67.31486
Probability  0.000000
 
 
Note: total confidence is calculated as the sum of the separate confidence scores on each confidence indicator i.e. 
accruals, acquisitions, investment, dividend, diversification, operating leverage and share buyback. 
                                                 
63 We use Eviews which does not calculate excess kurtosis, but instead provides the normal kurtosis (which 
should be 3 in case of a normal distribution 
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Table 5.4.2 summarizes the common sample correlation statistics for the various 
confidence variables. Needless to say, these correlations do not reveal how causality runs 
between two variables. Furthermore, we would like to clarify our definition of financing 
gap, as this could be easily misinterpreted. Similar to the tendency to consider risk only 
from a negative perspective or downside, the term financing gap could suggest that we 
only refer to a deficit. However, in our definition, a positive number implies a financing 
surplus. We use the financing gap as a measure to what extent the company is able to fund 
its current capital expenditures from maintenance capital expenditures or depreciation, 
current ordinary income and excess cash if any. Working capital changes, acquisition 
spending, dividend and the cumulative funding shortfall of investments in the past i.e. the 
net debt position is not included in our definition. Most correlation coefficients are low or 
not significant. The high negative correlation between the financing gap on the one hand 
and investment, operating leverage respectively dividend payout on the other hand is partly 
due to construction. 
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Correlation is highest (0.4113) between the investment to Tobin’s Q ratio and 
operating leverage. Endogeneity64 could be to blame, as capital expenditures and 
depreciation, the numerator of investment to Q, is related to fixed assets or the numerator 
of operating leverage. This may also account for the high negative correlation of 
investment respectively operating leverage and the financing gap. In addition, both 
calculations include the book value of total assets. Although highly capital intensive firms 
incur are more likely to incur high investment outlay on an absolute level, this is not 
necessarily the case when comparing it with its market-to-book ratio. However, when high 
operating leverage firms are associated with less growth or a low Q ratio, this indeed 
increases the risk of overinvestment relative to the market’s expectations. Both operating 
leverage and investment show negative correlation with share buybacks, the latter of which 
we indicated a more discretionary item in chapter four. If capital intensity and investment 
are at high levels, this implies less room for discretionary items. Similarly, one could also 
consider acquisitions a more opportunistic event. In addition, if firms are highly capital 
intensive, their industry65 targets may be as well, thus making these more expensive66.  
Albeit to a lesser extent, investment also shows relatively high positive correlation 
with diversification or the number of different business segments. This suggests that fixed 
assets cannot be easily used for unrelated business activities. Furthermore, we highlight the 
possibility that the widely documented conglomerate discount causes markets to easily 
consider investment levels (too) high. As a result of higher investment requirements, 
financial slack also diminishes for more diversified firms. We also see a positive 
correlation between dividend and diversification. This could reflect the benefits of 
diversification i.e. lower volatility of cash flows on an aggregate basis, thus making higher 
dividends more sustainable..  
We find a positive relation between the financing gap on the one hand and accruals, 
acquisitions respectively share buybacks. Conversely, correlation between the financing 
gap and dividend changes respectively dividend payout is significantly negative. Strictly 
speaking, dividends, acquisitions and share buybacks do have an impact on the financing 
gap on a cumulative basis by reducing the net cash position if any. A positive relation 
between the financing gap and accruals may seem contradictory to our view of more 
aggressive bookkeeping when confidence is high in order to keep up with high earnings 
expectations. Higher accruals imply a higher discrepancy between reported and cash 
earnings, thus suggesting a negative relation. However, while book value changes in 
working capital changes are incorporated in our accruals calculation following Sloan 
                                                 
64 The correlation of investment respectively dividend with the financing gap also reflects endogeneity 
65 Note that we earlier indicated that firms tend to be highly focused, thus making expansion in related businesses 
more likely 
66 This assumes that these targets are not trading at distressed market values i.e. below book value 
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(1996), lack of data on cash changes in working capital made us decide to exclude this 
item from our financing gap calculation. The positive relation with more ad hoc events, 
such as acquisitions (insignificant) and share buybacks (significant), is intuitive i.e. such 
actions follow investment and are more likely to occur if sufficient slack is available. The 
negative relation of dividend changes respectively dividend payout with the financing gap 
corroborates with our view that these items do not move at par with financial slack, but 
tend to be sticky and set together with investment levels. Earlier, we referred to results by 
Fama and French (2002) that short-term changes in investment and earnings are absorbed 
by higher debt rather than lower dividends. The different relations between dividend-
related variables and share buybacks confirm our assumption that these are no perfect 
substitutes, but convey different messages. While share buybacks are more opportunistic 
and a way of addressing current stock mispricing in the view of management, dividend 
policy can be considered part of a firm’s long-term strategy on its future investment plans.  
5.4.3 Extreme Confidence drivers 
In order to get a better view how the different indicators impact the extreme 
confidence scores, we have calculated the amount of high confidence scores respectively 
low confidence scores as a percentage of total. The cumulative numbers in the last column 
of table 5.4.3 show that high scores are clearly less frequent (17.0% vs. 25.5%) than low 
scores. Overall, the characteristics are similar to the individual sample, with high scores 
clearly underrepresented, except for accruals and operating leverage.  
 
Table 5.4.3: Share of Extreme Confidence Scores  
(Common Sample) 
 
 Accrual Acq Div Invest Oplev Sbb Segment Cum. 
Highscore (%) 24.78 7.94 20.64 9.47 25.59 20.44 10.01 16.98 
Lowscore (%) 23.19 54.32 14.55 1.51 21.82 13.81 49.11 25.47 
N  5,416 5,416 5,146 5,416 5,416 5,416 5,416 37,912 
Note: The columns refer to the seven confidence indicators that we have identified. Accrual reflects the non-cash 
items in the income statement, scaled to adjusted EBIT. Adjusted EBIT equals this year’s EBIT margin (items 
178/12) times last year’s asset turnover (items 12/ 6). Acq stands for acquisitions, scaled to total assets. Dividend 
(Div) includes both first order (the payout level) and second order itms (dividend change). Investment (Invest) is 
related to historical investment i.e. depreciation and the market’s growth expectations as reflected by Tobin’s Q.  
Oplev stands for operating leverage ratio, Sbb for net share buybacks as a % of total market capitalization and 
Segment is the number of business segments or a measure for diversification. The last column shows the 
cumulative numbers or total amount of high respectively low scores on all seven confidence indicators. 
 
Figure 5.4.2 illustrates that particularly accruals, acquisitions or specifically the 
lack thereof, dividend policy and degree of diversification drive the extreme low 
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confidence companies. With regard to high confidence, the accruals indicator has a high 
contribution, while the share of the other indicators is more balanced.  
 
Figure 5.4.2: Extreme Confidence drivers 
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Note: Accruals reflect the non-cash items in the income statement, scaled to EBIT. Acq stands for acquisitions to 
total assets. Dividend includes the payout level and dividend change. Investment (Invest) is related to 
depreciation and Tobin’s Q. Oplev stands for operating leverage ratio, Sbb for net share buybacks compared to 
total market capitalization and Segment is the number of business segments i.e. a measure for diversification.
5.4.4 Descriptive Statistics Extreme Confidence Samples  
Table 5.4.4 shows the descriptive data from observations pooled67 by confidence 
level, or more specifically the two extremes and the neutral confidence level. We observe 
that the low confidence sample comprises 1) smaller firms with 2) a higher book-to-market 
equity ratio, 3) less conservative financing than high confidence firms but leverage below 
the industry’s, 4) higher valuation multiples, 5) a lower return on invested capital at market 
value (ROIC MV) and 6) lower mean raw annual stock returns68. We perform an analysis 
of variances (ANOVA), to investigate whether or not differences between the two 
confidence extremes are indeed significant, the results of which are summarized in table 
5.4.5. We note that there are some small differences within the extreme confidence sample 
                                                 
67 We lose some observations by including valuation multiples and stock returns 
68 Specifically, Fama and French (1992) form portfolios based on the BM-ratio at the end of fiscal year t and the 
size (market capitalization) as of the end of June on t+1. Annual returns are calculated as of January in the 
following year t+2. We also take the annual return two years later 
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vs. table 5.4.4, as we no longer require data on stock returns. Overall, differences with 
regard to size, BEME-ratio, excess leverage, returns on invested capital and valuation 
multiples are indeed all significant.  
The smaller mean69 size of low confidence firms (USD 6,620m vs. USD 8,597m 
market capitalization) could suggest that the lower amount of available resources at 
smaller firms dominates less tight control mechanisms compared to larger firms. In other 
words, investment and acquisition spend may be lower. This may also result into a higher 
focus or lower degree of diversification.   
If we interpreted the BEME ratio as a proxy for growth, the higher BEME ratio for 
low vs. high confidence firms (0.6200 vs. 0.5419) suggests that their growth prospects are 
lower. An alternative interpretation is that the higher BEME ratio for the low confidence 
sample implies that these stocks are more distressed. Indeed, we find a very high share 
(210 or 37.37%) of negative earnings in the low confidence sample. This corresponds to 
58.5% of all negative earnings observations (359), of which four are awarded the highest 
confidence degree. The higher share of loss making firms is for the low confidence sample 
is also visible in the significantly lower mean EBIT margin of low confidence firms 
compared to high confidence ones (12.05% vs. 5.63%) at the 1% level70. This lower 
profitability may also explain why confidence moves to such extreme low levels, albeit the 
opposite does not seem to occur. In a multifactor model, a lower growth profile or 
distressed earnings could translate into a higher ROIC MV to prevent economic value 
destruction. Conversely, in a CAPM-framework, such stocks could have lower correlation 
with the market, thus translating into lower required returns when only market risk is 
rewarded.  
For low confidence firms, we arrive at significantly higher median valuation 
multiples as measured by EV/EBITDA (10.13x vs. 7.68x) and PE (71.43x vs.16.07x). As 
firms with negative earnings or EBITDA are winsorized at the 99% level, this inflates the 
valuation ratios. As earlier indicated, the high values for the low confidence sample, in 
particular the PE ratio, are due to a very high share of negative earnings in the low 
confidence sample. 
For both samples, financial leverage is low relative to the industry. High confidence 
firms in particular have less excess leverage (-7.49% vs.-1.84% of total assets) compared 
to their peers. The results of Malmendier and Tate (2005) imply that overconfident firms 
are more likely to use debt for covering a financing deficit than rational ones. Ben-David et 
al. (2007) also find that overconfidence translates into higher debt with longer maturity. 
However, this does not rule out more conservative balance sheet characteristics than the 
                                                 
69 Median market capitalization amounts to USD 1,659m and USD 3,663m for low respectively high confidence 
firms 
70 Using NOPLAT (Koller et al. 2010) instead of EBIT margin does not materially change results 
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industry’s ones, unless confidence levels are primarily driven by sector characteristics. 
Also, our findings are consistent with pecking order theory that internal financing is 
preferred to external financing. If we do not take the industry but the mean leverage of the 
neutral confidence sample (-14.29%) as a proxy for the rational debt level, financial 
leverage is significantly less conservative. The fact that our sample represents bigger and 
more mature firms with bigger free cash flow generation, while our industry debt ratio 
includes all firms could also explain these results. However, this is contrary to Myers 
(1977), who states that the optimal debt level is inversely related to the share of growth 
opportunities to total firm value, thus implying higher rather than lower financial leverage 
for more mature firms.  
In terms of performance, we would expect extreme situations of confidence to lead 
to suboptimal decisions and hence lower returns on invested capital, regardless of the 
direction of the bias. However, our results only show a lower return for low confidence 
firms, while higher confidence companies significantly yield higher returns. The latter 
result supports Hackbarth’s (2009) arguments that a mild overconfidence bias might be 
seen as positive, as it offsets underinvestment from risk-aversion. 
If high confidence was only to reflect risk as some might argue, we would have 
similar mean returns but significantly higher variance for higher confidence firms. 
Conversely, if high confidence was only to reflect mean returns, we would have similar 
variance but significantly higher returns for higher confidence firms.  
None of the above hypotheses were supported in our results i.e. both the mean and 
the variance of our performance metric are significantly different between the confidence 
samples, as shown in table 5.4.5.We find that the low confidence sample earns a lower 
mean return on invested capital at market value (ROIC MV), with a mean ROIC MV of 
2.81% or significantly lower than the 6.94% earned by high confidence firms. Conversely, 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) do not find abnormal returns for overconfident managers for 
which differences in measurement may be to blame. They define abnormal returns as 
returns in excess of the S&P 500, i.e. they assume a beta of one and exclude other risk 
factors. As it takes five years from the option grant date before a CEO is qualified as 
overconfident, there is also a long time lag. We claim extreme confidence in the year for 
which we have calculated the confidence indicators, while not allowing for a time lag i.e. 
we match with the same ROIC MV of the same year. In the next chapter, we will release 
this and also allow for a time lag of up to a year after the fact.  
If we would compare these returns to the mean return of 5.98% (not shown) for 
neutral confidence firms, both are significantly different at the 1% level. Overall, the mean 
ROIC MV is low and unlikely to meet the WACC, unless the market anticipates growth71. 
                                                 
71 Based on a WACC of 7-8%, it would imply 2-3% growth, which seems not very aggressive 
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When we narrow our scope to raw annual stock returns following extreme confidence 
levels, we find no significant difference (not shown in ANOVA-table) between the 
extreme confidence samples72. The median stock return for low confidence is even a bit 
higher. The rational explanation for this higher stock return is that it reflects a higher 
compensation for risk, while the irrational explanation implies that the market overreacted 
to bad news, which is reversed in subsequent years.  
The lower ROIC MV for low confidence firms could reflect a numerator effect or 
low earnings after tax. Looking at the denominator, we highlight that debt conservatism vs. 
the industry is less for low confidence than for high confidence firms. This implies a lower 
weighted average cost of capital or WACC, as even a higher credit spread would make 
debt not as expensive as equity. A lower WACC lowers the threshold with regard to 
required growth rate or required ROIC in order to create value73. The better financial 
position of higher confidence firms is partly due to construction, as we associated high 
financial slack with higher confidence levels, as summarized in table 4.7.1. 
                                                 
72 Raw returns are not adjusted for market or other risk factors. Fama and French (1992) form portfolio’s based on 
the BM-ratio at the end of fiscal year t and the market capitalization as of the end of June on t+1. Annual returns 
are calculated as of January in the following year t+2. We also take the annual return two years later. 
73 For reasons of parsimony, most WACC calculations only incorporate market risk and a correction for financial 
leverage (by using the levered beta), while excluding the size and value premium. Higher financial leverage 
lowers the WACC until default risk becomes too high and pushes the cost of debt. 
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5.4.5 Time characteristics  
As illustrated in figure 5.4.3, the firms in our sample have a low degree of 
confidence over the 1980-2008 period as a whole, although we see variation over time. 
The mean total confidence score never comes into positive territory for our sample. On an 
aggregate level, management’s deeds seem conservative, although their beliefs may be 
more outspoken. It is striking to see the confidence dip as of the second year of each 
decade. Like our resolutions in January, we start optimistically, but are caught by the fact 
going forward.  
Figure 5.4.4 shows the share of extremely high and low confidence firms by year. 
As to be expected, we see a high negative correlation (-0.6544) between the year on year 
change in the number of high confidence firms and low confidence firms. 
 Figure 5.4.5 puts the distribution of high and low confidence firms over the 1980-
2008 time period into a historical perspective. Changes in the proportion of high to low 
confidence firms corroborate with major financial market shocks and waves. For instance, 
the confidence boost in 2005 is clearly visible and so is the financial market shock in 2008. 
The figure suggests that confidence levels move in sync with macro-economic 
developments, which is indeed very intuitive. Such “collective behavioral bias” could be 
corrected for in the confidence indicator itself, but this would result into different, year-
related absolute definitions. and a big influence of fads, such as the Internet or real estate 
boom. In more detail, we can make the following observations of confidence across time. 
The start of our sample period is marked by the Savings and Loans crisis and a 
recessionary environment with high inflation following the second oil crisis in 1979. The 
share of high confidence firms of the total for which a confidence score can be calculated 
plummets by over 40%, while the proportion of low confidence firms nearly doubles 
(+88%) from 1980 to 1982. It is not until 1984, the year in which Reagan was re-elected 
after his expansionary fiscal policy, that we see the proportion of high to low confidence 
reverse in favor of the former. The October crash in 1987 is not visible in the figure, which 
suggests it was an isolated event rather than a leading indicator for the “state of the union”.  
When we move to the nineties period, we see another shock at the start of this 
decade, when the First Gulf War (1990-1991) broke out. In 1991, the share of high 
confidence firms was half that of 1989, while the share of low confidence firms was 59% 
higher. The ratio of high vs. low confidence firms stays low and only gradually improves 
as of 1994. The impact of the Asian crisis (1997-1998) seems limited, although this could 
be thanks to low interest rates and the hot issue markets in technology and Internet. The 
peak of the technology and dotcom bubble is achieved in 1999, which shows a strong 
uptick in the proportion of high to low confidence companies.   
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The new century starts with a confidence dip with the dotcom crash and the 
September 11th attacks in 2001 and the tide turns for the better as of 2003. A period of 
bullish real estate and financial markets follows, with the housing market crashing in 2007. 
One year later, the collapse of Lehman Brothers triggered a financial market meltdown, of 
which the effects still filter through.  
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 In order to explore performance differences across time, we have also explored 
return on invested capital (ROIC MV) characteristics by sub period i.e. the eighties, the 
nineties and the 2000 years74. We analyze differences both within and between the two 
confidence extremes, the results of which are summarized in table 5.4.6.  
 
Table 5.4.6: Analysis of Variance Mean ROIC MV by sub period 
 
Confidence level Period  80s  90s  00s  
High  Mean 0.0813  0.0585  0.0550  
 Difference prior period NA  -0.0228 *** -0.0036  
Low Mean 0.0322  0.0243  0.0240  
 Difference prior period NA  -0.0079  -0.0003  
High -/- Low  Mean difference 0.0491 *** 0.0343 *** 0.0310 *** 
Note: High respectively Low corresponds to the top (bottom) 10% confidence scores. ROIC MV as defined in 
table 5.3. Column 2 (4) shows the probability that the ROIC MV of the high (low) confidence sample is equal to 
the previous period. The last column shows the probability that within a certain period; the ROIC MV of the high 
confidence samples equals that of the low confidence sample. The 2000 years cover up to and including 2008. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance with at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level. 
 
We find that for the high confidence sample, the mean ROIC MV significantly 
differs for the eighties compared to the nineties. Conversely, there is no significant 
difference between the 2000 years and the nineties. For the low confidence sample, there is 
no significant difference in ROIC MV between the different decades at all. We note that 
the number of observations for both confidence samples are clearly higher in the eighties 
and follows a steep decline in the subsequent decades.  
When we look at difference between extreme confidence firms within a certain 
subperiod, we observe significant differences in mean returns on invested capital for the 
two confidence extremes by decade, albeit most pronounced in the eighties. 
5.4.6 Industry characteristics 
We have also investigated if certain industries are over- respectively 
underrepresented in the high and low confidence samples, which is shown in figure 5.4.6. 
We find a positive correlation coefficient of 0.5236 (not shown) between the industry 
representation of the high and the low confidence sample. In other words, if an industry is 
overrepresented in the high confidence sample, it also tends to be overrepresented in the 
low confidence sample and vice versa, albeit to a much lower extent. Both samples are 
underrepresented in Energy, Chemicals and Healthcare. High confidence firms are mostly 
                                                 
74 For a concise description of major historical market events from 1961 to 2000 linked to investor sentiment, we 
refer to Baker and Wurgler (2006). 
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overrepresented in consumer non-durables 75 and manufacturing, while low confidence 
firms show a high overrepresentation in business equipment and telecom or more dynamic 
industries76. The higher focus or less diversification, a lower likelihood of overinvestment 
in faster growing industries and a higher reliance on human rather than fixed capital, the 
costs of which are expensed rather than capitalized (accruals) may account for this.  
                                                 
75 Non-durables include food, tobacco, textiles, apparel, leather, toys e.g 
76 This is not synonymous to young industries 
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5.4.7 Pooled Panel Regression Results  
Tables 5.4.7 and 5.4.8 summarize the output of the pooled panel (OLS) regression 
with return on invested capital or ROIC MV as the dependent variable. We pool all our 
observations for the 1980-2008 period. Overall, we can explain about 30% of the ROIC 
MV, to which our confidence dummies contribute 5.93%. We find positive and significant 
coefficients on size, BEME ratio, the high confidence dummy and industry groups 1 
(consumer non-durables), 2 (consumer durables), 3 (manufacturing), 5 (chemicals), 7 
(telecom) and 9 (shops). We find a negative coefficients on industry group 6 (business 
equipment) and a positive one on group 10 (healthcare), neither of which is significant 
though. Coefficients are significantly negative on excess leverage and the low confidence 
dummy. 
The positive relation between size and ROIC MV indicates that bigger firms earn a 
higher ROIC MV than smaller ones, although the effect is small. For instance, a 10% 
higher market capitalization77 would increase ROIC MV by only 0.02% in absolute terms. 
The negative impact of a higher denominator or size is more than offset by a positive 
numerator i.e. higher EBIT after tax. Fama and French (1992) found a negative size effect, 
but this was related to (forward looking) stock returns, while our ROIC metric concerns all 
capital providers and also includes backward looking information.  
Although we find a significant positive relation between the book-to-market equity 
ratio and ROIC MV, the coefficient is low. For a stock at a BEME-ratio of 0.50, a 10% 
increase in market capitalization would, ceteris paribus, decrease ROIC MV by only 
0.06% in absolute terms. The inclusion of excess leverage vs. industry peers marginally 
increases explanatory power. We find a negative coefficient that translates into a 0.14% 
lower ROIC MV in absolute terms when financial leverage to total assets is 10% higher 
than peers.  
The opposite signs of the dummy coefficients imply asymmetry in returns vs. the 
benchmark. We find a significant positive relation between the high confidence dummy 
and ROIC MV. If confidence is high, this adds 1.17% to ROIC MV in absolute terms. 
Conversely, ROIC MV is 2.74% lower in absolute terms when a firm is qualified as low 
confident. Both relations are significant.  
 
                                                 
77 Note that we measure size as the natural logarithm of total market capitalization 
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Table 5.4.7: Pooled Panel Regression confidence dummies 
 
Dependent variable: ROIC MV (1980-2008) 
Constant 0.0316 *** 0.0302 *** 0.0160 * 0.0258 *** 
 (0.0076)  (0.0078)  (0.0084)  (0.0081)  
LNSIZE 0.0022 *** 0.0020 ** 0.0026 *** 0.0016 ** 
 (0.0008)  (0.0008)  (0.0008)  (0.0008)  
BEME 0.0102 ** 0.0127 *** 0.0129 ** 0.0129 *** 
 (0.0047)  (0.0049)  (0.0051)  (0.0049)  
EXCESS LEV   -0.0146 *** -0.0176 *** -0.0140 *** 
   (0.0037)  (0.0037)  (0.0035)  
DHIGH       0.0117 *** 
       (0.0015)  
DLOW       -0.0276 *** 
       (0.0028)  
Industry effects No  No  Yes  Yes  
Period effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.1971  0.2093  0.2441  0.3033  
Note: Method: Pooled Panel OLS regression with period fixed effects. The dependent variable equals the return 
on invested capital at market value. Dummies reflect high (low) confidence sample. LNSIZE equals ln(market 
equity). Market equity equals shares outstanding times price (items 199*25); BEME-ratio equals book to market 
equity. Book equity is total stockholder’s equity less preferred stock plus deferred tax assets (items 216 –130 + 
35). Excess leverage equals net debt to EBITDA [(items 9+34–1)/(item 13)] minus the industry debt ratio (based 
on two digit SIC code) times EBITDA to total assets. If EBITDA <=0 and net debt <=0, net debt to EBITDA is 
set at 0. If EBITDA is <=0 and net debt>0, excess leverage is set at net debt to total assets. Excess leverage is 
winsorized at (minus) one times total assets. ROIC MV or return on market value adjusted capital equals (1-cash 
tax rate) times EBIT (item 178) divided by invested capital at market value. Cash tax rate equals income tax less 
accrued and deferred taxes (item 16-305-126) divided by pre-tax income (item 170). If not between 0 and 1, we 
use the income tax cash rate or otherwise a default rate of 35%. Invested capital (item 37) includes market instead 
of book equity. We exclude observations with negative invested capital or a | ROIC| >1.Asterisks indicate 
significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). 
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Table 5.4.8: Specification industry effects and ROIC MV 
 
Dependent variable: ROIC MV (see table 5.4.5) 
Constant 0.0160 * 0.0258 *** 
 (0.0084)  (0.0081)  
FF_1 0.0203 *** 0.0198 *** 
 (0.0042)  (0.0040)  
FF_2 0.0092 * 0.0110 ** 
 (0.0055)  (0.0050)  
FF_3 0.0124 *** 0.0124 *** 
 (0.0043)  (0.0040)  
FF_4 0.0072  0.0066  
 (0.0057)  (0.0056)  
FF_5 0.0174 *** 0.0160 *** 
 (0.0045)  (0.0044)  
FF_6 -0.0031  -0.0009  
 (0.0045)  (0.0042)  
FF_7 0.0104 ** 0.0114 ** 
 (0.0053)  (0.0055)  
FF_9 0.0104 *** 0.0105 *** 
 (0.0041)  (0.0039)  
FF_10 0.0012  0.0027  
 (0.0043)  (0.0041)  
DHIGH   0.0117 *** 
   (0.0015)  
DLOW   -0.0276 *** 
   (0.0028)  
Adjusted R2 0.2441  0.3033  
Note: Method: Pooled Panel OLS regression with period fixed effects. ROIC MV equals the return on invested 
capital at market value. Dummies reflect high (low) confidence sample. Asterisks indicate statistical significance 
at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or 1% (***) level. White period adjusted standard errors in brackets. Variables as defined 
in table 5.4.5. FF_# refers to the twelve Fama French industry groups. Industry groups 8 and 11 i.e. utilities and 
financials are excluded. Industry group 12 = miscellaneous and reflected in the constant term. 
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5.5 Robustness checks 
As a robustness check, we redo our analysis by replacing the confidence dummies 
by aggregating78 the separate Z-scores on the seven confidence indicators. For brevity, we 
call this alternative variable the Z-score. In formula terms, the Z-score for each firm in a 
certain year (firm and period identifiers are excluded for readability) is calculated as 
follows:  
 
> @ > @
> @fingappayoutchangediv
fingapsharebbfingapinvest
sicoplevacqaccruals
ZscoreZscoreZscore
ZscoreZscoreZscoreZscore
ZscoreZscoreZscoreZscoreZscore


 
_3
1
2
1
2
1  
 
Equation 5.5.1 
 
The seven right-hand terms refer to the confidence indicators i.e. accruals, 
acquisitions, operating leverage, diversification, investment, share buyback policy and 
dividend policy. For more details on the variable calculations, we refer to Appendix I. As 
we have introduced additional constraints such as the financing gap and the change in 
dividend, we arrive at nine variables in total which are normalized and aggregated. When 
we assume a negative relation between a confidence indicator variable and confidence, the 
Z-score is subtracted i.e. dividend payout and operating leverage. If an indicator is based 
on several variables, such as the dividend indicator (dividend change, dividend payout and 
financing gap), each element is equally weighted.  
Unlike the determination of the extreme confidence portfolios, we no longer 
enforce a positive or negative direction i.e. zero scores are now possible for each 
confidence indicator separately. Table 5.5.1 summarizes the pooled panel regression 
(OLS) results of our alternative confidence variable i.e. the Z-score.  
                                                 
78 As shown in Equation 5.5.1, we subtract rather than add the Z-scores related to dividend respectively operating 
leverage  
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Table 5.5.1: Pooled Panel Regression Confidence Z-score  
 
Dependent variable: ROIC MV (1980-2008) 
Constant * 0.0258 *** 0.0262 *** 
  (0.0081)  (0.0091)  
LNSIZE *** 0.0016 ** 0.0018 ** 
  (0.0008)  (0.0009)  
BEME ** 0.0129 *** 0.0122 ** 
  (0.0049)  (0.0053)  
EXCESS LEV *** -0.0140 *** -0.0153 *** 
  (0.0035)  (0.0036)  
DHIGH  0.0117 ***   
  (0.0015)    
DLOW  -0.0276 ***   
  (0.0028)    
Z-score    0.0018 *** 
    (0.0005)  
Industry effects  Yes  Yes  
Period effects  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2  0.3033  0.2586  
Note: Method: Pooled Panel OLS regression with period fixed effects. The dependent variable equals the return 
on invested capital at market value. Dummies D reflect high (low) confidence sample. Z-score refers to the sum 
of normalized confidence variables. LNSIZE equals ln (market equity). Market equity equals shares outstanding 
times price (items 199*25); BEME-ratio equals book to market equity. Book equity is total stockholders’ equity 
less preferred stock plus deferred tax assets (items 216 –130 + 35). Excess leverage equals net debt to EBITDA 
[(items 9+34–1)/(item 13)] minus the industry debt ratio (based on two digit SIC code) times EBITDA to total 
assets. If EBITDA <=0 and net debt <=0, net debt to EBITDA is set at 0. If EBITDA is <=0 and net debt>0, 
excess leverage is set at net debt to total assets. We winsorize excess leverage at (minus) one times total assets. 
ROIC MV or return on market value adjusted capital equals (1-cash tax rate) times EBIT (item 178) divided by 
invested capital at market value. Cash tax rate equals income tax less accrued and deferred taxes (item 16-305-
126) divided by pre-tax income (item 170). If not between 0 and 1, we use the income tax cash rate or otherwise a 
default rate of 35%. Invested capital (item 37) includes market instead of book equity. We exclude observations 
with negative invested capital or a | ROIC| >1. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10 (*), 5 (**) and 1% 
(***). 
 
When we replace our confidence dummies by our Z-score variable, adjusted R2 is 
lower at 26%. Our Z-score variable adds 1.45% (not shown) to explanatory power. The 
constant term and coefficients on size, BEME ratio, excess leverage and industry groups 
remain similar, also in terms of significance. We find a significant positive relation 
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between the Z-score and ROIC MV at the 1% level. This suggests that not only extreme 
confidence characteristics are reflected in performance, but that any change in confidence 
may have an impact on returns on invested capital.  
Alternatively, we have introduced a one-year lag of the independent variables for 
addressing endogeneity and a possible delayed impact of the degree of confidence on 
performance79. The introduction of a one-year lag causes a loss of explanatory power to 
just over 20%, but overall the constant term and coefficients are similar in terms of size 
and significance. The coefficient on the BEME flips to negative, but is no longer 
significant. Also, neither excess leverage nor industry group 7 (Telecom) is now 
significant. The coefficients on the confidence dummies or Z-score are smaller but all 
remain significant at the 1% level for the confidence dummies respectively 5% level for 
the Z-score confidence variable. 
5.6 Summary and discussion 
In this chapter, we have calculated a degree of confidence for S&P 500 companies 
over the 1980 to 2008 period, which was inferred from corporate decisions on operations, 
investment and funding. Looking at the extremes, we find significant differences in the 
characteristics of low and high confidence firms in terms of size, book-to-market equity 
ratio, financial leverage vs. the industry average and performance. Lower confidence firms 
tend to be smaller, more distressed, less conservatively financed and, except for the new 
millennium, yield a lower return on invested capital with higher variability.  
In order to capture time characteristics, we use a long period that covers almost 
three decades i.e. from 1980 to up and including 2008. Our results indicate that the share 
of high to low confidence firms coincides with major economic events across time. We 
observe that the proportion of high vs. low confidence firms deteriorates during major 
shocks, such as the Savings and Loans crisis, the First Gulf war, the dotcom crash and 
September 11th attacks in 2001 and the collapse of the financial markets in 2008. Neither 
the October 1987 nor the Asian crisis in the late nineties seem to have heavily affected 
confidence and instead seemed isolated events. However, in the late 90s, there were some 
mitigating factors, such as the low interest environment and hot issue market in technology 
and Internet. Also, the boom and bust of the housing and financial market is visible.  
It is striking to see that the number of low confidence companies plummets to very 
low levels as of the mid-nineties, both compared to historical levels and compared to the 
amount of high confidence companies. Is this thanks to animal spirits in action or do we 
have to redo the math and enforce another correction to restore the balance? We have also 
                                                 
79 Fama and French (1992) also have a one- to two-year difference between annual stock returns (measured from 
Jan –Dec fiscal year +2) and the cut-off points for measuring the independent variables i.e. the BEME ratio (end 
of fiscal year) and size (end of June fiscal year +1). 
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analyzed industry characteristics, but it is hard to find a common denominator. Low 
confidence companies seem to have a higher representation in dynamic or rapidly 
changing industries like technology and telecom. We find that high confidence firms have 
high exposure to consumer non-durables and manufacturing.  
Finally, we have investigated if there is a relation between our confidence measure 
and company performance. We use a hybrid measure, defined as the return on invested 
capital at market value (ROIC MV) that captures both backward looking (accounting) and 
forward looking (market) information. We expect extreme situations of confidence to lead 
to suboptimal decisions and hence lower returns on invested capital, regardless of the 
direction of the bias. Hackbarth (2009) argues that a mild bias might be seen as positive, as 
it offsets underinvestment from risk-aversion.  
The descriptive statistics show an asymmetric relation with significantly lower 
returns for low confidence companies vs. high confidence ones. Differences in returns 
between the confidence extremes are most pronounced in the eighties, fade out in the 
nineties and evaporate in the new millennium. Overall, we consider returns very low, 
which can only be justified if growth prospects look bright or investors requiring modest 
returns. The use of a Z-score instead of a dummy variable for extreme levels of confidence 
does not violate the positive relation between the degree of confidence and performance, 
which also remains significant. This suggests that not only extreme levels of confidence 
have an impact on performance, but any level. 
Instead of using a hybrid dependent variable like ROIC MV which incorporates 
both book and market values, we could opt for a pure market performance measure, such 
as stock returns. In the next chapter, we will investigate if the move to an extreme 
confidence level yields abnormal stock returns using a multifactor model. In addition, we 
include investor sentiment indicators to explore the interaction between the degree of 
confidence and investor sentiment.  
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6 Does extreme confidence yield extreme stock returns? 
Abstract 
In this chapter, we contribute to current research by empirically investigating if 
companies that move to extreme levels of confidence also earn cumulative abnormal stock 
returns (CARs), adjusted for investor sentiment as well. Over the 1980-2008 period as a 
whole, we find that a long-short strategy in high-low confidence firms could pay off if in 
high abnormal returns of 6.21% and 9.47% if well-timed one to two years in advance. In 
the years after changing to extreme confidence levels, CAR differences between extreme 
degrees of confidence are not significant, except for the nineties. Then, investing in high 
confidence firms has a significant negative pay-off. On a standalone basis, we find highly 
negative CARs to up to -13.22% prior or during a move to the lower confidence tail, thus 
implying that low rather than high confidence is detrimental to stock performance. We find 
a significant positive relation with CARs and investor sentiment, the latter of which also 
significantly interacts with company confidence, albeit conditional on the CAR window.  
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6.1 Introduction 
“Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent” 
 
Attributed quote to Keynes in a biography by Harrod (1951)  
 
One of the key assumptions underlying the efficient market hypothesis or EMH is 
that economic agents have rational expectations and maximize utility. Irrational behavior is 
arbitraged away or does not have a long-lived impact. This implies that this non-
fundamental risk should not be awarded with persistent abnormal returns. In chapter three, 
we discussed that limits to arbitrage and the widely documented existence of market 
anomalies imply that this assumption is violated in practice.  
When we value a risky asset, we do not only have to deal with market participants, 
but with company management as well, including their interactions. The option to rely on 
the market for readdressing irrational management behavior can become costly, both in 
terms of money and time, as reflected in Keynes’ words. DeLong et al. (1990) state that “a 
departure from rationality or noise creates unpredictability, uncertainty and non-
fundamental risk regarding the length and extremeness of market distortions80”. Although 
they referred to investors, this may also apply to irrational managers. As a result, abnormal 
return opportunities may arise, which can be very persistent instead of just a temporary 
mispricing.  
Earlier, we already discussed how extreme company confidence can impact 
performance, for which we used a hybrid measure that contained both accounting and 
market information. We found that amongst other differences, lower confidence firms tend 
to yield a lower return on invested capital with higher variability, except for the new 
millennium. This seems hard to reconcile with a lower risk profile, as lower confidence 
tend to be more distressed and smaller.  
In this chapter, we narrow our scope to market-based performance indicators, or 
specifically abnormal stock returns. Our expectation is that when adjusting for risk-
adjusted returns, the performance gap between high and low confidence firms widens even 
further. As the information that we use for calculating our confidence indicator is all 
publicly available, albeit revealed with some delay after the fiscal year end, semi-strong 
market efficiency suggests that prices should reflect this information shortly after release81.   
                                                 
80 Although DeLong et al (1990) refer to the financial market, one could also take a broader definition and include 
real markets as well. 
81 It should be contained in the annual report, which is released shortly after the FY figures. When the book year 
coincides with the calendar year, one can expect this information by March/April when the annual report is 
released.  
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Apart from comparing cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) between firms 
that move to the most extreme company confidence levels, we also allow a role for 
investor sentiment and its interaction with company sentiment. As the market may 
anticipate a move to extreme confidence levels, but may also underreact or overreact to 
such news, we take various windows for calculating CARs. Causality could run from 
(lagged) market sentiment to management’s confidence but also the other way around. For 
instance, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) empirically find a positive relation between merger 
and acquisition activity and stock valuation. However, so-called “bellwether” stocks like 
Intel can also heavily impact market sentiment. 
The chapter is organized as follows. First, we discuss some limitations of current 
research on overconfidence. Subsequently, we describe our sample and methodology. 
Apart from reporting plain results on abnormal stock returns between the confidence 
extremes for the 1980-2008 period as a whole, we explore the characteristics by decade as 
well as possible interaction between investor sentiment and company sentiment. In 
addition, we include the overall stock market environment in the picture, for which we use 
the implied equity risk premium as a proxy. Similar to chapter five, we also perform a 
robustness check by using an alternative measure for calculating total confidence. Finally, 
we end the chapter with a summary and discussion of our main findings. 
6.2 Shortcomings of current research  
In literature on irrational management behavior, overconfidence and its impact on 
corporate decisions attracts most attention. The big challenge is how to measure 
overconfidence, while extending the analysis to performance would provide a link to 
investors. Empirical tests of the detrimental impact of suboptimal decisions by biased 
management on company or shareholder value are scarce if performed at all. Malmendier 
and Tate (2005, 2008) calculate excess returns vs. the S&P 500 by overconfident CEOs82, 
to test whether or not insider trading instead of overconfidence could be a rational 
argument why they are underdiversified. The authors mutually exclude positive excess 
returns and overconfidence though. They find no excess returns on average, although there 
is a negative announcement effect of acquisitions. Based on these results, the authors 
dismiss the insider trading argument. However, we note that these may have to do with the 
long time lag of five years, before a CEO who failed to exercise options is qualified as 
confident. 
Goel and Thakor (2008) show that, up to a certain point, management 
overconfidence can enhance company value by compensating for risk aversion. However, 
for extreme forms of overconfidence, the impact is detrimental, due to over- or 
                                                 
82 Malmendier and Tate (2005) define an overconfident CEO as one who has excessive exposure to his firm by 
holding instead of exercising in the money options 
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underinvestment. We are not aware of any literature on the culprit of extreme forms of 
diffidence. Assuming symmetry, we would also expect higher required returns for any 
form of extreme confidence. However, we only documented very low returns on invested 
capital for low confidence firms in the previous chapter, which may suggest asymmetry. 
The sign of the CARs is not clear though, as it depends on the source of the low returns on 
invested capital i.e. whether it reflects a denominator or a numerator effect. As the market 
value of equity represented the biggest component in the denominator, this could imply 
that the market has not yet fully discounted the stock or underreacted to news. However, 
overreaction is also possible if the market heavily discounted the shares in previous 
periods, while earnings recovery has yet to occur i.e. the numerator depresses return on 
invested capital. In the latter situation, positive CARs are possible.   
In chapters four and five, we constructed an indirect measure of a company’s 
confidence level and linked this to return on invested capital. We constructed a composite 
confidence measure from seven confidence indicators covering a wide range of corporate 
decisions on operations, investment and funding. As a result, companies were only marked 
as high or low confident if they exhibited this behavior consistently in those seven areas. 
We expected extreme confidence levels to lead to suboptimal decisions and hence lower 
returns on invested capital (ROIC), regardless of the direction of the bias83. However, 
amongst other differences, we found a significantly lower and more volatile performance 
for the bottom vs. the top confidence deciles, thus suggesting asymmetry.  
In this empirical study, we use Carhart’s (1997) four factor model and analyze if 
12- month cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) within and between the two confidence 
extremes are significantly different for various windows i.e. the year prior, the year itself 
and the two years after moving to an extreme low or high confidence level. In other words, 
we explore the profitability of a long strategy in either of the confidence extremes and a 
long-short strategy in the high- low extreme. The base case of efficient markets implies 
that it is not possible to persistently earn abnormal returns based on historical, recent 
market or even inside information. As our confidence measure entails various indicators on 
which news could be released throughout the year, this implies many price moving events 
and hence opportunities for abnormal returns if adjustments are insufficient. Apart from 
biases, investors may suffer from the use of heuristics.    
Financial market booms and busts across time imply that confidence is highly 
contagious rather than an isolated phenomenon. Akerlof and Shiller (2009) referred to this 
as the confidence multiplier. Baker and Wurgler (2006) already investigated the standalone 
impact of investor sentiment on cross-sectional stock returns, but we also explore if 
                                                 
83 Hackbarth (2009) shows that a mild bias might be seen as positive as it offsets underinvestment from risk-
aversion 
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interaction between company confidence and investor sentiment significantly impacts 
CARs.  
The relation between investor and management confidence is not straightforward. 
For instance, management may have good reasons to ignore or even defy market signals 
given their inside information, thus implying a non-existent or negative relation. 
Alternatively, there could be an asymmetric relation, conditional on management’s risk 
attitude and dominance of either confirmation bias or cognitive dissonance. If risk seeking, 
we would expect management to overweigh positive and to underweigh respectively 
ignore negative investor sentiment, while the opposite is more likely to occur if they are 
highly risk averse.  
6.3 Data and methodology 
For the first set of data, we use our confidence measure as calculated for the S&P 
500 firms from 1980 up to and including 2008 in chapters four and five. In our analysis, 
we use the 10% and 90% percentile as breakpoints for determining the two confidence 
extremes. The few companies (34) that move from one extreme to the other in the 
subsequent year are excluded, which does hardly affect our results. Furthermore, we only 
look at the change in confidence vs. the previous year, for which we use dummies. This 
approach enables us to track returns in the period before and after such a change. 
Conversely, if we take the absolute confidence level and no change takes place in the prior 
or post period, we cannot determine whether returns reflect the past, current or future 
situation, For companies that remain qualified as extremely high or low confident in the 
subsequent year, the confidence change dummy takes a value of zero. The reason for doing 
so is that we calculate CARs over different monthly time windows of [-12, -1], [0, 11], 
[12, 23] and [24, 35], with zero corresponding to the month January of the year in which a 
move to extreme confidence takes place84. This methodology significantly reduces the 
observations in the extreme confidence samples by roughly 50%, as confidence levels tend 
to be steady for a while.   
The second set of data comprises total monthly returns of these S&P 500 companies 
over 1979-2008. We only extract return data of common stock i.e. exclude share codes 10 
and 1185 from the CRSP database. We use these data for calculating abnormal stock returns 
following Carhart’s (1997) four factor model, in which the return in excess of the risk-free 
rate, denoted R, is explained by the excess market return (RMRF), size (SMB), distress 
(HML), prior year momentum (PR1YR) and some noise as denoted by the error term. This 
                                                 
84 Alternatively, we could correct t-values for this problem by dividing these by the square root of the maximum 
amount that an observation could pop up (i.e. four times). 
85 Sometimes, firms have more than one PERMNO code, due to different classes of stock or other technical 
reasons. In that case, we take the class which is most traded by the public 
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is shown by equation 6.3.1 (next page). The subscripts t = 1,2,…T and T correspond to the 
total months for which we have stock returns data and the subscript i identifies the firm.  
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Equation 6.3.1 
 
First, we have to estimate the factor sensitivities for each company, by regressing 
monthly stock returns from the same period on the monthly factor premiums86 by using an 
ordinary least squares approach. The error terms or residuals correspond to the monthly 
abnormal returns, which are accumulated for the full year. We thus assume perfect 
hindsight and no change in factor exposure across the years. Note that in the TMT 
(Technology Media and Telecom) bubble, we saw a large drop in market beta for non-
TMT stocks, while this was reversed in later periods. Such temporary distortions are not 
reflected in our coefficients, but translate into the error term87. We require data for the full 
year in order to be included. Investors could have anticipated the very low mean returns on 
invested capital for low confidence firms by depreciating the stock in previous months. 
Alternatively, it could take some time before the market finds out about the confidence 
level, as some information88 is revealed after the fiscal year-end. 
When we assume positive risk premiums on the four factors89, the smaller size and 
higher book-to-market ratio imply higher (required) stock returns for the lower confidence 
firms. Furthermore, we expect market beta to be positive for these S&P 500 firms90, which 
also translates into higher returns. It is intuitive to think that momentum is negative for low 
confidence stocks, but we doubt whether this factor could mitigate the higher required 
returns from the other three factors. Taking into account the lower raw annual stock returns 
that we found in earlier research, we would expect negative risk adjusted returns or CARs 
for the low confidence firms.  
We use an analysis of variance or ANOVA to test whether or not CAR differences 
are significant between the confidence extremes in the year before, the year itself and the 
two years after the change to extreme confidence. In addition, we explore how CARs 
evolve over different sub periods comprising the eighties, nineties and the 2000 years. 
                                                 
86 These factor premiums are extracted from Kenneth French’ website.  
87 If we would use year-fixed effects, such year-related distortions would translate into a higher constant term  
88 In particular, working capital changes i.e. changes in accruals are hard to predict, as these can be very volatile 
and subject to management’s discretion.  
89 This seems very logical, but we note that only in three out of thirty years, all factor premiums are positive. 
Excluding momentum, only six out of thirty years have positive premiums on all three factors simultaneously. 
90 We find a market beta of 1.12 and 1.10 for the low and high confidence firms. The sample includes three 
companies with a negative beta 
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Furthermore, the CAR difference between the two confidence extremes is put into a time 
and general stock market perspective. We use the forward (excess) earnings yield as a 
proxy for general stock market conditions. When long-term growth expectations and 
expected dividend payout ratios hardly change91, the change in earnings yield should 
mirror the change in the equity risk premium. The latter is illustrated in the appendix, 
where we discuss Gordon (1962) growth model.  
We calculate the actual and expected earnings yield for the market by using IBES 
data on earnings forecasts for as many companies as possible in a certain year, so beyond 
the S&P 500. In addition, we require at least five estimates before including a forecast. 
Most earnings forecasts are only one to two years ahead, while there is a high amount of 
missing data on long-term growth. Sufficient data on dividend estimates are not available 
until 2003. We supplement the forecast data with realized data from the (merged) 
Compustat/CRSP data with regard to earnings and dividends per share, fiscal year-end 
shares outstanding, fiscal year-end closing price and the share price on the date at which 
the consensus forecast was calculated (April 15th). We cannot perfectly reconcile the three 
different databases, but the loss of data is limited to less than two percent. 
Next, we perform panel regressions for explaining CARs, which allows us to add 
additional control factors when explaining abnormal stock returns. We neither assume 
cross-section fixed nor period fixed effects, as abnormal returns should not be company or 
time dependent but noisy instead. In other words, we assume that smart investors will 
prevent companies from consistently beating or underperforming Carhart’s model. 
However, we face a joint testing problem in this case and omitted risk factors could render 
Carhart’s model less useful for specific companies.  
Similar to our descriptive analysis, we take different time windows for calculating 
cumulative abnormal returns i.e. one year prior, the current year, next year and two years 
after the extreme confidence year. The right-hand terms or independent variables includes 
the change in the high (low) confidence dummy takes a value of one when a company 
moves from the mainstream confidence level to the top (bottom) 10%. As we discussed 
earlier, observations from one extreme to the other are excluded, while those implying no 
change in the degree of confidence level take a dummy value of zero. Apart from including 
the change in the confidence dummy, we control for the twelve92 Fama-French industry 
groups. Finally, we also add lagged investor sentiment and its interaction with company 
confidence.  
In current literature, there are various proxies for investor sentiment. Brown and 
Cliff (2004) consider a comprehensive set of sentiment proxies, which consists of both 
                                                 
91 For the market as a whole, such an assumption is not uncommon 
92 As our sample excludes utilities and financials due to their specific balance sheet characteristics and regulatory 
environment, we are only left with ten industry groups 
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direct and indirect variables. Also, they distinguish between institutional investor 
sentiment and those of individual investors and test the relation of sentiment with 
subsequent stock returns. Baker and Wurgler (2006) also construct a composite sentiment 
variable from various indirect investor sentiment proxies in earlier literature and clean for 
business cycle effects as well. Their measure allows for lagging effects between these 
variables and investor sentiment. They find significant evidence that, when adjusting for 
Carhart’s (1997) four factors, investor sentiment may indeed have a significant impact on 
cross-sectional stock returns. The effect seems higher, the more subjective and the more 
difficult to arbitrage a stock is. These data can be retrieved from Wurgler’s website93 and 
we include these in our regression equation. We refer to the appendix for more details 
about these investor sentiment proxies. These factors are all summarized in the following 
regression equation: 
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Equation 6.3.2 
 
CAR stands for the cumulative abnormal stock return, the constant term α also 
captures the industry group one, the dummies D refer to the direction of the confidence 
change, the term SENT refers the clean sentiment indicator of Baker and Wurgler (2006) in 
the prior year t-1 followed its interaction with company confidence. Finally, we correct for 
industry effects94, while the error term captures the unexplained part.  
In our robustness check, we will define an alternative confidence variable or the 
change in the standardized individual confidence score on each of the seven indicators, 
abbreviated as the Z-score. We calculate mean CARs for different windows for each of the 
Z-score deciles and use an F-test to calculate whether or not mean CARs are 
simultaneously different among deciles.  
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Cross-sectional differences in CARs 
In chapter five, we reported significant differences between low and high 
confidence companies, with the former having 1) a smaller size, 2) a higher book-to-
market equity ratio, 3) less conservative financing, albeit still underleveraged vs. the 
                                                 
93 Data are updated until 2007 
94 As our sample excludes financials and utilities, Fama French industry groups 8 and 11 are not represented in 
our sample. 
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industry, 4) higher valuation multiples, 5) a lower and more volatile return on invested 
capital at market value and 6) lower raw annual stock returns95. Although a high share of 
cheap (debt) financing or low required returns could justify lower returns on invested 
capital, this explanation seems implausible for low confidence firms. Even with 100% debt 
financing, it is hard to believe that debt holders would be sufficiently compensated for 
their risk with a required return of less than 3% 96 after tax, especially when bearing in 
mind that these companies tend to be more distressed. Assuming efficient markets, this 
implies that the dip in ROIC is temporary and should reverse. If this view on recovery 
proves wrong, the market value of invested capital should depreciate until the required 
return hurdles are met, hence creating negative CARs.  
 
Table 6.4.1: Performance Characteristics by confidence level 
 
 Change to Highconf Change to Lowconf Change to Neutral 
  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
AT 6,624 3,307 6,045 2,123 6,694 2,929 
EBITMARGIN 0.1157 0.1049 0.0573 0.0539 0.1239 0.1055 
ROIC_MV 0.0679 0.0610 0.0349 0.0317 0.0580 0.0550 
PRE12M_CAR -0.0028 0.0088 -0.0968 -0.0808 0.0017 -0.0027 
CAR_FYEAR -0.0174 -0.0088 -0.0657 -0.0598 -0.0242 -0.0236 
POST12M_CAR -0.0360 -0.0395 -0.0055 -0.0096 -0.0173 -0.0083 
POST24M_CAR -0.0105 -0.0204 0.0140 0.0097 -0.0240 -0.0271 
N 247 247 231 231 313 313 
Note: AT stands for total assets, ROIC MV for return on invested capital at market value, CAR refers to annual 
cumulative abnormal return, which is measured 12 months before, during and after the year in which a degree of 
confidence was calculated. Using seven confidence indicators on investment, operating and financial decisions, 
we calculate a total degree of confidence score. The top (bottom) 10% belong to the high (low) confidence 
sample, while zero scores are qualified as neutral. 
 
Although each of the sub samples is much smaller or about half that in chapter five, 
company characteristics are similar as shown in table 6.4.1. Within each confidence 
sample, we only include observations which have data on all financial variables. Low 
confidence firms are indeed smaller and have much lower profitability. We stress that low 
                                                 
95 Specifically, Fama and French (1992) form portfolio’s based on the BM-ratio at the end of fiscal year t and the 
size (market capitalization) as of the end of June on t+1. Annual returns are calculated as of January in the 
following year t+2. We also take the annual return two years later. 
96 We found mean returns on invested capital at market value of 2.81% and 6.94% for low respectively low 
confidence firms over the 1980-2008 period.(Chapter 5) 
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EBIT margins or related profitability measures were not used as criteria for assigning a 
degree of confidence level. Overall, return on invested capital at market value (ROIC MV) 
is low and below six percent for the total sample (not shown in table). Unless required 
returns are low, this suggests that the market anticipates future growth.  
Figure 6.4.1 shows the frequency of the number of firms that move to extreme 
confidence areas. In total, we only have 280 respectively 26797 observations of firms that 
move to extremely high respectively extremely low confidence areas in a certain year. The 
positive correlation (0.1769) implies that years with a higher frequency of one extreme, 
also tend to have a higher frequency of the other extreme.  
                                                 
97 Note: the higher amount of observations vs. table 6.4.1. is due to the fact that we no longer require data on 
financial metrics, such as sales, margins and stock returns.  
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Figure 6.4.1: Frequency of movements to extreme confidence 
 
Note: highconf respectively lowconf refers to companies that move to extremely high respectively extremely low 
confidence levels. 
 
Table 6.4.2 shows the outcome of the Analysis of Variances (ANOVA) between the 
two extreme confidence levels. We note that the number of observations is approximately 
10% higher for each window for each confidence sample compared to table 6.4.1, as we 
only require data on CARs for this specific window instead of all windows. This explains 
the differences in mean CARs.  
We find that for the high confidence sample, CARs are all negative, but not 
significantly different from zero for either window. This suggests that insider trading does 
not pay off for overconfident firms, as the results of Malmendier and Tate (2005) also 
indicated. For the low confidence sample, however, we see a clearly different pattern. 
CARs are significantly negative in the year prior and low confidence year itself, despite 
the fact that we include momentum in the equation. As momentum is determined by 
looking at prior 12 month raw returns98 i.e. not adjusted for risk, this might be to blame. 
However, we see an improvement in the two years hereafter, when CARs even turn 
positive, albeit not significant.  
                                                 
98 Formally, prior year momentum is constructed as the equal weight average of the firms with the highest 30% 
eleven-month returns lagged one month less the equal weight average of the firms with the lowest 30% eleven-
month returns lagged one month. See Carhart (1997) and Kenneth French’ website.  
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Apart from within sample CARs, we also examine whether the difference in mean 
CARs between extreme samples is significant. In other words, we test if a long-short 
strategy could earn significantly positive CARs. We find that 12 months prior to moving to 
an extreme confidence level, CARs of the low confidence sample are significantly lower at 
-9.56% vs. -0.08% for high confidence firms, thus implying a gap of 9.47%. In the low 
(high) confidence year itself, the CAR gap narrows to 6.21%, both of which are negative at 
-8.20% (-1.99%). However, in the next 12-24 months, the loser (winner) turns out to be 
less of a loser or even a winner (loser) with CARs of -0.31% (-2.25%) respectively 1.50% 
(-1.23%). Consistent with De Bondt and Thaler (1985), we find a reversal pattern for 
abnormal stock returns of diffident companies after two years99, but CAR differences are 
not significant in either year. In the next section, we will explore if these significant 
differences also hold within specific periods, i.e. the eighties, the nineties and the 2000 
years.  
 
Table 6.4.2: mean CARs confidence extremes (1980-2008) 
 
Mean CAR  High Confidence N Low Confidence N High-/- Low N 
PRE12M -0.0008  279 -0.0956 *** 266 0.0947 *** 545 
FYEAR -0.0199  280 -0.0820 *** 267 0.0621 ** 547 
POST12M -0.0225  270 -0.0031  252 -0.0194  522 
POST24M -0.0123  250 0.0150  232 -0.0273  482 
Note: Using seven confidence indicators on investment, operating and financial decisions, we calculate a total 
degree of confidence score. The top (bottom) 10% belong to the high (low) confidence sample. CAR refers to 
annual cumulative abnormal return, which is measured 12 months before, during and after the year in which a 
degree of confidence was calculated. The asterisks identify significance level at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***).
                                                 
99 If we would take the start of the confidence change year, reversal takes place after three years.  
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6.4.2 Period characteristics of extreme confidence CARs 
When we analyze period characteristics, we divide the samples into three sub 
periods i.e. the eighties, nineties and 2000 years. We also explore different time windows 
with regard to cumulative abnormal stock returns. The results are summarized in table 
6.4.3.  
 
Table 6.4.3: Analysis of Variance in mean CARs by sub period 
 
Subperiod Mean High Confidence Low Confidence High minus Low 
Eighties PRE12M 0.0235  -0.0957 *** 0.1193 *** 
 FYEAR 0.0085  -0.0663 ** 0.0748 ** 
 POST12M -0.0060  0.0072  -0.0132  
 POST24M 0.0142  0.0092  0.0049  
Nineties PRE12M -0.0287  -0.1026 *** 0.0740 ** 
 FYEAR -0.0229  -0.1322 *** 0.1093 ** 
 POST12M -0.0575 * -0.0305  -0.0270  
 POST24M -0.0485 * 0.0450  -0.0935 * 
2000 Years PRE12M -0.0133  -0.0773  0.0640  
 FYEAR -0.0825 ** -0.0028  -0.0798  
 POST12M -0.0036  0.0406  -0.0442  
 POST24M -0.0149  -0.0593  0.0444  
Note: Using seven confidence indicators on investment, operating and financial decisions, we calculate a total 
degree of confidence score. The top (bottom) 10% belong to the high (low) confidence sample. CAR refers to 
annual cumulative abnormal return, which is measured 12 months before, during and 12 after the year in which a 
degree of confidence was calculated. The asterisks identify significance level at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***).
 
On a standalone basis, prior and current year CARs for firms moving to low 
confidence are no longer significantly negative in the 2000 years, while the opposite is true 
for high confidence firms. Furthermore, CAR differences between extreme confidence 
groups seem period specific as well and with no longer significance for the new 
millennium. However, we note that we have fewer observations, as we only have data until 
2008, thus making it more challenging to achieve significance. Furthermore, this was a 
very turbulent decade which started with high valuations and ended with the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in 2008.  
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In more detail, we first discuss CARs for the high respectively low confidence firms 
on a standalone basis, which is followed by a comparison of the CAR differences between 
the two extremes by each sub period.  
For the eighties, CARs are positive (significantly negative) a year prior to the 
extremely high (low) confidence year and in the year itself. The sign shifts in the next 
years, but is not significant though. For the high confidence firms, CARs turn negative in 
the year after changing to high confidence and positive hereafter, but none of these are 
significantly different from zero.  
The nineties show a very weak performance with negative CARs prior, during and 
after the high confidence year, although only the latter is significant. In the years after 
moving to the high confidence sample, CARs are in significant negative territory at -5.75% 
and -4.85%. The low confidence firms perform very poorly with negative CARs in the 
double digit region, which cannot be compensated by the positive, albeit insignificant CAR 
of 4.50% two years later.  
For the 2000 years, none of the CARs are significant for the low confidence sample, 
regardless of the time window. The high confidence firms continue their weak stock 
performance, with negative CARs across the board. Only in the high confidence year itself, 
it is significantly negative and sizable at -8.25%.  
When we explore the CAR differentials between the extreme confidence samples, 
we arrive at the following results. For the eighties and nineties, there is a significant 
positive gap when we take a long position in high confidence and a short position in low 
confidence firms if we anticipate it well; the gap is only positive in the twelve months prior 
to and in the confidence year itself (for which realized data are released in the next year). 
Hereafter, the gap is no longer significant and tends to move to negative territory. Only for 
the nineties, we find a significant negative gap between high and low confidence firms in 
the 24 months following an extreme confidence year i.e. a reversal pattern. We note that 
the number of confident firms is not clustered at the late nineties at the time of the dotcom 
bubble, which could have been a possible explanation. Especially the high confidence 
companies showed a very weak stock performance in this period. For the 2000 years, low 
confidence firms no longer show a significant performance differential vs. high confidence 
firms. The difference in current and post 12 month CARs are in favor of the low 
confidence firms albeit not significant and partly reversed in the last period. 
6.4.3 Extreme confidence CARs and general market developments 
In this section, we compare CARs of extreme confidence stocks with general stock 
market developments, which we proxy by the implied earnings yield, including a forward 
measure. The descriptive statistics are shown in tables 6.4.4 and 6.4.5. In addition, we add 
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some major economic events to give more color to our findings, as illustrated in figures 
6.4.2 and 6.4.3.  
In summary, we find that in most years, the mean CAR difference between 
confidence extremes is positive. Years in which high confidence firms underperformed 
seem to coincide with major economic shocks. This higher sensitivity to negative events 
may results from the significantly lower B/M ratios of high confidence stocks, which 
imply higher growth expectations. Furthermore, we find a positive correlation of 0.3247 
between the high minus low returns gap and the equity risk premium. 
The descriptive statistics in tables 6.4.4 and 6.4.5 show that the dividend payout can 
be highly volatile, mainly due to a (lagged) denominator effect. Also, the scarcity of 
forward looking dividend per share and long-term estimates becomes clear. One has to be 
cautious in looking at total market value, as it depends on sufficient analyst coverage. The 
dotcom bubble is clearly visible, which was accompanied with many IPOs and increased 
analyst coverage. One might have expected the highest PE ratio for the 1999 peak year as 
well, but the big multiples in excess of 100 were restricted to a specific industry rather than 
a market-wide phenomenon. Therefore, the inflating impact of a market-wide recession on 
the price-to-earnings ratio could be more severe than a bubble in a certain industry, as the 
former implies that expected earnings are depressed across all industries.  
 100 
 
Table 6.4.4: Dividend Payout, Forward PE and Size 1980-2008 
 
Year Dividend payout prior year Forward PE Market Value in USD m 
1980 36.28% 6.23 742,159 
1981 40.40% 8.27 1,077,163 
1982 42.59% 6.81 955,100 
1983 52.67% 11.62 1,345,694 
1984 50.38% 10.67 1,348,924 
1985 45.27% 10.56 1,586,179 
1986 53.47% 18.12 2,392,026 
1987 58.83% 18.64 2,486,141 
1988 52.06% 13.51 2,228,360 
1989 46.63% 11.81 2,498,598 
1990 50.96% 13.68 2,707,214 
1991 61.10% 16.64 6,189,999 
1992 69.14% 22.45 3,489,665 
1993 63.15% 21.21 3,952,814 
1994 52.87% 17.60 4,166,723 
1995 41.78% 14.95 4,705,464 
1996 40.46% 17.57 6,173,399 
1997 37.76% 17.30 7,305,970 
1998 38.74% 24.85 10,901,912 
1999 44.25% 29.55 25,854,885 
2000 38.76% 27.98 14,981,078 
2001 38.52% 27.60 13,192,734 
2002 88.62% 59.44 12,060,021 
2003 63.06% 31.18 9,620,843 
2004 37.10% 21.53 12,901,264 
2005 32.74% 17.76 13,448,326 
2006 39.75% 17.73 13,613,966 
2007 30.42% 16.25 17,546,959 
2008 41.39% 18.29 15,689,047 
Note: Calculations are on an aggregate basis. including all companies with sufficient coverage i.e. a minimum of 
five earnings estimates on the highest frequency data item (i.e. EPS +1) as provided by I/B/E/S. Forward PE is 
calculated as the aggregated market capitalization, divided by the aggregated one-year ahead earnings forecast. 
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Table 6.4.5: Number of Earnings per Share (EPS) estimates 
 
Year # LTG  # EPS +1 # EPS +2 # EPS +3 # DPS +1 # DPS +2 # DPS +3 
1980 NA 841 109 NA NA NA NA 
1981 NA 1,018 218 NA NA NA NA 
1982 544 1,064 334 NA NA NA NA 
1983 679 1,093 455 NA NA NA NA 
1984 786 1,247 677 NA NA NA NA 
1985 797 1,325 667 1 NA NA NA 
1986 783 1,317 712 2 NA NA NA 
1987 881 1,455 768 3 NA NA NA 
1988 734 1,387 694 2 NA NA NA 
1989 792 1,470 882 6 NA NA NA 
1990 761 1,455 915 7 NA NA NA 
1991 1,624 2,828 1,944 30 NA NA NA 
1992 852 1,432 1,065 17 NA NA NA 
1993 904 1,596 1,180 20 NA NA NA 
1994 976 1,836 1,344 24 NA NA NA 
1995 982 1,864 1,365 19 NA NA NA 
1996 1,107 2,025 1,459 32 NA NA NA 
1997 1,220 2,190 1,619 26 NA NA NA 
1998 1,355 2,284 1,722 33 NA NA NA 
1999 2,700 4,664 3,480 90 NA NA NA 
2000 1,299 2,206 1,655 45 1 1 NA 
2001 1,062 1,893 1,344 22 NA NA NA 
2002 1,195 1,750 1,439 17 NA NA NA 
2003 1,168 1,736 1,415 75 102 25 4 
2004 1,061 1,943 1,738 158 209 130 5 
2005 1,029 2,053 1,863 180 208 127 7 
2006 894 2,161 1,963 278 303 237 22 
2007 857 2,302 2,161 365 380 327 29 
2008 581 2,300 2,128 473 485 457 140 
Note: LTG stands for long-term earnings growth. EPS (DPS) for earnings (dividends) per share, while suffices 
+1, +2 respectively +3 refer to the forecast horizon in years. NA stands for Not Available.  
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The solid line in figure 6.4.2 illustrates the mean CAR difference between high and 
low confidence firms and the stock-bond return difference or the equity risk premium. The 
latter variable is retrieved from Damodaron’s website. High confidence firms 
underperformed low confidence firms in the following periods. In 1982, the aftermath of 
the oil and savings and loans crisis took its toll. In 1987, the stock markets crashed in 
October, although this seemed an isolated event. In 1991, the First Gulf War began and the 
US went into a recession. In 2000, the dotcom bubble burst and the heavily inflated stock 
market showed a sharp correction. In 2002, a recession followed the September 11th 
attacks, and high confidence companies underperformed in the subsequent three years as 
well. As of 2006, the housing and financial markets were flourishing and high confidence 
companies outperformed, until the financial meltdown in 2008.  
Figure 6.4.3 shows the forward earnings yield (solid line), including the yield in 
excess of the risk-free rate (dotted line). Although the earnings yield in the early eighties 
seems very attractive, the picture is less rosy when correcting for the highly inflationary 
environment. At a quick glance, one could become very pessimistic when looking at the 
high frequency of bad events, as mentioned in the lower part of the graph. Also, the excess 
earnings yield is low with an arithmetic mean of only 1.27% for the period, albeit this 
ignores the long-term growth potential of stocks. The trough level of the excess earnings 
yield (-2.38%) coincided with the peak of the dotcom bubble in 1999. Conversely, when 
the housing and financial markets collapsed in 2007 and 2008, excess earnings yield 
moved to the mid-single digit region.  
6.4.4 Pooled Panel Regression results 
When we perform pooled panel regressions with CARs as the dependent variable, 
we take four different windows. These include up to one year before the move to an 
extreme confidence level, to the year of change itself and up to two years hereafter. The 
regression approach enables us to filter out other possible drivers behind CARs, such as 
industry effects and investor sentiment. Table 6.4.6 shows the regression results in the year 
in which a move to extreme confidence levels occurred and the contribution of each 
variable to explanatory power.  
We note that the constant term partly captures an industry effect100. Excluding this, 
efficient markets require a constant of zero or no persistence in abnormal returns. The 
highly negative coefficient of -5.70% on the low confidence dummy is significant, both in 
statistical and economic terms. This continues to be the case when additional control 
factors are added. The positive coefficient on the high confidence dummy is not significant 
though. The sensitivity to prior year investor sentiment is positive and significant, also in 
                                                 
100 Specifically, it captures Fama French industry group 1 i.e. non-durable consumer goods 
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economic terms. When we use the average investor sentiment score of 0.34, it would 
enhance CAR by some 80 basis points. This positive relation suggests that the momentum 
factor does not fully capture investor sentiment or future expectations. We find no 
significant interaction between company and investor sentiment.    
 
Table 6.4.6: CARs in the year of confidence change  
 
Method: Pooled Panel Regression (OLS) 1980 - 2008 
Dependent Variable: CAR_FYEAR 
 
CONSTANT -0.0029  -0.0062  -0.0118  -0.0127  
 (0.0068)  (0.0076)  (0.0077)  (0.0078)  
Dhigh   0.0056  0.0067  0.0047  
   (0.0150)  (0.0155)  (0.0183)  
Dlow   -0.0570 *** -0.0514 *** -0.0358 * 
   (0.0189)  (0.0193)  (0.0214)  
SENT(-1)     0.0248 *** 0.0276 *** 
     (0.0062)  (0.0068)  
SENT(-1)* Dhigh       0.0056  
       (0.0219)  
SENT(-1)* Dlow       -0.0371  
       (0.0235)  
Industry effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year effects No  No  No  No  
Adjusted R2 0.0045  0.0112  0.0151  0.0154   
N 5,111  3,860  3,827  3,827  
Note: Observations pooled for the 1980-2008 period. Dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal stock return 
in the year in which a company moves to the top (bottom) confidence decile. Asterisks denote significance at the 
10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% level (***). FF_industry groups as defined by Fama and French. excl. utilities and 
financials (groups 8 and 11). Industry group 1 (non-durable consumer goods) is captured by the constant term. 
ENT(-1) refers to the sentiment indicator in the prior 12 months, cleaned for business cycle effects as defined by 
Baker and Wurgler 2006. Sentiment data are available up to and including 2007. White adjusted standard errors 
in brackets. 
 
We have also tested for asymmetry to the confidence dummies respectively 
interaction terms. The Chi square-test that the coefficient of the interaction term with low 
confidence is minus that of the high confidence yields a high p-value of 0.3461, so we 
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cannot reject symmetry. Neither can we reject symmetry between the standalone 
sensitivities to extremely high respectively low confidence changes (p-value of 0.1549). 
Table 6.4.7 summarizes the regression output when CARs prior respectively after a 
change to extreme confidence are taken as dependent variables. Overall, we only observe a 
few differences, such as a significant positive coefficient to the interaction term with high 
confidence in the year after the change. For this window, the coefficient to the low 
confidence also becomes positive, albeit not significant. Another year later, however, the 
CAR reversal to positive territory for low confidence firms indeed becomes significant, as 
tables 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 also indicate. Apart from other factors, confidence extremeness 
seems to have an important impact on stock performance.  
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Table 6.4.7: CARs prior (post) a change to extreme confidence 
 
Method: Pooled Panel Regression (OLS) 1980- 2008 
Dependent Variable CAR: PRE12M POST12M POST24M 
CONSTANT -0.0152 ** -0.0300 *** -0.0354 *** 
 (0.0067)  (0.0086)  (0.0092)  
Dhigh 0.0195  -0.0078  0.0188  
 (0.0177)  (0.0159)  (0.0196)  
Dlow -0.0608 *** 0.0220  0.0490 ** 
 (0.0160)  (0.0217)  (0.0239)  
SENT(-1) 0.0386 *** 0.0266 *** 0.0339 *** 
 (0.0071)  (0.0067)  (0.0073)  
SENT (-1)* Dhigh -0.0246  0.0558 ** -0.0069  
 (0.0194)  (0.0228)  (0.0288)  
SENT(-1)* Dlow -0.0501 * 0.0102  -0.0209  
 (0.0272)  (0.0258)  (0.0305)  
Industry effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year effects No  No  No  
Adjusted R2 0.0165  0.0112  0.0116  
N  3,820  3,584  3,294  
Note: Dependent variables are the cumulative abnormal stock returns in the year prior to respectively after 
moving to the top (bottom) confidence decile. Asterisks denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
FF_industry groups as defined by Fama and French, excl. groups 8 and 11 (utilities and financials). Industry 
group 1 (non-durable consumer goods) is captured by the constant term. SENT(-1) refers to the sentiment 
indicator in the prior 12 months, cleaned for business cycle effects as defined by Baker and Wurgler 2006. 
Sentiment data are available up to and including 2007. White adj. standard errors in brackets. 
 
In more detail, the table above shows that the negative coefficient on the low 
confidence dummy is significant 12 months prior to this move, both in statistical and 
economic terms. Including investor sentiment and its interaction with company confidence, 
a move to low confidence reduces CARs by 6.08%. This can be reinvigorated by its 
interaction with investor sentiment, which is both statistically and economically 
significant; if we use the average sentiment score of 0.34, CARs will be reduced by 1.71% 
in the year prior to moving to low confidence levels. The inclusion of Baker and Wurgler’s 
investor sentiment variable renders statistically significant coefficients of up to 3.86% on a 
stand-alone basis. Its economic impact is mitigated by the low average sentiment score 
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over the period as a whole, but still adding a little over one percent to CARs101. The 
interaction with high confidence is also negative, but not significant. The coefficient of the 
change in high confidence dummy is positive at 1.95%, but insignificant. We have tested 
for symmetry of the confidence coefficients respectively their interaction with investor 
sentiment and the low probability values show that we can reject this. 
Moving to the CARs 12 months after the year of high (low) confidence, the sign on 
the low confidence dummy flips to positive (2.20%), but is not significant. The coefficient 
on the high confidence dummy is negative, but continues to be insignificant. We cannot 
reject symmetry for the standalone coefficients on extreme confidence (p-value of 0.2434), 
but the tests suggest asymmetry with regard to the two coefficients on the interaction terms 
at the 10% level (p-value of 0.0716). Another year later or two years after the change to 
extreme confidence, the coefficient to the low confidence dummy turns significantly 
positive at 4.90%, thus signaling a reversal effect. We can also reject symmetry with 
regard to moving to the high confidence level. 
6.4.5 Robustness checks 
We test for robustness by taking current year instead of prior year sentiment and by 
using an alternative confidence score. We find that the use of current year investor 
sentiment does not materially change our results. We still find a significant positive 
relation between the investor sentiment indicator and CARs, although explanatory power 
remains low at one to two percent. In other words, a large amount of the cumulative 
abnormal returns is left unexplained by our model. This leaves random noise or model 
misspecifications as the main explanation for these abnormal returns. Due to these 
explanations, the latter of which can be qualified as the joint hypothesis problem, we 
cannot reject market efficiency, even while CARs are sizeable.  
As an alternative to our extreme confidence dummies, we take the change in the 
sum of all standardized confidence indicator scores, which we abbreviate as the change in 
Z-score. In chapter five, we provided the following formula for estimating the Z-score:  
 
> @ > @
> @fingappayoutchangediv
fingapsharebbfingapinvest
sicoplevacqaccruals
ZscoreZscoreZscore
ZscoreZscoreZscoreZscore
ZscoreZscoreZscoreZscoreZscore


 
_3
1
2
1
2
1  
Equation 6.4.1 
 
                                                 
101 Data are retrieved from Wurgler’s website and updated until 2007. Using all available years, the average 
(clean) sentiment would be close to zero. 
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We note that we lose a few observations, as we could not calculate a payout ratio 
for a few stocks with a dividend decrease. This lack of data, or specifically ordinary 
operating income was not a major issue before, as the dividend decrease itself was already 
sufficient to assign the lowest confidence level. Payout and financing deficit were only 
relevant for companies with stable or higher dividends year-on-year. First, we explore 
whether or not relations between CARs and confidence variables are similar i.e. comparing 
the output of table 6.4.8 with table 6.4.6. Next, we compare the CAR differences between 
extreme Z-score change deciles in table 6.4.9 with the gap in CARs between extreme 
confidence samples as shown in table 6.4.2. If high swings in Z-scores occur within the 
non-extreme confidence area instead of between the non-extreme and extreme confidence 
area, we would arrive at different outcomes.  
In summary, we find a significant relation between company confidence and CARs, 
regardless of the confidence measure used. However, the impact on CARs seems most 
pronounced for moves to extreme low confidence levels. Furthermore, the significant 
positive relation between investor sentiment and CARs is not conditional on either the 
confidence measure or CAR window. The CAR difference between extremes is 
significantly positive in the year prior and the year of change for both confidence 
measures. The difference is somewhat lower between extreme Z-score deciles in the year 
before, but higher in the year of change itself. For years hereafter, the differences in CARs 
between extremes is no longer significant, which is mainly due to improving returns of the 
lowest confidence firms.  
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Table 6.4.8: Robustness test CARs and Z-score change  
 
CAR:  PRE12M FYEAR POST12M POST 24 M 
CONSTANT -0.0168 ** -0.0137 * -0.0291 *** -0.0311 *** 
 (0.0066)  (0.0077)  (0.0085)  (0.0090)  
ZSCORE Δ 0.0092 *** 0.0047 ** -0.0042 * 0.0010  
 (0.0028)  (0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.0026)  
SENT(-1) 0.0353 *** 0.0271 *** 0.0319 *** 0.0338 *** 
 (0.0065)  (0.0062)  (0.0062)  (0.0071)  
SENT(-1) * 
ZSCORE Δ 
 
0.0025 
  
0.0047 
 
** 
 
0.0009 
  
0.0001 
 
 (0.0037)  (0.0024)  (0.0036)  (0.0037)  
Industry effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year effects No  No  No  No  
Adjusted R2 0.0186  0.0187  0.0114  0.0116  
N  3,775  3,773  3,533  3,251  
Note: Dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return in the year prior to moving to an extreme confidence 
level, the year itself and the year hereafter. Asterisks denote significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% level 
(***). FF industry groups as defined by Fama and French, excl. utilities and financials (groups 8 and 11). 
Industry group 1 (non-durable consumer goods) is captured by the constant term. SENT refers to the sentiment 
indicator cleaned for business cycle effects as defined by Baker and Wurgler (2006).White adjusted standard 
errors in brackets. The symbol Δ refers to change.  
 
Although we already highlighted our main findings from the robustness test, we 
proceed with a more detailed discussion of our findings as shown in table 6.4.8. With 
regard to the CARs in the 12 months prior to the change to extreme confidence, we find a 
positive and significant coefficient of 0.92% to the Z-score change. As the average102 
change in Z-score is close to zero, it is tempting to say that the economic impact is 
negligible. However, there is a high standard deviation of 2.13, which implies a close to 
two percent impact on CAR when the Z-score is one standard deviation away. There is no 
major interaction with investor sentiment.  
In the year of change itself, the coefficient to the Z-score change diminishes to 
0.47%, but continues to be significant. The negative CAR impact becomes even higher if 
investor sentiment was positive in the prior year. This may seem counterintuitive, as one 
might expect a dampening effect of positive investor sentiment. A possible explanation 
                                                 
102 Both the mean and median change in the Z-score are close to zero 
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could be that when investors are in a good mood, they want to see this translated into 
actions as well and dissociate from conservative management. If sentiment is positive 
(negative), this effect is aggravated (offset) by the significant interaction term. With an 
average sentiment indicator of only 0.34 for the 1979- 2007 period, an increase in the Z-
score by one standard deviation would increase CAR by 30 basis points103.   
When we move to the CARs 12 months after the extreme confidence year, the 
coefficient on the Z-score shifts signs and turn significantly negative at -0.42% on a 
standalone basis at the 10% level. The coefficient on the interaction term is no longer 
significant. Another year later, only standalone investor sentiment and the constant term 
remain significant.  
 Concluding, when we narrow our scope to significant results, we find no major 
differences when we use the change in the Z-score instead of the extreme confidence 
dummies. For both confidence measures, we only find a significant CAR difference 
between extremes in the year prior and in the year of change itself, in favor of the highest 
confidence firms. This suggests that standardization of the components of the confidence 
indicators, does not lead to major different outcomes.   
 
                                                 
103 Note that our Z-score variable is the aggregate of separate Z-scores and it is not standardized itself. Therefore, 
its value does not correspond to the standard deviation 
Table 6.4.9: ANOVA mean CARs by Z-score change decile 
 
DECILE Mean CAR 
PRE12M 
Mean CAR 
FYEAR 
Mean CAR 
POST12M 
Mean CAR 
POST24M 
1 -0.0603 -0.0851 0.0066 -0.0295 
2 -0.0637 -0.0411 -0.0097 -0.0143 
3 -0.0299 0.0023 -0.0283 -0.0454 
4 -0.0327 -0.0309 -0.0135 -0.0402 
5 -0.0079 -0.0406 -0.0518 -0.0610 
6 -0.0320 -0.0416 -0.0469 -0.0390 
7 -0.0005 -0.0491 -0.0506 -0.0348 
8 0.0054 -0.0169 -0.0513 -0.0210 
9 0.0257 -0.0329 -0.0424 -0.0106 
10 0.0001 -0.0069 -0.0298 -0.0112 
ANOVA F-test mean CARs:  
Equal means all deciles  No (***) No (***) No (**) Yes 
Equal means decile 1 and 10  No (***) No (***) Yes Yes 
Equal means deciles 2 to 9 No (***) Yes Yes Yes 
Mean difference: 
Deciles 10 -/- 1  
0.0604***  0.0782*** -0.0364 0.0182 
High -/- Low conf  0.0947*** 0.0621** -0.0194 -0.0273 
Note: CAR stands for cumulative abnormal return, which is measured 12 months before, during and 12 months 
after the year in which a degree of confidence was calculated. Asterisks below the variable denote significance at 
the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% level (***). High respectively Low conf refers to the differences in CARs when 
high respectively low confidence dummies are used instead (table 6.4.2). 
 
Based on the mean CAR differences between extreme Z-score changes, we arrive at 
the following results. For CARs 12 month prior to a certain change in the Z-score, we find 
that the mean CARs significantly differ between the highest (0.0001) and lowest Z-score 
change decile (-0.0603). This CAR difference is less extreme than the results in table 6.4.2, 
which were based on regressions with extreme confidence dummies. Based on that non-
standardized measure, firm that moved to extremely low confidence levels realized a CAR 
of -9.56%. The results of F-test statistics imply that mean CARs of the non-extreme 
deciles, also significantly differ from each other and widely vary from -6.37% to 2.57%.  
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In the (change in) Z-score year itself, the mean CAR of the lowest decile 
deteriorates by over 2% in absolute terms to -8.51%. The gap with the mean CAR of the 
highest decile widens, as the standalone decrease of this decile is less severe at -0.69%. 
The negative CAR for the low confidence dummy sample of -8.20% in table 6.4.2 is 
comparable to that of the lowest Z-score decile. Conversely, the highest decile performs 
better than its high confidence dummy counterpart (-0.69% vs. -1.99%). The CAR 
difference of 7.82% is significant between the two extreme deciles, while those between 
the other eight deciles are not significant. The latter vary from -4.91% to 0.23%.  
Moving another year ahead, CARs for the top decile deteriorate to -2.98%, while 
the bottom decile has a slight positive CAR of 0.66%. The CAR difference is not 
significant and neither are the mean CARs of the other deciles. We can only reject equality 
of all ten means together. Earlier, we also saw the worst performance (-0.60%) for high 
confidence dummy firms twelve months following the confidence year, albeit not 
significantly different from zero. Similarly, the low confidence dummy firms moved to 
positive with a mean CAR of 0.72%, or comparable to that of the lowest decile.  
Finally, after two years, the CARs of the highest decile remain negative at -1.12% 
vs. -2.95% for the lowest decile, but the difference stays insignificant. Although there is a 
high difference with the stand alone CARs of 1.50% when using low confidence dummies, 
this value was not significant either. CAR differences for the remaining deciles are not 
significantly different from each other either and vary from -6.10% to -1.06%.  
6.5 Summary and Discussion  
Current research only focuses on the upper confidence extreme or overconfidence 
and investigates its impact on corporate decisions rather than performance or company 
valuation. It is widely documented that overconfidence has a detrimental impact on 
company decisions which suggests a negative impact on stock returns as well. In this 
chapter, we seek to address this. We have explored the relation if moving to extreme 
confidence levels results in cumulative abnormal stock returns, both on a standalone basis 
and in comparison with the other confidence extreme.  
In chapter five, we already found very low returns on invested capital for low 
confidence firms, where we used the market value of equity in the denominator. This could 
have implied that a markdown had yet to occur i.e. that the denominator was still inflated. 
If so, we would expect negative abnormal returns following a move to low confidence. 
However, our results do not support this underreaction hypothesis, as we find that 
significant negative CARs precede rather than follow a move to low confidence. This 
leaves the numerator effect or depressed earnings as the main explanation of the low 
returns on invested capital. Indeed, we calculated much lower EBIT margins and a high 
share of loss-making in our low confidence sample. 
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Our empirical study shows that extremely low rather than extremely high 
confidence is the culprit to stock performance, adjusted for several common risk factors. 
Although it takes until the next year before all variables for calculating our degree of 
confidence score are publicly known, the markets seem to anticipate this well in advance. 
Our results suggest that the market heavily discounts companies that move to the lowest 
confidence level on the rumor rather than on the fact, as CARs are mostly negative in the 
year of such a move and 12 months prior to that. In the year in which a firm moves to an 
extremely low confidence level and the twelve months prior to that, we find significantly 
negative CARs of up to –13.22% in the nineties. Part of this is reversed after two years for 
this sub period, thus suggesting that overreaction took place. Ironically, this was the 
decade when stock market valuation reached unprecedented peaks. For other sub periods 
or for the 1980-2008 as a whole, we do not find significant support for such overreaction 
or a reversal in CAR in later periods.  
Conversely, we find no significant standalone CARs when companies move to the 
highest confidence area, thus suggesting that this may not be put on par with suboptimal 
and value destructing actions. Alternatively, one could argue that investors expect 
management to be driven by animal spirits and high confidence, as this is also the way 
how they are selected according to Goel and Thakor (2008). We did not find strong 
support for interaction with investor sentiment, but on a standalone basis, this variable 
seems an important factor.  
We conclude that it is only with perfect hindsight and good timing that one could 
exploit a profitable strategy consisting of a short position of firms that move to diffidence 
and a long position in firms that become overconfident. Even then, the persistence of such 
a strategy is questionable, as it did not work out in the new millennium. 
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7 Anchoring and Adjustment in Analyst Forecasts 
Abstract 
In this chapter, we investigate how heuristics, specifically anchoring and 
adjustment, may distort analyst forecasts. We test to what extent analysts anchor to a 
variable which contains both firm-specific and time-series information, such as prior year 
earnings. To disentangle anchoring from adjustment, we control for variables that trigger 
adjustments from the starting point, such as risk appetite and news. We also allow for 
asymmetric responses by separating good news from bad. Our empirical analysis differs 
from prior research by exploring how sensitivities to these variables may differ at different 
levels e.g. forecast horizon, analyst, firm or the industry. Our results suggest that innate 
bias, anchoring to prior year earnings, risk attitude and responses to recent news are 
conditional on the level of analysis. This could explain why market reactions are not 
always in sync with analyst forecast errors. Innate optimism prevails on the industry and 
analyst level. We find no support for anchoring by analysts with a long track record or 
across industries, which suggests a more bottom-up approach. Furthermore, long-term 
volatility is considered an upside opportunity, while short-term risk is taken more 
cautiously. Finally, we mostly find underreaction to news, whether good or bad, albeit we 
find weak support for asymmetric responses.  
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7.1 Introduction 
 
“… I looked at the business first. If I look at the price first, I get influenced by it.” 
 
Warren Buffett explains his investment approach in an interview with FOX Business 
Network, 19 October 2007 
 
In the lines above, investor Warren Buffett articulates the pitfall of anchoring to a 
certain starting value, such as a company’s current stock price when making investment 
decisions. I this chapter, we also focus on the use of anchoring and adjustment heuristics 
by security analysts, which is a topic that has not attracted a lot of research attention so far. 
Conversely, as outlined in chapter three, analyst optimism bias in earnings forecasts is 
widely investigated. Similarly, analyst under- or overreaction to news events, such as past 
results or past stock performance, attracts a lot of research interest.  
In this chapter, we take a more comprehensive approach on the underlying process 
on how analysts set their forecasts. Following Trueman (1994), weak analysts tend to be 
followers and in order to prevent such a qualification, an analyst is pressured to issue an 
updated view before the crowd does. As financial analysts work in a very dynamic 
environment with severe time constraints, these could induce them to using heuristics 
when setting or updating their forecasts, especially when they walk out before the rest. 
Specifically, we will look at anchoring and adjustment heuristics, but we also correct for 
other cognitive distortions or biases in analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
 As analysts perform a balancing act of keeping many internal and external parties 
satisfied, we believe that these cognitive distortions should not be isolated but taken 
together. Although overoptimism serves company management, the sales and corporate 
finance department, it hurts investors and his reputation of being a good forecaster. As an 
analyst covers a portfolio of stocks, this gives him leeway to leave an overall good 
impression at all parties involved. For instance, for so-called maintenance stocks in his 
universe i.e. stocks that he needs to cover but in which he or his employer have no 
competitive edge with regard to deal flow, it is easier to be somewhat more pessimistic and 
skeptical. Conversely, for the stocks that he “owns”, he will probably follow a different 
approach. Investors also look through this game of coverage on a company by “house 
banks” compared to less dependent parties. Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) also 
forces investment banks to disclose whether or not they have done substantial business 
with the company under coverage and the analyst’s rating track record. Combined with the 
large fines charged to the investment banking industry during the Internet boom, this could 
have changed equity analyst behavior as well.   
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As earlier discussed, research on analyst behavior tends to narrow its focous on a 
single behavioral bias, such as overoptimism or under- and overreaction to news. Although 
these topics are widely covered, we see, however, little interest in the analysts’view on 
long-term and short-term risk and how the use of heuristics may affect their behavior. As 
earlier mentioned, the analysts’ time pressure makes the use of heuristics more attractive. 
With regard to anchoring, we are only aware of work in progress by Cen et al. (2010). 
After performing interviews104 with equity analysts, they define the absolute median 
industry EPS as an anchor. This implies that analysts neither rescale EPS figures to a 
common denominator nor account for other firm-specific differences such as operating or 
financial leverage105. We expect analysts to be less naïve and define another anchor 
variable. Apart from exploring whether anchoring occurs on an aggregate level, we explore 
to what extent this is present on the analyst, firm and industry level.  
This study provides insight in the underlying process behind the production of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts and resulting forecast errors. We construct an extensive dataset 
that covers widely covered stocks from 2000 to 2009. This period was characterized by 
analyst scandals following the burst of the dotcom bubble that provoked legislative 
changes in the industry. Unlike earlier research, we do not only consider one specific 
cognitive error in their issued forecasts, but instead allow for various human factors to 
have an impact. Our empirical results confirm the latter is the case or more specifically that 
one should be aware of innate optimism, anchoring, aversion to short-term risk but high 
appetite for long-term risk and a tendency to underreact to recent news. However, 
sensitivities to these factors are conditional on the level of analysis, i.e. the aggregate, 
analyst, firm or industry level.  
Apart from the fact that investors can incorporate such behavioral distortions106, 
company management could also use this information. Brown and Caylor (2005) argue 
that as of 1996107, management focus has shifted from avoiding earnings losses or earnings 
declines to avoiding negative earnings surprises. If management is more aware of innate 
biases, anchors and how analysts react to certain news, they could incorporate this in their 
communication strategy. As long as these behavioral biases enable the analyst to keep 
many different parties content without compromising too much on their overall forecast 
error or reputation, it seems a rational strategy to follow. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, we discuss our dataset and methodology. 
Next, we discussed the pooled regression results, followed by the analyst-, firm- and sector 
                                                 
104 This reference points was inferred from interviews with six analysts 
105 By taking prior year EPS, we assume that these characteristics do not dramatically change year-on-year 
106 Campbell and Sharpe (2009) find that the market incorporates such biases, while Cen et al. (2010) do not find 
empirical support for such a correction by the market 
107 Their study covers the 1985-2002 period 
 118 
 
specific regressions. Furthermore, we also perform several robustness checks. The last 
section concludes and makes suggestions for further research.  
7.2 Data and Methodology 
7.2.1 Introduction 
In order to test whether analysts fail to properly process news, we perform 
regressions with actual EPS, forecast EPS and forecasting error as dependent variables. 
Although most research focuses on taking forecast errors as dependent variable in the 
regressions, we would not only like to show to what extent analysts underweight or 
overweigh certain information, but also if the coefficient signs are consistent between 
actual and forecast EPS. This also shows the absolute importance of each type of 
information, or specifically the anchor variables. 
Inspired by the wide coverage on analyst bias, the over- and underreaction effect 
and our previous working practice in equity sales and research, our independent variables 
cover anchoring, risk attitude and adjustment to news. All variables are based on publicly 
available information. Daniel et al. (1998) argue that if analysts are overconfident, they 
tend to underweight public and overweigh their private information. This implies a 
positive relation between the absolute forecast error and these publicly known variables.  
7.2.2 Variable and Data description 
First, we will briefly describe the anchor, risk and news variables. Subsequently, we 
will discuss how and which data we capture for our analysis and separately discuss the 
issues that we face with the non-pooled or micro-level regressions.   
Our anchor variable comprises prior year earnings per share, which suggests that 
analyst cater to investors’ needs of “fixating” on earnings, which is empirically supported 
by Sloan (1996). We also test for robustness by substituting prior year EPS with the mean 
consensus EPS in the prior quarter. Both anchor variables are publicly known, so 
following Daniel et al. (1998), we could argue that if we detect anchoring or a too high 
weight to the anchor variable, this is hard to comply with analyst overconfidence. Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974) discuss how anchoring may cause miscalibration – a proxy for 
overconfidence. Block and Harper (1991) directly test if there is a relation between 
(extreme) confidence levels and anchoring and find no higher overconfidence for people 
who use anchors vs. non-users.   
The risk proxies cover both long-term and short-term risk and comprise past five-
year EPS volatility respectively consensus forecast dispersion. The news variables which 
trigger analysts to update their forecasts consists of recent quarterly earnings surprises i.e. 
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prior quarter forecasting errors and a stock’s momentum vs. the market over the past three 
months. Finally, we add a control variable for company size as well. 
We retrieve detailed forecast and realized or actual earnings per share (EPS) data 
from the adjusted (for stock splits, stock issues, stock dividends, share buybacks e.g.) 
detailed IBES file108. We only consider the 2000-2009 period. Forecast errors are defined 
as the difference between the actual and forecast EPS. Our main focus is on annual EPS 
forecasts issued in four forecast windows of up to 90 days, up to 180 days, up to 270 days 
or more than 270 days and less than 365 days ahead of the earnings release date.  
We apply several restrictions on the sample. As forecast horizons beyond a year are 
based on earnings estimates rather than realized earnings for the prior year, we exclude 
these. In addition, we only include firms with a fiscal year-end coinciding with the 
calendar year-end, so each forecast window refers to a similar period or calendar quarter. 
This mitigates the impact of specific events in a certain quarter. We do not take the fiscal 
year-end but the earnings announcement date for calculating forecast windows, as earnings 
information remains uncertain until disclosed.  
Next, we require minimum analyst coverage of at least five annual EPS estimates 
by different analysts in each forecast window. As alternative to prior year EPS, we use 
prior quarter consensus, which we consider not very meaningful if based on less than five 
observations. In addition, we require at least five different analysts for each quarterly EPS 
forecast (not necessarily the same), so there is ample quarterly information for updating 
full year EPS forecasts. If analysts issue more than one forecast in a certain window, we 
only keep the most recent one. As a result, the self-selection bias highlighted by 
McNichols and O’Brien (1997), or the initiation respectively drop of coverage when news 
becomes favorable respectively bad, could have an impact on our results.  
We also use individual forecast data for calculating earnings forecast dispersion, 
which is defined as the difference between the highest and lowest estimate. For the longest 
forecast window of up to a year, we set the forecast dispersion in the prior quarter, the one 
in which prior year earnings also have to be estimated, at zero. This implies that when 
prior year EPS have not been revealed yet, most effort is put in this year's forecast rather 
than next year’s EPS. This dispersion measure could be seen as a proxy for short-term 
earnings risk, while EPS volatility over the past five years is a long-term risk measure. The 
former changes when we move another quarter or forecast window ahead, while the latter 
is unchanged throughout the year and could also be considered an anchor variable109. 
                                                 
108 Detailed earnings estimates are not available until 1982. We are well aware of rounding errors in IBES, but 
believe this problem is mitigated for detailed forecasts vs. summary forecasts, as the former are rounded at four 
rather than two digits. 
109 Kahneman and Tversky (1974) state that anchoring not only happens when the starting point i.e. prior year 
EPS is given, but also when incomplete computations are made 
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Long-term earnings risk or volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of realized 
(adjusted) EPS figures, as revealed by IBES110.  
Quarterly earnings surprises convey information whether or not the company is on 
track on realizing its full year targets. We note that this quarterly news variable can be very 
volatile and reverse in subsequent quarters. Hence, analysts might not change their annual 
estimates at par with quarterly results. We define EPS surprise as the difference between 
the actual and forecast quarterly EPS in the prior period, scaled to beginning of quarter 
stock price. 
Stock momentum is the other news variable, which is calculated for the three 
months preceding the activation date of an analyst’s annual earnings forecast in a certain 
forecast window. We use a simple market factor or CAPM model, although we argue that 
analysts have sufficient leeway to pick a benchmark (sector or multifactor based) that 
supports their investment case better. For each month, we calculate the excess (log) returns 
as the difference between (log) returns and the equal weighed (log) market return, which 
are aggregated for three consecutive months. We only look at ordinary common stock 
(share codes 10 and 11) with a minimum share price of USD 5.00 i.e. we exclude REITs, 
ADRs, preferred stock and penny stocks. Finally, we also control for size, which we 
measure by the natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization.  
Using the above mentioned variables, we perform pooled regressions with (scaled) 
actual EPS, forecast EPS and the difference between the two or forecast error (FE) as 
dependent variables111. We estimate the following panel regression equation: 
 
DEPVARx,t =  
 
α0 +β1*(1-DLOSS)*EPS_PRIORx,t-1 + β2*(DLOSS)* EPS_PRIORx,t-1 + β3*EPSVOLx,t  
+β4*(DGOOD_EPS)* SURPRISEi,x,t-1 + β5*(1-DGOOD_EPS)* SURPRISEi,x,t-1 + β6*DISPx,t-1 + 
β7*(DGOOD_MOM)*MOMx,t+β8*(1- DGOOD_MOM)*MOMx,t+β9*LNSIZE+εi,x,t  
   
Equation 7.2.1  
 
The left-hand side variable DEPVAR refers to the dependent variable which 
comprises the annual EPS forecast (EPSFC) respectively the actual EPS (EPS_ACTUAL) 
or the difference between the two i.e. the forecast error (FE) The dependent variables 
comprise prior year annual earnings per share or EPS_PRIOR, past five year annual EPS 
volatility (EPSVOL), prior quarter EPS surprise as denoted by SURPRISE, forecast 
dispersion of prior quarter consensus (DISP), momentum (MOM) and size (LNSIZE). Also, 
                                                 
110 We do not use Compustat EPS data, as definitions may differ from IBES 
111 Although actual earnings should not be impacted by heuristics, one could determine what optimal weight 
should have been used to minimize mean (or median if quantile regression is used) forecast error. 
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we have included dummies, denoted with D, for firms that were loss-making in the prior 
year, for good and bad earnings surprises respectively stock momentum. Easterwood and 
Nutt (1999) follow a similar approach in an attempt to reconcile the ambiguous results of 
both over- and underreaction in prior research. Such a distinction allows us to test for 
asymmetric responses to good respectively bad news. The subscripts i, x and t refer to the 
analyst, firm and estimation quarter. The latter ranges from 1 (1Q00) to 40 (4Q09). 
In order to avoid endogeneity problems, we use a one period lagged quarterly EPS 
surprise. All dependent variables, except size and momentum, are scaled to start of the 
quarter stock price and winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. As we use adjusted quarterly 
EPS forecasts from IBES, we also have to use the adjusted share price when scaling 
variables to price. Although we require minimum (unadjusted) share prices of at least USD 
5.00 per share by the end of the month when calculating excess returns, adjusted shares 
prices at the start of the quarter could fall below USD 5 per share, thus boosting the scaled 
earnings yield ratio. If we would scale forecast dispersion to the absolute mean consensus 
forecasts, it could be seen as a rough proxy for the shape of the anticipated earnings 
distribution112. The term MOM captures stock momentum in the three months prior to the 
analyst’s forecast activation date.  
7.2.3 Model modifications for non-pooled regressions 
The main restriction of the pooled regression analysis is that it is a “one size fits all” 
solution, yielding only one set of coefficients applicable to every analyst, firm, year, 
industry and forecast horizon. Although we could add a bias per analyst-firm pair or per 
year by including cross-section respectively period fixed effects, it does not allow for 
cross-section or time varying weights. Therefore, we also perform separate regressions by 
analyst respectively industry, firm or forecast horizon. We use the Fama and French 
classification of 48 industry groups based on the SIC codes.  
However, as we lack sufficient data on prior year EPS losses on the analyst, firm or 
industry level, we can no longer allow for asymmetry to this anchor variable. Due to this 
negative earnings skewness113, we modify the regression equation by no longer 
distinguishing between profitable and loss-making firms. As negative skewness is less of 
an issue for prior quarterly EPS surprises and stock momentum, we still allow for 
asymmetric reactions to these news items. Still, we lack sufficient data for some analysts 
or firms, which corroborates with underreaction (bandwagon) rather than a random walk or 
mean reversion caused by overreaction model. A bandwagon effect implies that the signs 
                                                 
112 We refer to Gu and Wu (2003) who discuss earnings skewness and forecast bias 
113 See Gu and Wu (2003), as earlier discussed. Note that survivorship and selection bias could also be to blame 
for negative earnings skewness, as companies that structurally underperform will turn into penny stocks or no 
longer attract sufficient analyst coverage and hence drop from our sample 
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remain similar in subsequent periods, while randomness would imply that we would more 
or less the same amount of positive and negative signs, unless the sample size is small. 
However, continuation of both analysts and good coverage on firms i.e. at least five 
analysts follow the firm per quarter, is the main challenge to our sample. 
7.2.4 Drivers Behind Forecast Errors  
When we use actual or forecast EPS as the dependent variable, the rational 
expectations hypothesis suggests that the constant term is positive and above the risk-free 
rate, unless high future growth compensates for this. Looking at the difference between the 
two or the widely used forecast error, the constant term should be zero in the absence of- 
what we refer to as - innate forecast bias. One could refer to this as a person’s nature or 
optimism or pessimism, albeit the jury is not out whether this is indeed a biological or a 
learned trait. We define innate bias as a residual or bias beyond that caused by anchoring 
and adjustment errors or strategic drivers. The widely documented optimism bias suggests 
a negative constant term or innate optimism, although we have to remark that most studies 
do not include as many variables in the equation as we do.  
We could analyze the superiority of analyst predictions relative to time-series 
models by taking the commonly used seasonal random walk model as an alternative to 
analysts’ EPS predictions. Such models assume no relation between prior year and current 
(expected) EPS, albeit not ruling out temporary distortions. Conversely, mean reversion 
models assume a negative relation and momentum models a positive relation between past 
and future EPS. If analysts indeed attach a too high weight to the anchor variable than the 
proper weight, this translates into a negative coefficient to the prior year EPS when taking 
forecast error as dependent variable. Hence, the overweighing to the anchor translates into 
more negative forecast errors when prior year earnings are positive.  
The firm’s risk profile114 and the analyst’s risk attitude determine the relation of 
these risk proxies with future (expected) earnings. Higher earnings risk translates into 
more extreme results, both in the positive and negative direction. Risk seekers rather see 
risk as an upside potential, while risk-averse people are focused on the downside. The 
signs of the coefficient to the risk proxies reveal which risk appetite prevails.  
With regard to the news variables, the rational expectations assumption that 
earnings are i.i.d. and unbiased implies a one-on-one positive relation between annual 
(forecast) EPS and the prior quarter EPS surprise. Deviations from par suggest over-and 
underreaction to this news. Momentum could convey information about the current year’s 
(expected) EPS, which should translate into a significant coefficient in our regression. 
Abarbanell (1991) points to empirical evidence suggesting a positive association between 
                                                 
114 This includes a company’s internal hedge or ability to absorb earnings volatility, as determined by its operating 
leverage, financial leverage and, to a limited extent, accounting practices 
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earnings estimates and prior price changes. If there is no relation with current year 
estimates, momentum could convey information about a firm’s long-term growth or cost of 
capital instead. When we focus on the forecast errors, under- and overreaction suggests 
positive respectively negative coefficients of prior quarter earnings surprise and 
momentum. Abarbanell (1991) and Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) find a positive relation 
between past share price and earnings forecasts. If analysts would be indifferent to whether 
news is good or bad, the coefficients on the interaction terms would be similar. 
The size variable could pick up strategic bias, such as the importance of 
management access or hunt for corporate deals. Alternatively, size could also be closely 
related to analyst following. However, as we set stringent conditions for the latter, it is 
hard to interpret the size coefficient in this perspective. If small firms are less predictable 
due to a lower availability of public information, Das et al. (1998) suggest that strategic 
bias could be more important. This would translate into more positive EPS forecasts or 
more negative forecast errors for smaller firms. The negative relation between forecast 
error and size can also be reconciled with Fama and French (1992), who argue that size is a 
proxy for risk and that small firms are riskier than big ones. If, however, underwriter and 
banking relationships are the main drivers behind strategic bias as Lin and McNichols 
(1998) and Dugar and Nathan (1995) argue, it could be more beneficial to please large 
firms with optimistic forecasts, as these are more likely to engage in corporate deals. Also, 
if smaller firms are associated with higher growth than large ones, current earnings yield 
forecasts could be lower. Then, the optimism bias is present in the future or long-term 
growth rather than in the current year’s earnings estimate, thus falling out of the scope of 
our model. Similarly, if growth rates and required rates of returns do not differ between big 
and small companies, market inefficiency could cause lower (higher) earnings yields for 
the firms with more positive (negative) forecast bias. 
Table 7.2.1 summarizes the expected relation between the price-scaled forecast 
error, which is most widely used as dependent variable in prior research, and the 
independent variables that we have defined. Our commonly used forecast error definition 
as the difference between the actual and forecast EPS, implies that a negative forecast error 
corresponds to too optimistic analyst forecasts and vice versa.  
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7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Descriptive Statistics   
We end up with a final dataset of 237,058 observations that meet our analyst 
coverage criteria of at least five quarterly and five annual EPS estimates by different 
analysts. We lose 1% of observations to 235,185 when matching our firm with CRSP price 
data, based on (N)CUSIPS.  
The descriptive statistics of the individual sample in table 7.3.1 show that the 
median (mean) size of the firms in the individual sample is large at three to just below 
eight USD billion (USD 12-27 billion). When requiring firms to have data on all variables, 
we lose roughly half of the observations to 121,691, but size characteristics remain similar. 
The high market valuations at the start of 2000 reflect the unprecedented peak valuation 
during the dotcom bubble, which also affected mature companies. We note that due to our 
requirements of a five-year EPS history, young Internet firms fall out of our sample. 
Furthermore, the impact of the financial market meltdown after the Lehman Brothers’ 
collapse in September 2008 is also clearly visible in the (start of) 2009 market valuations.  
The cross-section characteristics of the common sample as summarized in tables 
7.3.2 and 7.3.3 show a very low number of observations in 2000. Particularly, the limited 
analyst coverage in the third quarter of 2000 is to blame. A possible explanation could be 
that following the dotcom bust, business models had to be redefined and this high 
uncertainty could have made analysts reluctant to issue forecasts. During the period, the 
number of firms and analysts gradually increases, with the exception of small dip in 2008.   
To summarize the main results of table 7.3.3, we find that the mean forecast error is 
negative and significant, thus consistent with overoptimism. The median forecast error is 
close to zero, in line with results of Abarbanell (2003). The skewness to big firms and 
optimistic forecasts could result from strategic motives if indeed bigger firms generate 
higher fees and trading commissions for affiliated parties. Earnings volatility is high, but is 
not scaled to price. Furthermore, we use (stock split, issuance, stock dividend e.g.) 
adjusted rather than reported figures. 
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Table 7.3.3: Common Sample Characteristics EPS forecasts (2)  
Period: 2000-2009, N= 121,961 
 
  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum 
     
EPS_ACTUAL a,b) 5.22% 5.69% 21.31% -36.37% 
EPSFC a,b) 5.57% 5.85% 19.98% -26.19% 
FE a,b) -0.35% 0.01% 42.78% -46.39% 
EPS_PRIOR a) 5.75% 5.68% 92.76% -135.51% 
EPSVOL 0.82 0.50 34.69 0.03 
DISP a) 1.47% 0.42% 456.27% 0.00% 
SURPRISE a) 0.05% 0.00% 83.92% -22.65% 
MOM -2.73% -1.81% 104.85% -207.57% 
SIZE (USD m) 19,962 6,832 521,071 85 
FC horizon 181 187 365 0 
Note: a) variable scaled to share price if at least USD 5.00. b) winsorized at 1 and 99%. EPSFC stands for EPS 
Forecast, FE for forecast error, DISP for dispersion in consensus EPS in the prior quarter (high-/low annual EPS 
estimate), EPSVOL for past 5-year EPS volatility, MOM for past 3month cumulative outperformance vs. the 
market index, SURPRISE for quarterly EPS surprise in the prior quarter. SIZE equals outstanding shares times 
closing price at the first trading day of the calendar year. FC horizon equals days before the actual earnings 
announcement. 
 
Table 7.3.3 indicates that the earnings yield amounts to five to six percent on 
average, implying a price-earnings ratio of 17 to 19. This seems a hefty valuation multiple, 
but this can be compensated by the firm’s future growth potential. The mean forecast error 
may seem small at -0.35%, but when we multiply this by the price-earnings ratio, it implies 
an error of about six percent of EPS. Although exceptional, momentum can exceed -100% 
in the case that the market is significantly up, while the stock is hammered. Although not 
revealed in the table, losses in the prior year occur in only 6.19% of the observations, 
which is partly due to the fact that we exclude penny stocks. This low percentage could 
hint at self-selection bias or analysts dropping coverage when news flow becomes bad. 
We find slightly more positive than negative or zero forecast errors (50.41% vs. 
49.59%115), thus pulling the median forecast error to zero. This compares to Brown et al. 
(1987) who detect negative skewness in analyst forecast errors. Conversely, Abarbanell 
and Lehavy (2003) find slight positive skewness or analyst pessimism with a share of 48% 
positive and 52%116 negative or zero forecast errors. The symmetry that we find could 
result from more effective earnings expectations management and legislative changes like 
                                                 
115 This 49.59% consists of 45.58% negative forecast errors and 4.01% zero forecast errors 
116 This number consists of 40% negative forecast errors and 12% zero forecast errors 
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the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Furthermore, we also find more negative than positive momentum 
(55.33% to 44.77%) compared to the market index, which suggests that selection bias does 
not play a major role in our sample. In other words, analysts do not seem to restrict their 
coverage to stocks with positive momentum. 
In line with prior research, we also find a higher magnitude of negative forecast 
errors (mean of -1.53% vs. +0.81%), which pulls the mean into negative territory (-0.35%). 
Also, the frequency of large negative vs. large positive surprises is higher, while we do not 
detect middle asymmetry i.e. a higher amount of small positive surprises vs. small negative 
surprises. We also put these forecast errors into historical perspective as shown by graphs 
7.3.1 and 7.3.2. These suggest that more negative forecasts errors coincide with major 
event, such as the September 11th attacks in 2001, the slowdown in the US housing 
markets as of 2007 and finally the financial crisis as of 2008. The forecast dispersion is 
quite stable until 2007, but significantly widens hereafter. This divergence suggests higher 
uncertainty and, with hindsight, could be considered a red flag. In addition, the 
denominator effect or stock de-rating could also have contributed to this widening gap. 
Finally, table 7.3.4 shows the correlation matrix. Overall, correlation coefficients 
between the dependent and independent variables are low, which mitigates the risk of 
multicollinearity. However, we find a high a correlation between actual respectively 
forecast EPS and prior year EPS respectively prior period consensus EPS. This suggests 
that it seems a logical move to use the latter117 as anchor variables. Correlation of the 
anchor variables with forecasting error is low though, thus suggesting that the adjustment 
process rather than the starting point is mainly to blame for these EPS inaccuracies. The 
low negative118 correlation between forecast error and the earnings forecast is surprising, 
as the latter is part of the definition of the former. This can only be explained if changes in 
forecasts are joined by changes in actual EPS, so there is a combined instead of standalone 
effect on forecast error. However, if forecasts tend to be static or do not change119, this 
does not mean that actual EPS does not come in higher or lower either. Furthermore, we 
observe positive correlation between our long-term and short-term risk proxies, i.e. EPS 
volatility and forecast dispersion, and between the news variables i.e. prior quarter EPS 
surprise and stock momentum. 
 
                                                 
117 Note that we substitute prior year EPS by prior period consensus EPS when testing for robustness 
118 Our definition of forecast error implies that the higher the forecast vs. the actual number, the more negative the 
forecast error 
119 One could argue that analysts do not like major earnings revisions, as this implies that you were wrong in your 
assumptions about the company 
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7.3.2 Pooled regression analysis 
Table 7.3.5 summarizes the pooled regression results with EPS forecasts as the 
dependent variable. It shows that by only including prior year EPS, we can explain some 
23% of the annual EPS forecast. Overall, each variable adds explanatory power to up to 
one third of the forecast EPS, in particular the inclusion of momentum. The constant term 
is also significantly positive as expected, albeit declining to 1.33% when more variables 
are added. Although this is well above zero, Treasury Bills would yield higher returns, thus 
suggesting innate pessimism rather than optimism with regard to current earnings 
potential120. 
Except for positive events, all coefficients are significant and their signs can be 
reconciled with earlier work and theory. Coefficients for prior year EPS are positive and 
both economically and statistically significant. The higher coefficient for prior year losses 
compared to prior year profits indicates that analyst tend to be more cautious when starting 
from a bad year, which seems very intuitive as well.  
With regard to risk, results are ambiguous with a positive coefficient for past five-
year EPS volatility and a negative coefficient for forecast dispersion. It suggests that 
analysts interpret long-term risk as upside potential and short-term uncertainty as downside 
risk. Similarly, the negative coefficient for prior quarter earnings is counterintuitive, but 
not significant. However, analysts could have strategic reasons to lower full year EPS 
forecasts following a better than expected quarter, as this enables management to continue 
positive EPS surprises. Alternatively, management itself may downplay expectations 
rather than inflate earnings expectations. Richardson et al. (2004) empirically tested this 
“earnings-guidance game” and indeed found evidence of long-term optimism and short-
term pessimism. The coefficient for good momentum is neither stable in terms of direction 
nor significant.  
Finally, the significant positive size coefficient implies higher forecast for bigger 
firms, thus supporting the strategic bias arguments of Lin and McNichols (1998) and 
Dugar and Nathan (1995). Economic significance of size is also high, as it captures half of 
the earnings yield for the average-sized firm.  
                                                 
120 However, one could be optimistic on future earnings growth or on the cost of capital 
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We have disentangled how each of the independent variables impacts actual 
respectively forecast EPS. For those coefficients that are statistically significant, signs are 
the same between the two regressions. The contradictory signs for positive earnings 
surprises are not significant, which could be conditional on the magnitude121.  
When we analyze the difference between the two or the forecast error, we find a 
significantly negative constant term, thus implying innate optimism. Moving to the anchor 
variable or prior year EPS, only positive prior year EPS numbers have significance. The 
negative coefficient implies that by anchoring too heavily to prior year earnings, forecasts 
become too optimistic. Similar to Gu and Wu (2003), we find a significantly positive 
coefficient for size. This higher pessimism or less optimism for bigger firms translates into 
higher than expected realized EPS figures or positive respectively less negative forecast 
errors.  
With regard to the risk proxies, dispersion is no longer significant, but its long-term 
counterpart is. It suggests that past years’ earnings volatility is too much considered an 
upside opportunity rather than downside risk, thus leading to inflated forecasts. 
Similar to the standalone actual and forecast EPS regressions, coefficients for good 
events, either earnings or stock-price related, are not significant and imply underreaction 
rather than the widely documented overreaction effect. Conversely, the positive 
coefficients for bad events are significant and imply underreaction to these negative events, 
in line with prior empirical evidence, such as Ali et al. (1992) and Abarbanell and Bernard 
(1992).  
7.3.3 Time varying regression analysis  
Including year-effects in the regression, explanatory power of the forecast error 
more than doubles to 7.35%. Following major events, such as September 11th in 2001 and 
the US housing market and financial crisis in 2007 and 2008, we see a more negative 
forecast-error adjustment. The results of the Wald-test imply that the year-coefficients are 
significantly different from each other at the 1% significance level.  
                                                 
121 Trueman (1994) and Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) suggest that this ambiguity could be related to the size of 
the earnings surprise 
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Table 7.3.7: Regression Forecast Error and Year Effects 
 
Dependent variable: Forecast Error  
(1-DLOSS)*EPS_PRIOR -0.0482 *** 
DLOSS*EPS_PRIOR -0.0044  
EPSVOL -0.0014 ** 
DISP -0.0080  
DGOOD_EPS*SURPRISE 0.1288  
(1-DGOOD_EPS)*SURPRISE 0.4782 *** 
(DGOOD_MOM)*MOM 0.0102 ** 
(1-DGOOD_MOM)*MOM 0.0210 *** 
LNSIZE 0.0013 *** 
FPE_YEAR=2000 = C(10) -0.0091 *** 
FPE_YEAR=2001 = C(11) -0.0167 *** 
FPE_YEAR=2002 = C(12) -0.0087 *** 
FPE_YEAR=2003 = C(13) -0.0052 *** 
FPE_YEAR=2004 = C(14) -0.0069 *** 
FPE_YEAR=2005 = C(15) -0.0066 *** 
FPE_YEAR=2006 = C(16) -0.0077 *** 
FPE_YEAR=2007 = C(17) -0.0128 *** 
FPE_YEAR=2008 = C(18) -0.0198 *** 
FPE_YEAR=2009 = C(19) -0.0005  
Adjusted R2 0.0736  
   
Wald-test that Year Coefficients C(10) to C(19) are equal 
Test Statistic Value Probability 
F-statistic 8.1102 0 
Note: Forecast Error is scaled to a min. share price of USD 5.00 and winsorized at 1 and 99%. D stands for 
dummy, EPSVOL for annual EPS volatility over the past five years, DISP for forecast dispersion (high-low). 
SURPRISE for the actual less forecast quarterly EPS in the prior quarter. MOM is the cumulative market 
outperformance of the stock in the past 3 months. LNSIZE equals the natural log of a firm's market value. 
Asterisks imply significance levels of 10, 5 and 1% (*, **, ***). White cross-section adjusted standard errors. 
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Figure 7.3.3: Year-effects Forecast Errors 2000-2009 
 
Note: FE stands for Forecast Error, which is scaled to the share price. 
 
We have also investigated the impact of varying the forecast horizon and its impact 
on the forecast error. We run separate regressions for a sample excluding forecast window 
four i.e. forecasts one-year ahead, for which we set the default earnings dispersion at zero. 
In other words, when we run separate regressions by forecast horizon, we only include 
horizons up to 270 days ahead. The results are summarized in table 7.3.8.  
Despite the loss of observations, explanatory power is similar or strongly improves 
when narrowing the forecast window. We can better explain forecasting error the shorter 
the forecast horizon. The constant term or innate optimism bias found earlier is no longer 
significant, except for forecasts from 180 to 270122 days ahead. The latter could have to do 
with the fact that most companies will not have reported their half-year results yet by that 
time, which can be considered a first reality check for the analysts’ full year forecasts. If 
any, bias is caused by anchoring and adjustment or strategic concerns (size).  
When we pool all observations for the three forecasts windows together i.e. 
forecasts of no more than three quarters ahead, we find the following results. Anchoring to 
the prior year EPS is significant for longer forecast horizons when it concerns profits. For 
shorter horizons up to 180 days ahead, analysts seem to hang on too heavily on the prior 
                                                 
122 The mean (median) forecast horizon amounts to 200 (193) days ahead for forecast window 3, 111 (104) days 
ahead for forecast window 2 and 42 (37) days for forecast window 1.  
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year loss and this pessimism results into positive forecast errors. For medium to long-term 
forecast horizons, the size coefficient is small but positive, thus implying less pessimism 
for smaller firms. If smaller firms are less predictable due to less publicly available 
information, a more positive or less negative analyst stance could pay off in better 
management access, as Das et al. (1998) argue.  
Analysts do not seem to take a consistent approach towards risk during the forecast 
cycle. For longer forecast horizons, long-term risk or EPS volatility is too much considered 
an upside opportunity, thus leading to too optimistic forecasts and disappointing actual 
results. Conversely, for short-tem horizons of no more than 90 days ahead, EPS volatility 
is too much considered a downside. The short-term risk appetite as reflected by the 
dispersion measure seems more consistent. When statistically significant, dispersion is 
overly considered an upside opportunity rather than a downside risk. Our findings of 
bigger negative annual EPS surprises for stocks with higher forecast dispersion could also 
result from a higher use of (wrong) private information by weaker analysts. Trueman 
(1994) argued that weak analysts are more inclined to use their private information instead 
of herding when earnings volatility is greater. However, economic significance is very low 
of these risk variables.  
When we move to the news events, we find a significant sensitivity to bad prior 
quarter earnings surprises and, to a lesser extent, bad stock momentum. Similar to findings 
by Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003), analysts seem to underreact to both. Surprisingly, we 
also find underreaction to positive quarterly earnings surprises for short forecast horizons 
of 90 days or less ahead. This reluctance could stem from strategic reasons i.e. analysts 
pleasing management by giving them room to beat estimates at the full year results 
announcement. We also find signs of overreaction to good momentum for the short 
forecast horizons. 
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7.3.4 Cross-sectional regression analysis forecast errors 
We have redone the regressions on three separate levels comprising analyst, 
industry and firm specific data. For brevity and comparability with other research, we 
narrow our discussion to forecast errors only. The lack of continuation of both analysts and 
firms causes a high loss of observations. When requiring a common sample of at least 25 
respectively 50 observations per analyst, we only keep 1,374 (27%) respectively 693 
(14%) out of 5,073 analysts. For firms, the picture looks better, as we end up with 57% 
(535 out of 930 firms) when requiring at least 50 observations on all variables. With regard 
to industries, we lack sufficient data on industry groups 1, 5, 16 and 20, which comprise 
agriculture, tobacco products, textiles and fabricated products. Listed companies with good 
analyst coverage are hard to find in these specific sectors. 
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Panels A and B in table 7.3.9 show the characteristics of the analyst-specific 
regression. There is a striking difference with regard to innate bias or the constant term. 
For analysts for whom we have fewer observations, we see more innate optimism, while 
the opposite is true for analysts for whom we have more observations. Furthermore, the 
former tend to anchor to prior year EPS. If the latter uses a (more complex) bottom-up 
approach for constructing estimates123, the separate components of prior year EPS are 
relevant rather than the aggregated number.  
Except for the risk proxies and good momentum, the majority of coefficients are 
significantly positive rather than negative. We have tested if the constant and median 
coefficients are significantly different from zero124 and if there is a significant difference 
between bad and good news events. Trueman (1994) argues that when explanatory power 
is very high125 i.e. when error terms are low when explaining an analyst’s individual 
forecasts, this could be a sign of herding. He also argues that a low coefficient on historical 
earnings volatility suggests herding. In our analyst-specific regression, however, we find a 
significant coefficient on past earnings volatility, although the term is not significant when 
performing industry or firm level regressions.   
Except for bad EPS surprises, all (median) coefficients are significant and we also 
find asymmetry between good and bad news. In line with prior research by Easterwood 
and Nutt (1999) and Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003), we find underreaction to negative 
news i.e. the positive coefficient suggests a higher EPS shortfall given negative EPS or 
stock momentum. However, we also find that analysts underreact rather than overreact to 
positive news. On an individual basis, we have more negative coefficients on positive 
stock momentum, but the associated overstated EPS forecasts are more than offset by 
underestimated EPS for the other positive coefficient stocks with good momentum. The 
size coefficient is also relevant on an analyst level and the positive coefficient corroborates 
with strategic bias driven by management access rather than potential fees from corporate 
deals.  
On the industry level (Panel C), we find neither significant innate optimism nor less 
cautious earnings estimates for smaller firms. Size effects if any seem to balance out, as 
neither the median nor mean coefficient are significant. In addition, the insignificant 
positive coefficient for prior year EPS suggests no anchoring to this variable on the 
industry level. It could imply that industry forecasts are built from bottom up and based on 
macro-economic variables, legislation and market structure. EPS volatility or long-term 
                                                 
123 One could think of this as starting with estimating volumes and prices per product group, and estimating the 
cost price by estimating raw material prices, wage inflation and labor productivity, marketing e.g. 
124 If earnings forecasts are the dependent variable, we test if the median coefficient for the earnings surprise 
differs from one   
125 The mean (median) adjusted R2 equals to 18% (15%) on the analyst_min50 level. On the firm level, mean and 
median adjusted R2 are around 50%.  
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risk is significant and tend to be perceived as upside potential, unlike short-term risk (not 
significant). Regardless of the direction of the news, we find underreaction and asymmetric 
responses to recent EPS surprises.  
Finally, panel D shows the results when performing regressions on a firm-by-firm 
level. The median constant term implies innate pessimism, although the mean does not 
significantly point south. We also detect anchoring and a size effect. The negative size 
coefficient implies optimism, which is lower rather than higher the smaller the firm. The 
risk attitude seems more cautious, with no significant optimism towards long-term risk and 
a too prudent view on the short-term risk proxy. We only find significant overreaction to 
bad momentum, which is more intense than the (under)reaction to good momentum.  
Overall, we find conflicting results with regard to innate bias, anchoring, risk 
attitude and responses to recent news for the pooled, time varying and cross-sectional 
regressions. This could also explain why market reactions are not always in the same 
direction as analyst forecast errors. Except for the firm regressions, we find that innate 
optimism prevails. We do not find support for anchoring for analysts with a long track 
record on well-covered firms or across industries. This could suggest a more bottom-up 
approach for constructing EPS estimates. The risk proxies reveal that long-term volatility 
is considered an upside opportunity, while short-term risk or forecast dispersion is taken 
more cautiously. Finally, we mostly find underreaction to news, whether good or bad, 
albeit the degree of underreaction is conditional on the direction i.e. asymmetry. Table 
7.3.9 summarizes the findings of our pooled and cross-sectional regression results with 
forecast error as the dependent variable.  
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7.3.5 Robustness checks 
As a robustness check, we have substituted prior year (annual) EPS by the 
consensus EPS forecast as constructed from the prior quarter for the firm, which is also 
publicly known information. We avoid endogeneity issues by using consensus in the prior 
quarter. Trueman (1994) states that analysts have a tendency to release forecasts closer to 
prior earnings expectations rather than fully incorporate their private information. This 
herding behavior is particularly more likely to happen the weaker the analyst and the less 
volatile earnings are. Amir and Ganzach (1998) also argue that analysts’ earnings may not 
be independent from each other, but rather anchored to previously issued forecasts by other 
brokers. Campbell and Sharpe (2009) also find that expert consensus forecasts on macro-
economic variables are systematically biased toward the value of releases in previous 
months.  
For each forecast window, we calculate a consensus estimate, which is based on the 
most recent forecasts of the analysts following the firm in that quarter. If an analyst issues 
a forecast for the firm in the prior forecast window, but does not follow up in the current 
one, he is no longer included. IBES would include forecasts until they are notified that the 
stock is no longer covered, thus increasing the risk of stale forecasts in its summary 
statistics. By using only recent estimates, we believe that the risk of stale estimates is 
mitigated126.  
As analysts are more reluctant to forecast losses, we no longer distinguish between 
a negative and positive value of the anchor. Logically, we follow the same approach when 
comparing the regression results with the prior year EPS anchor, as shown in table 7.3.11. 
Furthermore, we exclude forecasts to up to a year ahead, we set the prior quarter 
consensus (i.e. five quarters before the earnings release date) at the prior year EPS. This 
suggests that analyst do not make sophisticated estimates of earnings in year t+1, until the 
EPS for year t is released. If the anchoring and adjustment weights are indeed time, firm 
and analyst invariant and consensus would already fully reflect these heuristics and biases 
(innate, selection or strategic), none of the other regression coefficients or the constant 
term should be significant127. 
                                                 
126 Trueman (1994) states that in order for consensus forecasts to be an informative measure for market 
expectations, simply averaging individual forecasts is inappropriate, as one should account for the timing of an 
earnings forecast. Chen et al. (2005) attach more weights to more recent forecasts. 
127 By construction, we have set consensus equal to prior year EPS for forecast windows beyond nine months to 
up to a year ahead, so exclude this forecast window when comparing coefficients with those based on prior year 
EPS 
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Overall, we cannot better explain forecasting errors by substituting prior year EPS 
by consensus estimates128 . Unless we include period fixed effects, the constant term is no 
longer significantly negative when excluding forecasts horizons of more than 270 days 
ahead i.e. forecast window four. The negative coefficient to the anchor variables indeed 
suggests that the market too heavily weights on this number. We still find significant 
underreaction to bad news and a size effect, so this seems a persistent among analysts 
rather than balancing out on the aggregate level.  
As an alternative to EPS volatility data, we have also calculated the five-year 
historical volatility in return on equity for the 48 industry groups, as defined by Fama and 
French. In order to calculate return on equity, we have retrieved data from the Compustat 
database (items ibcom and ceq) and require common equity to be positive. The inclusion 
of this alternative long-term earnings volatility measure increases the number of 
observations as we lacked IBES-data of five-year EPS history for a large amount of firms. 
The use of industry statistics enables us to keep young companies on board with no or a 
very short earnings history. 
                                                 
128 Due to lack of sufficient observations for some analyst-firm pairs, we only show period fixed and no cross-
section fixed effects 
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Overall, the sign of significant coefficients and the constant term are the same, 
except for the long-term risk proxy. Forecast errors become more negative the larger the 
firm’s earnings volatility, while becoming more positive when industry risk is used in the 
equation. This suggests that industry risk is perceived as a downside and firm-specific risk 
as an upside opportunity. The cautious view on industry risk is partly offset by 
underestimated short-term risk or forecast dispersion.  
Our final robustness check is also inspired by Trueman (1994), who suggests that 
reactions could be different for extreme earnings surprises. We narrow our scope to 
extreme quarterly EPS surprises in the prior quarter, which is publicly known information, 
and define extremeness as the top and bottom decile EPS surprises. As we already divided 
the sample in extremely high and extremely low EPS numbers respectively extremely 
positive and extremely negative quarterly forecast errors, we no longer have a dummy that 
refers to the direction of the EPS surprise.  
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Table 7.3.13: Robustness check: Extreme earnings surprises 
 
Dependent variable: Forecast Error a) 
Sample: Extremely 
high EPS 
SURPRPISE 
 Extremely 
low EPS 
SURPRISE  
 
C 0.0015  -0.0077 *** 
(D_LOSS)*EPS_PRIOR a) -0.0609 *** -0.0374 *** 
(1-D_LOSS)*EPS_PRIOR a) 0.0118 ** -0.0493 *** 
EPSVOL -0.0005 ** 0.0009 *** 
DISP a) -0.0136 *** -0.0179 * 
SURPRISE a) -0.0397  0.4820 *** 
(DGOOD_MOM)*MOM -0.0152 *** -0.0044  
(1- DGOOD_MOM)*MOM 0.0272 *** 0.0263 *** 
LNSIZE 0.0002  0.0009 *** 
     
Adjusted R2 0.0259  0.0663  
N 11,476  11,258  
     
Descriptives sample Mean Median Mean Median 
EPS_ACTUAL a) 0.0588 0.0744 0.0297 0.0489 
EPS_PRIOR a) 0.0648 0.0709 0.0638 0.0699 
EPSFC a) 0.0584 0.0721 0.0396 0.0528 
FE_P5 a) 0.0004 0.0019 -0.0099 -0.0014 
Note: The subscript a) refers to price-scaled variables, conditional on a minimum share price of USD 5.00. In 
addition, we have winsorized FE at 1 and 99%. D stands for dummy, EPSVOL for annual EPS volatility over the 
past five years. DISP stands for forecast dispersion (highest -lowest estimate). SURPRISE equals the difference 
between actual and forecast quarterly EPS in the prior quarter. MOM stands for the past cumulative market 
outperformance in the past 3 months. Asterisks identify significance levels of 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
White cross-section adjusted standard errors. 
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First of all, we remark that the prior year EPS is not materially different between 
extremely positively and extremely negatively surprising firms. In other words, negative 
(positive) surprises are not necessarily preceded by bad (good) years. The negative 
coefficients for prior year losses in both subsamples suggests that analysts tend to be too 
conservative in those situations, thus leading to positive or less negative forecast errors. 
Conversely, when prior year earnings are positive, analysts on negatively surprising firms 
tend to anchor too heavily to this, unlike the extremely positively surprising firms. Other 
differences regarding extremely negative surprises stem from underreaction to prior 
quarter earnings surprises and momentum. This is only partly offset by a conservative 
stance to EPS volatility and positive size effect. Extremely positive surprises are higher 
when prior year profits are higher, albeit partly offset by a too positive view on risk, 
overreaction to good momentum and underreaction to bad momentum.   
7.4 Summary and Discussion 
In this chapter, we empirically investigated the impact of heuristics or specifically 
anchoring and adjustment on analysts’ earnings forecasts. Apart from determining the most 
optimal weights for the anchor, risk and news variables on an aggregate basis, we 
investigated time and cross-sectional differences. Overall, our findings imply the use of 
heuristics and various biases are incorporated in analysts’ earnings forecasts for which 
their multi-task environment may be to blame. Otherwise said, as analysts have to please 
many internal and external clients, they may fall prey to such cognitive errors.  
We find signs of innate optimism in analysts’ EPS forecasts, except when firm-
specific regressions are run or when forecast horizons are no more than half a year ahead. 
The former could result from our narrow scope to widely covered firms. For such firms, it 
is more difficult to establish a close relation with management as investor relation officers 
come in between. This makes it easier to issue more critical or less optimistic estimates 
and hence could account for the significant pessimism in our firm results. This is further 
supported by our findings of more pessimism or less optimism for bigger firms. The fading 
out of optimism for shorter forecast horizons could imply that analysts perform a reality 
check after the release of the half-year results.  
Conversely, anchoring to prior year EPS seems most pronounced on the firm-level, 
although we note that on the analyst level, we have not included their full coverage, but 
only the widely followed stocks. On the industry level and among well-represented 
analysts in the sample, signs of anchoring are absent or weak. This could suggest that a 
more complex bottom-up approach is used. Instead of taking last year’s prices, volumes, 
cost base, taxes and financing structure as a starting point, estimates evolve from 
identifying macro-economic factors, demand and supply trends, raw material price 
developments, capacity utilization, labor productivity, wage developments e.g.  
 153 
 
Furthermore, we find ambiguous results with regard to risk. Long-term risk or EPS 
volatility is perceived a positive element or upside potential, while short-term risk is taken 
negatively. March and Shapira (1987) find that managers tend to view risk from a 
downside perspective rather than upside potential, but do not link this to forecast horizon. 
Our evidence mainly points at underreaction to news and asymmetry between good 
and bad news. The underreaction to bad momentum is larger than to good momentum, 
while the underreaction to bad earnings is often insignificant and below the underreaction 
to good earnings. Moving to extreme earnings surprises, those that are extremely negative 
in the prior quarter, filter through in negative annual EPS surprises as well. Too heavy 
anchoring to prior year profits and underreaction to quarterly news, including stock 
momentum is to blame. Overreaction is only found to bad news in the firm-specific 
analyses.  
The use of consensus EPS as an anchor does not materially change results on an 
aggregate basis and implies that this alternative measure does not neutralize innate bias, 
different risk attitudes or improper reactions to news. Conversely, the use of an industry- 
instead of company specific long-term risk measure translates into higher innate optimism. 
This is offset by a too conservative view on this long-term risk proxy, which is opposite 
the optimistic view on its company specific risk measure.   
Finally, when we narrow our scope to the most extreme quarterly earnings 
surprises, we find too much pessimism when losses were incurred in the prior year and 
underreaction to negative momentum, regardless of the sign of the extreme surprise. Also, 
we find a too high reliance on prior year profits for negatively surprising firms, while 
short-term risk and prior quarter earnings surprises are underestimated.  
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8 Summary and directions for future research 
Abstract 
Inspired by ample anecdotal evidence from the investment industry, we felt “a 
spontaneous urge” to investigate irrationality at company management, investors and 
financial intermediaries. This dissertation was focused on extreme management 
confidence, abnormal stock return opportunities and anchoring and insufficient adjustment 
to news by security analysts. Our research was exploratory in nature and based on data 
from the past three decades from the 80s, 90s and the 2000 years. However, in the next 
sections, we will put our results into today’s and tomorrow’s context and suggest 
directions for further research. 
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8.1 Measurement and impact of extreme confidence 
8.1.1 Main results and findings 
This study investigates to what extent extreme confidence of either management or 
security analysts may impact financial or operating performance. We construct a 
multidimensional degree of company confidence measure from a wide range of corporate 
decisions. We empirically test this measure for large US companies from 1980 -2008 and 
find significantly different company and performance characteristics between confidence 
extremes. Diffident firms tend to be smaller, more distressed, less conservatively financed 
and, except for the new millennium, yield a lower return on invested capital with higher 
variability.  
In addition, we find significantly lower, mostly negative, risk adjusted stock returns 
preceding and in the year of change to low confidence vs. the ones that move to upper 
confidence level. The new millennium shows an opposite pattern though. This turbulent 
decade started with unprecedented peaks in stock valuation and ended with huge asset 
markdowns. Following shifts to extreme confidence levels, we find weak support of return 
reversals, albeit insufficient to compensate in full. The strategy “Buy on the Rumor, Sell 
on the Fact” could pay off, but requires perfect foresight of company confidence levels a 
year in advance  
Extreme confidence could also distort earnings forecasts as analyst may overly rely 
on an anchor or make insufficient adjustments. Innate bias, anchoring to prior year 
earnings, risk attitude and responses to recent news are conditional on the level of analysis. 
Innate optimism prevails on the industry and analyst level. We find no support for 
anchoring by analysts with a long track record or across industries, which suggests a 
bottom-up approach. Long-term risk is considered as upside and short-term risk as 
downside potential. There is also a tendency to underreact to news, the extent of which 
seems conditional on the direction. 
In the next sections, we will take a closer look at our main results and put these in 
today’s and tomorrow’s perspective.  
8.1.2 Diffidence deserves more attention 
Any bias is a human trait and with it comes the challenge of finding an unbiased or 
objective way of measuring it. We attempted to do so by taking various corporate actions 
as a starting point, subsequently combining this information with theoretical and empirical 
research on overconfidence and hence inferring a degree of confidence. In our definition of 
high (low) confidence, we included both risk and return characteristics, which resulted in 
overestimating (underestimating) the net present value of certain management actions. 
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Unlike prior research, we did not only narrow our scope to overconfidence, but also 
explicitly included its negative or diffidence. In our view, this area demands more 
attention, particularly as we found that diffidence can have a major negative impact on a 
company’s performance as measured by return on invested capital and abnormal stock 
returns. Conversely, we did not find such negative effects for overconfidence.  
Although diffidence is more likely to translate into a passive stance and probably 
for this reason considered less attractive from a research perspective, this does not imply 
that there is no impact on the bottom line either. Conversely, we found that diffidence is 
detrimental for performance based on both accounting and market-based measures. 
Although this may be a sufficient justification for devoting more research attention in this 
area, the fear of being qualified as “Dr. Doom” may have a deterring effect. However, this 
is not about bringing the bad news, but rather how to prevent such undesirable situations 
from diffidence to materialize. Take the example of countervailing power, such as 
investors pushing management to embark on share buyback programs or risky projects 
instead of sitting on a cash pile. However, this resistance is not institutionalized and 
management cannot be formally held to give in to such demands. As investors themselves 
are not immune to bias either, it may sometimes be a better strategy to ignore or exploit 
such market signals, as Baker et al. (2004) argue.   
8.1.3 Countervailing powers to confidence …  
Although corporate governance is an institutionalized mechanism and a potential 
source of countervailing power to management, it tends to be focused on addressing 
agency problems. It contains management’s locus of control or their freedom to make bold 
moves like acquisitions. In additional, risk management and compliance systems should 
act as a countervailing power to contain excessive behavior.  
We could extend our analysis by adding a measure for measuring the existence of 
countervailing powers, such as the governance score developed by Gompers et al. (2003). 
They combine a large set of governance provisions into an index which is used as a proxy 
for shareholder strength. In the extremes, they distinguish democracies (G-score <=5) and 
dictatorships (G-score >=14). They empirically investigate the relation between this index 
and corporate performance and find that a long-short strategy in low-high governance 
score portfolios clearly pays off. It generates high abnormal returns of 8.5% a year based 
on Carhart’s (1997) four factor model.  
We would predict that companies which score low on this metric i.e. those who do 
not restrict shareholder’s power are less prone to extreme forms of confidence in both 
directions. We empirically found significantly lower profitability in terms of EBIT margin 
and return on invested capital and a higher distress risk as indicated by a higher share of 
loss making firms and higher book equity to market equity ratio for the lower confidence 
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extreme. As diffidence in particular seems more detrimental than overconfidence, we 
would expect that higher shareholder involvement mitigates the risk of moving to this 
negative territory. In other words, we would also predict asymmetry or higher 
underrepresentation of diffident compared to overconfident companies when the corporate 
governance score is low and vice versa when the corporate governance score is high.  
8.1.4 …and reinvigorating powers to confidence 
Contrary to mitigating factors to confidence extremes, we can also observe 
organizational procedures that encourage high confidence, such as the selection process for 
electing new CEOs. Goel and Thakor (2008) develop a model that shows that an 
overconfident manager is more likely to become CEO. Furthermore, management share 
and options plans are mainly criticized for inducing risky behavior. However, the structure 
of compensation contracts could also be an effective tool to prevent management from 
exhibiting low confidence, as the latter is likely to be penalized by negative abnormal 
stock returns. In the model by Goel and Thakor (2008) an even more dramatic scenario in 
which the CEO is dismissed when extremely confident or extremely diffident. We could 
empirically test if this is the case, although it may be hard to have sufficient observations 
to achieve significance. We could increase this by assuming that takeovers of extreme 
confidence firms where the CEO moves to a non-executive function as a special case of 
forced resignation.  
In forthcoming work by Gervais et al. (2011), the authors investigate how 
compensation contracts could optimally adjust to overconfidence effects on the firm. They 
model that if a manager is mildly overconfident, firm value increases by offering less 
convex contracts or a lower share of performance-based compensation. Conversely, when 
a manager exhibits extreme overconfidence, highly convex contracts are more optimal, as 
these are overvalued by the manager. This may seem hard to defend as the high share of 
variable compensation is also blamed for being the culprit behind the 2008 financial crisis, 
from which we have yet to recover. The absence of claw back provisions i.e. repayment of 
(part) of bonuses when things go sour, encouraged excessive risk taking and myopic 
behavior in search of short-term gains. We could also incorporate the structure of the 
compensation contract of the CEO respectively all executive members to empirically test if 
there is a relation with our degree of confidence measure. 
In addition to internal procedures, there is a role for government bodies. In this 
respect, take the example of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. This new legislation made 
senior executives individually responsible for accuracy and completeness of corporate 
financial reports, but it also tempered their animal spirits. This may have affected the 
results of our period specific regressions, which showed no significant CAR differences 
between confidence extremes and highly negative CARs for high confidence firms on a 
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standalone basis in the same year. Conversely, the government can also encourage 
entrepreneurship by offering subsidies or guarantees. During the financial crisis, 
government guarantees were put in place to induce banks to perform their core business of 
lending. However, such measures also carry the risk of moral hazard by offering a bail-out 
option when things go wrong.  
8.1.5 Extensions of our measure: dynamism and other industries 
Over the 1980-2008 period as a whole, we found that the average company 
confidence level was low, which may not bode well for the future. Looking at 2008, the 
picture was very gloomy with a very low proportion of high confidence firms. We do not 
dare to speculate if we have reached another tipping point, or that we will face some steady 
years with little changes in the share of high vs. low confidence firms. Paradoxically, the 
number of low confidence firms was not that high either, but the exclusion of financials, 
for technical reasons, could be to blame. In order to extend our degree of confidence to 
financials as well, the take example of redefining investment by including human capital 
(wage costs) rather than production, plant and equipment. Instead of operating leverage, 
tier capital ratios could be considered. Segments could be divided into traditional banking 
or savings and loans business, insurance and investment banking, while accruals could be 
replaced with bad loan provisioning practices.  
Furthermore, our degree of confidence measure is fairly static, although we allowed 
for interaction with prior period investor sentiment. However, we could add more 
dynamics based on self-attribution, as Daniel et al. (1998) used in their investor behavior 
model. This bias implies that confidence is reinvigorated when decisions turn out very 
well, the latter of which can be inferred from higher compensation, higher stock valuation, 
a good earnings track record with positive surprises or positive press coverage. 
Conversely, if feedback is negative, one may blame others or the environment for this, thus 
leaving the manager’s own confidence level intact.  
8.2 Performance Measurement 
8.2.1 Disentanglement of risk and return expectations 
In our definition of confidence we adopted a risk-return perspective. Alternatively, 
confidence could be defined from a risk only or returns-only perspective. In our approach, 
there was no need to disentangle whether corporate decisions were driven by too optimistic 
forecasts on either cash flows, or growth or the discount rate. It is clear that such a 
distinction is more of a challenge and requires more direct input from executives and 
insight of their personal characteristics. Although listed companies share their vision on 
the market developments and margin potential during analyst meetings and strategy 
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updates, we expect reluctance with regard to more detailed information on projects. 
Competitors are also listening and such transparency also makes executives vulnerable 
when such specific targets are communicated. Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we would 
expect listed companies to be more transparent in communicating more details en masse, 
as it becomes too risky to share such information “off the record” in one-on-one meetings 
with investors.  
Goel and Thakor (2008) argue that overconfident managers underinvest in 
acquiring project relevant information, thus increasing the risk of selecting bad projects 
and scrutinizing the quality of information that is used to evaluate the CEO. One could 
argue that management has little leeway to do so, as auditors will require impairments or 
provisions when investments do not live up to expectations. However, they can give 
management, who are also their principals, the benefit of the doubt before requiring such 
dramatic charges. We could empirically test this by constructing a transparency measure 
that reflects whether or not management frequently communicates on projects or a 
portfolio thereof i.e. provides segments guidance and targets. In addition, the information 
that a company provides when making acquisitions, such as price paid, valuation 
multiples, payback time given a certain cost of capital e.g. could be included in this 
measure as well.  
8.2.2 On abnormal return measurement 
As far as investors are concerned, information on risk appetite and attitude is easier 
to extract, as we could take the implied option inferred volatility as a proxy. Furthermore, 
the widely used factor risk premiums on French’ website could be used as an ex post 
indicator. As we looked for the best model fit or factor loadings on market risk, size, book-
to-market and momentum for the full period data rather than on a subsample of data, we 
more or less assumed that factor loadings would not be time-varying by firm. In other 
words, a move to extreme confidence levels is just a temporary drift away from its mean 
risk profile, to which it will revert in the long-term. Alternatively, if we would have 
estimated factor sensitivities by using a sub sample of observations before a change to an 
extreme confidence level, this may have led to distortions as well.  
We are well aware of the joint testing problem i.e. the risk of misspecification of 
the model rather than irrational behavior by investors. Overall, our confidence and investor 
sentiment variables can only explain a minor part of the cumulative abnormal returns, thus 
implying that either there is a lot of noise or that there are some additional systematic 
factors that are yet to be identified. For instance, take the example of temporary drifts from 
speculative behavior.  
Our implicit assumption that the long-term risk profile is the key ingredient of any 
market valuation model implies that fundamentalists dominate speculators. Although we 
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include time-varying required returns as risk premiums vary, allowing for different factor 
loadings would make the model more dynamic. In such a framework, we could also add a 
dominant role of speculators from time to time. However, it continues to be a challenge to 
predict tipping points i.e. when one type of investor starts to dominate the other. We would 
predict a higher difference in returns between confidence extremes when speculators 
dominate the market.   
Finally, we could look at bond returns as an alternative to stock returns. However, 
we have to be cautious in comparing bond returns, as characteristics i.e. duration, 
provisions, credit rating, may heavily differ among and within companies. Next to being 
standardized, shares and associated derivatives are also very liquid, thus reducing the risk 
of market inefficiencies. Although diffident or passive management seems negative for 
shareholders, one could argue that bond holders may encourage such behavior, thus 
implying lower credit spreads. However, as we find that diffidence is associated with more 
distressed situations of lower profitability, we would expect higher spreads instead.  
8.3 Earnings forecast errors  
8.3.1 Analysts to blame… 
Although the lower-level i.e. the analyst, firm and industry specific regressions 
strongly contribute to explaining analyst forecasting errors, there is still room left for 
improvement. The results of our study indicate that the level of analysis is an important 
determinant whether or not innate bias, anchoring and (insufficient) adjustment and under- 
or overreaction occurs. We can come to different conclusions, such as that innate optimism 
at the analyst level, while we observed pessimism at the firm level. The latter implies that 
firms tend to positively surprise, which may be for a reason, such as building a good track 
record. We also found that long-term risk is considered as upside opportunity, while short-
term risk is seen as a downside threat.  
We could extend our regression analysis by adding stock recommendations as a 
dummy variable, as these may also have an impact on analyst estimates. We argue that 
earnings cuts (increases) are more difficult for stocks on which the analyst has a positive 
(negative) stance. Paradoxically, optimistic estimates can coincide with a sell 
recommendation but for very different reasons. It could be fuelled by the need to restore 
management relations, or on the negative hand, put more pressure on management; as the 
earnings bar is raised, it negative earnings surprises become more likely, thus supporting 
the analyst’s negative stance. However, it remains a challenge to unfold the analyst’s true 
underlying view, as this could disrupt the fragile equilibrium of the various parties he or 
she is involved with. 
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If we would have less strict criteria on coverage, we could include smaller firms 
and the individual analyst’s full stock coverage instead of only stocks that are well covered 
by others as well. Moving to a balanced panel would also enable a time-series analysis by 
firm or by analyst and the ability to add dynamics in the framework, such as firm or 
analyst reputation. The less negative the earnings surprises respectively the more accurate 
the earnings forecast, the better the reputation.  
Furthermore, a larger sample would enable us to look how so-called lower levels 
forecast errors develop by forecast horizon. In the pooled regressions, we already saw that 
innate bias was only present at long forecast horizons of up to 270 days ahead, while it 
moved to pessimism for shorter forecast horizons, albeit not significant. In addition, 
anchoring was also most pronounced for longer forecast horizons, while prior year EPS 
seems less important after some releases of interim results. These announcements are 
usually accompanied with more specific earnings guidance, which can become the new 
anchor. In order to test this, we could include management’s earnings guidance as reported 
in press releases or in conference calls. This also brings us to forecast and earnings 
management practices, which could also be to blame for analysts’ forecast errors.  
8.3.2 …or management to blame? 
In this dissertation, we only attributed forecast errors to the analysts, but 
management could also have an important impact by influencing the reported numbers and 
by managing expectations. We only briefly discussed this when we discussed accruals as 
an indicator for confidence. Gu and Wu (2003) also looked at accruals, or specifically the 
unexpected part of it, when controlling for earnings management. It should not be put on 
par with fraud, which is an excessive form of earnings management.  
Earnings management has been widely covered in literature. In their study from 
1985 to 2002, Brown and Caylor (2005) detect a major shift in management focus to 
avoiding negative earnings surprises as of 1996. Before, management’s main priority was 
to avoid earnings losses or year on year earnings declines. As possible explanations of this 
shift, they mention a higher market impact of missing forecasts and better analyst coverage 
and precision. Matsumoto (2002) and Burgstahler and Eames (2006) also explicitly 
mention the phenomenon that management downplays analyst expectations in order to beat 
these hereafter. This would result in a higher frequency of zero or positive surprises and a 
smaller frequency of small negative surprises.  
Forecast management is less explored, as it also requires hand-collection of data, as 
unlike analysts’ forecasts, earnings guidance is not widely gathered in databases. In 
addition to press releases, one could use the transcripts of conference calls, from which 
even more information can be revealed. In press releases, the company’s determines what 
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is communicated, while in the conference, analysts can guide what topics are more 
discussed in detail.  
8.3.3 Forecast errors and market impact 
Our results show that underreaction to news, both earnings and stock price related, 
is also an important driver behind analyst forecast errors. The extent of this underreaction 
seems dependent on the direction, with higher sensitivity to bad news events. However, 
this does not imply that the stock market response in the same way. If analysts would be a 
good proxy for investor expectations, we would expect a similar pattern. Alternatively, we 
could argue that as investors do not work in what Francis and Philbrick (1993) referred to 
as “a multi-task environment”, but only deal with their own goals, bias is not instrumental 
to them. In other words, investors adjust for such biases before making investment 
decisions. In current literature, we find support for both views.  
 Fried and Givoly (1982) find that analyst forecast errors are more closely related 
with security price movements, thus suggesting that analysts’ forecasts are a better 
substitute for market expectations than time-series models. When measuring the market 
impact of equity analysts, Chen et al. (2005) find that investors attach bigger weights on 
the accuracy of an analyst i.e. his forecast error the longer his track record. Abarbanell and 
Bernard (1992) also find that analysts underreact to prior earnings news, but this can only 
explain half of the post-earnings announcement drift. With regard to macro-economic 
news and forecasts thereof, Campbell and Sharpe (2009) find that the market adjusts for 
anchoring in consensus forecasts and react to surprises that cannot be attributed to such 
cognitive errors. However, the use of consensus estimates assumes an equal weighing of 
each analyst forecast, while Chen et al. (2005) suggest that investors differentiate among 
analysts based on their forecast accuracy. Although these studies emphasize one specific 
type of cognitive errors, i.e. reaction to prior news or the use of anchoring and adjustment 
heuristics, we have cleaned analyst forecast errors for various errors, including the 
direction of the news and time-varying risk. We could extend our analysis by testing to 
what extent post-earnings announcement drift can be explained by expected and 
unexpected forecast surprises. For calculating the expected surprise component we use the 
coefficients from our pooled or lower level regression results.  
8.4 Concluding remarks 
Without being extensive, we highlighted various ideas for further research in the 
areas that we discussed in this study. Apart from exploratory analyses, we consider a move 
to predictive models as one of the main challenges for the future of behavioral finance. 
Although we could develop ex ante measures of preferences and expectations of economic 
actors, they do not always put the money where their mouth is. Hence, we believe that 
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actions or the aggregate of revealed preferences and beliefs speak louder. As our degree of 
confidence is based on revealed rather than planned actions, a forward looking view on the 
different components could be used for flagging tipping points in a firm’s stock 
performance. Also, if we could better predict forecast behavior of each individual analyst 
and firm-specific biases in forecasts, we may better anticipate the market’s reaction to 
earnings news. Ironically, this would kill one of the main drivers, i.e. market anomalies, 
behind behavioral finance. Our animal spirits will, however, prevent such predictable 
situations. These animal spirits should be kept alive, as lack thereof or extreme low levels 
of confidence seem the major threat to performance. No guts, no glory.  
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Appendix I: List of variables (in alphabetical order) 
Note: Items refer to Compustat 
Accruals. We follow Sloan (1996) and calculate accruals as the change in non-cash 
working capital (items 4+34-1-5) less depreciation (items 14) and scale this to adjusted 
EBIT. Similar to Sloan, we exclude debt in current liabilities from working capital. We 
winsorize the accruals ratio at (minus) one. 
Acquisitions. We scale acquisition spend to total assets at the start of the year 
(items 129/6).  
Adjusted EBIT. In order to correct for potential distortions by end of year 
acquisitions or divestments, we adjust EBIT. This equals this year’s EBIT margin 
multiplied by last year’s asset turnover. 
Adjusted Earnings per Share (EPS). These EPS numbers are retrieved from the 
detailed IBES database and are adjusted for stock splits, share issues, share buybacks, 
stock dividends e.g 
Asset turnover. This equals total assets to sales (items 12/6). 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR). The cumulative abnormal stock return is 
calculated on a monthly basis and equals the (natural logarithm of the) return in excess of 
the predicted return by using Carhart’s (1997) four factor model. The monthly CARs are 
aggregated to arrive at an annual cumulative abnormal return for the full year.  
Degree of diversification. We determine the degree of diversification by counting 
the number of different business segments, based on the two-digit SIC codes . In case of 
missing data, we look at the number of segments in the prior and following year and if 
acquisitions or divestments have taken place during this period. 
Dispersion (DISP). Dispersion is is a short-term risk proxy and equals the 
difference between the highest and the lowest EPS estimate, measured by quarter and 
based on all available individual forecasts. This measure is scaled to the share price, 
conditional on a minimum (adjusted) share price of USD 5.00.  
Dividend change. First, we calculate the change in dividend per share (item 26).  
Dividend payout ratio. We calculate this ratio by scaling common dividend to 
income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations and preferred dividend (items 
21/237). If a firm is loss-making i.e. the denominator is negative and a dividend is paid, we 
set the payout ratio at one. The payout ratio is winsorized at values between zero and one.  
EBIT margin. This equals Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to sales (Items 
178/12).  
Enterprise Value (EV). EV equals the sum of the market value of equity, preferred 
stock and net debt (items 25*199+130+9+34–1).  
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Enterprise Value to EBITDA ratio. For the enterprise value (EV) to EBITDA 
ratio, we use our earlier calculations of EV respectively EBITDA and winsorize at the 1% 
and 99% percentile for observations with positive EBITDA. Similar to negative earnings 
firms, those with negative EBITDA are assigned the highest EV to EBITDA multiple.   
EPSVOL. This is a long-term risk proxy and equals the volatility in adjusted EPS 
(as documented in IBES) in the past five years. 
Equity risk premium. This equals the return difference between stocks and T-
bonds. Data retrieved from Damodoran’s (2011) website.    
Excess leverage (EXCESS LEV). We control for financial leverage, specifically 
excess leverage vs. the industry average. First, we scale net debt (items 9+34–1) to 
EBITDA (item 13) and relate this to the industry average, based on the two digit SIC code. 
Next, we multiply the difference by the EBITDA to total assets ratio (items 13/6). For loss 
making firms with net cash, we assign a net debt to EBITDA of zero. In case of losses and 
net debt, we set excess leverage to net debt to total assets. Excess leverage is winsorized at 
(minus) one times total assets. 
Financing gap (FINGAP). Financing gap equals income before extraordinary 
items, discontinued operations and preferred dividend plus depreciation less common 
dividend less capex (items 237+14-21-128) less the lower of zero or net debt. (= negative 
if there is net cash). The financing gap is winsorized at (minus) one times the enterprise 
value (EV).  
Forecast Error (FE). We use the commonly used definition of actual minus 
forecast EPS and scale this difference to the share price, conditional on a minimum 
(adjusted) share price of USD 5.00.  
Forward PE. This ratio is calculated for the market as a whole and equals the 
aggregated market capitalization of all stocks for which one-year ahead earnings estimate 
data is available, scaled to the aggregated one-year ahead estimated earnings. The latter 
equals the earnings per share estimate for year t, multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding at the end of the prior book year (t-1). 
Growth (BEME-ratio). We also include growth as a control variable which we 
proxy by the book equity to market equity (BEME) ratio. Book equity is total 
stockholders’ equity less preferred stock plus deferred tax assets (items 216 –130 + 35). 
Market equity equals shares outstanding multiplied by price (items 25*199). We omit 
observations with negative book equity or a market capitalization below USD 20m.  
Invested capital at market value. This equals invested capital (item 37) but 
includes market equity (items 199*25) instead of book equity (items 216 –130 + 35).  
Investment-to-Q-ratio (INVEST). First, we relate the capital expenditures to 
depreciation (items 128/14), which indicates if a company is increasing its tangible 
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production capacity. Second, we scale this number to the market’s growth perception 
which we proxy by the widely recognized Tobin’s Q ratio.  
MOM. This variable measures the stock’s return in the past three months.  
Net debt. This equals long-term debt plus current debt less cash (items 9+34–1).  
Operating leverage (OPLEV). We calculate operating leverage by scaling fixed 
assets to total assets (items 8/6).  
Price to Earnings ratio (PE). This ratio equals price divided by earnings per share 
before exceptional items (items 199/58). and is winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentile of 
observations with positive earnings. Firms with negative earnings are attributed the 
maximum PE ratio, similar to those with marginal profits. 
Return on invested capital at market value (ROIC MV). The numerator of this 
measure consists of EBIT (item 178) less cash tax. (1-cash tax rate) times EBIT (item 
178), divided by invested capital at market value. Cash tax rate equals income tax less 
accrued and deferred taxes (item 16-305-126), divided by pre-tax income (item 170). If not 
between 0 and 1, the income tax cash rate is used or else a 35% default rate. We winsorize 
ROIC MV at (minus) one.  
Return on equity (ROE). This equals income before extraordinary items, 
discontinued operations and preferred dividend, divided by common equity (items 237/60). 
Observations with negative common equity are excluded. 
Share buybacks (SHAREBB). Share buybacks are net of share issues and scaled 
to market capitalization (items (115-108)/(25*199).  
(LN)SIZE. We take the widely used (natural logarithm of a) company’s market 
capitalization (items 199*25) and exclude book values below USD 20m. 
SURPRISE. This equals the share price-scaled forecast error of quarterly EPS or 
the difference between the actual and forecast quarterly EPS. We only included 
observations with a minimum (adjusted) share price of USD 5.00.  
Tobin’s Q ratio. This ratio is calculated as the market to book value of total assets. 
Market value of total assets equals total assets less stockholders equity less deferred tax 
assets plus the market value of common stock and preferred stock (items 6-216-
35+199*25+130).  
 Z-score. This robustness variable equals the aggregate of the separate Z-scores on 
each confidence indicator. If an indicator consists of several underlying variables, the 
normalized scores of each variable is equally weighed. In formula terms: 
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Appendix IIa: Investor sentiment proxies 
Brown and Cliff (2004)  
Brown and Cliff (2004) explore how investor sentiment relates to near-term stock 
market returns. They consider a comprehensive set of sentiment proxies, both direct and 
indirect, explore the relations among these variables and test the relation of sentiment with 
subsequent stock returns. In their paper, they summarize the main direct and indirect 
measures of investor sentiment. Also, they distinguish between individual and institutional 
investors. 
The direct or survey-based measure for individual investor sentiment is inferred 
from a weekly poll as of July 1987 by the American Association of Individual Investors. 
Among each of its members, it asks where the stock market will be in six months; up, 
down or unchanged. The direct proxy for institutional investor sentiment is inferred from 
the Investor Intelligence’s weekly bull-bear spread by investigating approximately 150 
market letters and available on a monthly basis as of 1965. 
The indirect measure is composed of the following components: 
 
x Advance/Decline ratio or the issues up vs. issues down, can be adjusted by 
standardizing with average volumes  
x Monthly percentage change in margin borrowing (published by Fed)  
x Short interest and short sales 
x Ratio of put-call trading volume (from the CBOE) 
x Expected vs. current volatility 
x Closed-end fund discount 
x IPO first day returns and number of IPOs  
x Mutual fund redemptions 
 
Brown and Cliff (2004) face some difficulty when constructing this composite 
measure, as some correlations between de direct and indirect sent measures are 
counterintuitive. In order to deal with this, they filter data a single state variable via the 
Kalman filter and then perform a principal component analysis. They only use the first and 
second Principal Component in their investor sentiment variable.  
All in all, they find that institutional sentiment seems to impact individual investors, 
but not the other way around. Only some weak evidence of a delayed impact of the level 
institutional sentiment on large cap stock returns, Furthermore, they find a negative 
relation between the change in professional investor sentiment and subsequent returns of 
small stocks on a monthly basis.  
 182 
 
Appendix IIb: Investor sentiment proxies 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) also construct a composite investor sentiment measure 
and investigate how investor sentiment could impact cross-sectional differences in stock 
returns. Their indirect proxy for investor sentiment is based on the common variation in six 
underlying proxies for sentiment. The authors make no explicit distinction between 
fundamentalists and speculators or between individual and common market sentiment. The 
six proxies that Baker and Wurgler include are respectively: 
 
x the closed-end fund discount (CEFD) to net asset value 
x the NYSE share turnover (TURN) 
x the number of IPO’s (NIPO) 
x the average first-day returns on IPO’s (RIPO)  
x the equity share in new issues (S) and  
x the premium of dividend payers vs. non-payers (PD-ND).  
 
They perform a principal component analysis with the six proxies and their lags as 
variables and end up with a sentiment index consisting of current standardized variables 
CEFD (negative sign), NIPO’s (positive sign), S (positive sign) and lagged standardized 
variables RIPO (positive sign), turnover (positive sign) and PD-ND (negative sign). The 
signs of these (lagged) variables are intuitive. In addition, they also calculate a clean 
sentiment proxy in which common business cycle effects are removed. Data can be 
retrieved from Wurgler’s website.  
Overall, the authors find that the impact of market-wide investor sentiment on the 
cross-section of stock returns is larger the more subjective and the more difficult to 
arbitrage a stock is. Higher subjectivity suggests more room for behavioral bias to have an 
impact. 
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Appendix III: Gordon growth model (1962) 
The Gordon (1962) growth model for valuing a company’s stock can be summarized by: 
 
gk
DP  
1
0
 
 
where P0 equals the current share price. D1 equals next period’s dividend, k refers to 
the cost of equity and g to the perpetual growth in earnings. When data on expected 
dividend are scarce or lacking, we could proxy next period’s dividend by multiplying last 
period’s dividend payout d with the expected earnings per share (EPS1) or: 
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When we reshuffle the terms in such a way that we have k on the left side and the 
terms on the right side of the equation are E/P. dividend payout ratio and long-term growth 
respectively. Differentiating k to dividend payout respectively PE ratio and growth gives: 
 
∆k = EPS/P *∆d0 + d0 ∆ (EPS/P) +∆g 
 
If both the dividend payout and the long-term growth rate remain unchanged, it 
follows that only the change in earnings yield drives a change in the required rate of return.  
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Nederlandse samenvatting (Dutch summary) 
In deze studie onderzoeken we hoe irrationaliteit in financiële beslissingen gemeten 
kan worden en hoe dit prestaties beïnvloedt, zoals het rendement op geïnvesteerd 
vermogen, abnormale aandelenrendementen en de nauwkeurigheid van 
winstverwachtingen. We beschouwen verschillende type actoren, te weten managers, 
beleggers en aandelenanalisten en bespreken kort welk gedrag voor hen optimaal is. Voor 
managers definiëren we maximalisatie van de netto contante waarde van de vrije 
kasstromen als optimaal. Voor beleggers beschouwen we het streven naar rendementen in 
lijn met de blootstelling aan de vier risicofactoren als onderscheiden door Carhart (1997) 
als optimaal. Tenslotte definiëren we voor aandelenanalisten de minimalisatie van de 
gemiddelde voorspellingsfout als optimale strategie.  
Aan de hand van bestaande theorie en empirisch onderzoek ontwikkelen we een 
alternatieve maatstaf om de mate van management vertrouwen te meten. Hierbij zijn 
daadwerkelijk genomen en niet geplande beslissingen op diverse vlakken leidend. Naast 
onze multidimensionale aanpak, beschouwen we niet alleen een extreem hoge graad van 
vertrouwen, maar ook een extreem lage graad als vertrouwen. Over de periode 1980 tot en 
met 2008, vinden we duidelijk onderscheidende ondernemingskarakteristieken en 
prestatieverschillen tussen deze extremen, welke we als volgt kunnen samenvatten.  
Ondernemingen met extreem laag vertrouwen zijn kleiner, hebben een lagere 
marktwaardering ten opzichte van de boekwaarde, grotere druk op de winstgevendheid, 
minder conservatieve balansverhoudingen en hebben een lager en meer volatiel rendement 
op geïnvesteerd vermogen. We vinden duidelijk lagere en veelal negatieve abnormale 
aandelenrendementen voorafgaand en tijdens een verschuiving naar een extreem lage 
vertrouwensgraad ten opzichte van het andere extreem. Echter, dit lijkt niet te gelden voor 
het nieuwe millennium, waardoor de winstgevendheid van een dergelijke long-short 
strategie niet persistent lijkt. Een groot deel van de abnormale aandelenrendementen blijft 
onverklaard, eveneens na toevoeging van een indicator voor het sentiment van beleggers. 
Dit impliceert dat de markt niet structureel inefficiënt is.  
Tenslotte onderzoeken we of en in hoeverre analisten te veel vasthouden aan een 
anker in hun winstschattingen en of inconsistenties ten opzichte van risico en recent 
nieuws leiden tot hogere voorspellingsfouten. De resultaten verschillen naar gelang het 
niveau van de analyse i.e. geaggregeerd, per analist, per sector of per bedrijf. In de meeste 
gevallen vinden we een neiging tot natuurlijk optimisme en het vasthouden aan de winst in 
het voorgaande jaar als ijkpunt. Daarnaast vinden we een positieve houding ten opzichte 
van lange termijn risico, terwijl korte termijn risico eerder als negatief wordt ervaren. We 
vinden een onderreactie op nieuws, met name recente koersontwikkelingen, terwijl ook de 
aard van het nieuws bepalend kan zijn voor de mate van onderreactie.   
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NO GUTS, NO GLORY?
This study investigates to what extent extreme forms of confidence, from either a
management or an analyst’s perspective, may impact financial or operating performance. 
We construct a multidimensional degree of company confidence measure from a wide
range of corporate decisions. We empirically test this measure for large US companies
from 1980-2008 and find significantly different company and performance characteristics
between confidence extremes. Diffident firms tend to be smaller, more distressed, less
conservatively financed and, except for the new millennium, yield a lower return on
invested capital with higher variability. When adjusting stock returns for risk, the
performance differences prior to moving to extreme confidence become even more
pronounced. 
Analysts’ earnings forecasts may also be distorted by extreme confidence or overly
relying on an anchor and insufficient adjustments. Innate bias, anchoring to prior year
earnings, risk attitude and responses to recent news are conditional on the level of
analysis. Innate optimism prevails on the industry and analyst level. We find no support
for anchoring by analysts with a long track record or across industries, which suggests a
bottom-up approach. Long-term risk is considered as upside, but short-term risk is seen as
downside. There is also a tendency to underreact to news, whether good or bad. If we
could better predict individual analyst’s forecasts, we may better anticipate market
reactions to earnings news. Our animal spirits will prevent this from happening and
should be kept alive, as lack thereof seems the main culprit to performance. No guts, no
glory.
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